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the interpenetration of pain and Hippocratic theories of the body. Chapter One contrasts the Hippocratic
view of pain with the modern understanding of the phenomenon. While the experience of pain is actually
subjective and need not necessarily be associated with a physical cause, Hippocratic authors conceived of pain
as an objective phenomenon that was always caused by material change. The following three chapters of this
project explore the consequences of this relationship between pain and material.
Chapter Two argues that, owing to its connection with material change, Hippocratic pain gains special
semiotic currency: hence, pain is often the crucial or only sign of disease. As a symptom, pain is used to
classify and identify diseases, predict the course or outcome of a disease, determine the type and application
of treatment, and prove important theories, such as the theory of humors.
Chapter Three argues that the strategies whereby the physician perceives the patient's pain rely on - or at least
reveal a belief in - the objectivity of pain experience and expression. Nevertheless, the Hippocratic physician
shaped the phenomenon of pain both by prompting the patient to report only particular, "relevant," pains and
by investing certain dimensions of the pain experience with special significance.
Chapter Four explores what happens to pain when the body within which it operates is "marked" as young or
old, male or female. In some cases, the material etiology and association with change that define pain dictate
how these patients were assumed to have felt (e.g. the bodies of unborn infants must of necessity experience
pain if they undergo change). At the same time, however, assumptions about how marked bodies work can
influence the presentation of pain in these patients (e.g. assumptions about the reliability of children and
women influence how pain in these marked bodies is communicated to the physician).
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ABSTRACT 
HIPPOCRATIC PAIN 
Sarah E. Scullin 
Ralph M. Rosen 
 
This dissertation assesses the manifold functions of pain in the practice of 
Hippocratic medicine and examines the interpenetration of pain and Hippocratic 
theories of the body. Chapter One contrasts the Hippocratic view of pain with 
the modern understanding of the phenomenon. While the experience of pain is 
actually subjective and need not necessarily be associated with a physical cause, 
Hippocratic authors conceived of pain as an objective phenomenon that was 
always caused by material change. The following three chapters of this project 
explore the consequences of this relationship between pain and material. 
Chapter Two argues that, owing to its connection with material change, 
Hippocratic pain gains special semiotic currency: hence, pain is often the crucial 
or only sign of disease. As a symptom, pain is used to classify and identify 
diseases, predict the course or outcome of a disease, determine the type and 
application of treatment, and prove important theories, such as the theory of 
humors. 
Chapter Three argues that the strategies whereby the physician perceives 
the patient’s pain rely on – or at least reveal a belief in – the objectivity of pain 
experience and expression. Nevertheless, the Hippocratic physician shaped the 
phenomenon of pain both by prompting the patient to report only particular, 
 vii 
“relevant,” pains and by investing certain dimensions of the pain experience 
with special significance. 
Chapter Four explores what happens to pain when the body within which 
it operates is “marked” as young or old, male or female. In some cases, the 
material etiology and association with change that define pain dictate how these 
patients were assumed to have felt (e.g. the bodies of unborn infants must of 
necessity experience pain if they undergo change). At the same time, however, 
assumptions about how marked bodies work can influence the presentation of 
pain in these patients (e.g. assumptions about the reliability of children and 
women influence how pain in these marked bodies is communicated to the 
physician). 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The over five dozen texts of the Hippocratic Corpus, ranging in form from 
detailed case studies and personal musings to philosophically and rhetorically 
inclined polemical treatises, reflect many aspects of the thoughts, theories, 
practices and experiences of their anonymous Greek physician-authors. Even a 
cursory perusal of the corpus reveals that the strongest thread holding these 
various texts together is the topic of pain. In a fundamental sense, pain is the 
reason medicine was invented; it is one of the most common and reliable 
indications of disease; it is proof of the theory of humors (the idea that the 
human body is composed of liquids and that health depends on maintaining 
their proper balance); it is even present when it is not mentioned: surgical 
treatises do not mention the pain of the (more often than not) non-medicated 
patient … but they do recommend that strong attendants hold the patients down 
and urge them to stop struggling during surgery. 1 In short, pain is everywhere in 
the corpus. 
Yet the topic of pain in Hippocratic medicine, while treated incidentally in 
explorations of related subjects, has received scant scholarly attention in its own 
right. Rey, in her over 350 pages long History of Pain, devotes a mere 7 pages to 
the Hippocratic view of pain.2 While several scholars have treated the vocabulary 
of pain in the Hippocratic Corpus, most have focused merely on the semantics of 
                                                
1On pain and the invention of medicine, see below, Introduction; on the relationship between 
pain and diseases, see below, Chapter Two; pain as proof of humors: Nature of Man 2; holding the 
surgical patient down: In the Surgery 6.1-3, cf. Jouanna 1999, 127f. 
2 Rey 1993, 26-32. 
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specific words for pain.3 Most recently, Holmes' study of the development of the 
body in Greek thought situates the emergence of body-soul dualism in medico-
philosophical inquiries into the physicality of the symptom (which she defines as 
“often, though not always, painful”).4  
The lack of attention paid to Hippocratic pain is especially surprising in 
light of its prominence in many of the definitions of medicine found within the 
Hippocratic corpus.5 The author of The Art, for example, states that the technê of 
medicine has three purposes (The Art 3.4-7): 
 
First of all I suppose I ought to explain what I consider the 
responsibilities of “medicine” to be: to entirely relieve the 
sufferings of the sick, to blunt the extremities of disease, and to 
refuse to treat those who have been conquered already by their 
disease, knowing that medicine has no power over such situations.6  
 
!"#$%& '( )*+"*(,-.* / &+-012 34$"*56& (7&.*, $8 )6 !9-!.& 
:!.;;9<<(*& $#& &+<(%&$2& $+=> 5.-9$+?>, 5.@ $#& &+<4-9$2& $A> 
<B+)"%$4$.> :-C;D&(*&, 5.@ $8 -6 E'F(*"G(*& $+H<* 5(5".$4-G&+*<*& I!8 
$#& &+<4-9$2&, (3)%$.> J$* $.,$. +K )D&.$.* 34$"*5L. 
 
This definition gives special prominence to the role of pain in the definition of 
medicine: the alleviation of suffering is, in fact, the only duty medicine is 
expected to accomplish thoroughly. Diseases may only be blunted, while some 
                                                
3Several studies have merely catalogued aspects of Hippocratic pain: Byl 1993 lists different 
Hippocratic remedies for pain, Marzullo 1999 summarizes the vocabulary used for pain from 
Homer to Hippocrates, Villard 2006 itemizes the lexical and qualitative dimensions of pain. Rey 
1993 and King 1988 both delve a little deeper into the subject, but still focus on lexical issues. 
Horden 1999 analyzes Rey and King’s findings and concludes that the Hippocratics weren’t 
interested in pain. King 1999 touches on the subject of pain narratives in Hippocratic medicine, 
but her focus on the experience of the second century CE patient (and author) Aelius Aristides is 
beyond the historical parameters of this project.  
4 Holmes 2010, 2. 
5For other discussions of these passages, see Byl 1993, Rey 1993 and Villard 2006. 
6Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own. 
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diseases are beyond the scope of the medical art.7  
The author of Ancient Medicine also draws a connection between medicine 
and suffering. Those who wish to explain the operation of medicine (and thus, of 
the human body) to laymen ought to explain it in terms that the general 
populace might understand (Ancient Medicine 2.10-13). 
Above all, I believe that in speaking about this art one must say 
things that can be understood by lay people. For it is not fitting 
either to investigate or to speak about anything other than the 
affections of these very people when they are sick and suffering.8 
  
M9;*<$. )G -+* )+5G(* !("@ $.D$4> )(H& ;G'+&$. $N> $GF&4> '&2<$A 
;G'(*& $+H<* )4-%$O<*&. PK 'A" !("@ Q;;+? $*&8> +R$( 14$G(*& !"+<L5(* 
+R$( ;G'(*& S !("@ $#& !.T4-9$2& U& .K$+@ +V$+* &+<G+?<0 $( 5.@ 
!+&G+?<*& … 
 
This same author stresses the role of pain as a motivating factor in the invention 
of medicine. Ancient humans used to suffer from both terrible pains and 
diseases, even early deaths, owing to the fact that they consumed raw food.9 
These ancient peoples eventually learned through experimentation, however, 
how to prepare foods in such a way as to adapt them to the human constitution 
(Ancient Medicine 3.36-40): 
 
To this discovery and search what more just or fitting name could 
one give than medicine, since it was discovered for the sake of the 
health, preservation, and nourishment of the human being, in place 
of that regimen which led to suffering, diseases, and death?10 
 
WX )’(I"L-.$* $+D$Y 5.@ 14$L-.$* $0 Q& $*> +R&+-. )*5.*%$("+& S 
!"+<N5+& -Z;;+& T(04 S 34$"*5L&; J$* '( (["4$.* E!@ $\ $+, :&T"]!+? 
I'*(0O $( 5.@ $"+B\ 5.@ <2$4"0O, Q;;.'-. 5(0&4> $N> )*.0$4>, E^ _> +` 
                                                
7On hopeless cases, see von Staden 1990. See also, Rosen and Horstmanshoff 2002. 
8Tr. Schiefsky. 
9Ancient Medicine 3.19-20. 
10Tr. Schiefsky. 
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!%&+* 5.@ &+,<+* 5.@ T9&.$+* E'0&+&$+. 
 
The field of medicine is thus responsible for not just the promotion of health, but 
also for averting pain, disease, and death. 
The Hippocratic patient was similarly focused – perhaps even more so 
than the physician – on medicine’s ability to remove pain. In an attempt to prove 
that patients die as a result of refusing to follow physician's orders, rather than as 
a result of improper treatment on the part of physicians, the author of The Art 
contrasts the physician's state of mind with the patient's (The Art 7.12-18): 
 
Patients, on the other hand, receive treatment knowing neither 
what they suffer, nor why they suffer, nor what will come to pass 
from their present condition, nor what will come to pass from 
similar conditions. They suffer pain in the present yet fear for the 
future; they are full of disease yet empty of food; they are desirous 
of receiving pleasures to counter their disease more than treatment 
to promote health, desperate not to die, but incapable of being 
strong. 
 
+` )a +R$( b 59-&+?<*&, +R$( )*’ b 59-&+?<*&, +RT’ J $* E5 $#& !."(%&$2& 
c<$.*, +RT’ J $* E5 $#& $+?$G+*<*& d-+02& '0&($.*, (3)%$(>, E!*$9<<+&$.*, 
:;'G+&$(> -a& E& $X !."(%&$*, B+C(D-(&+* )a $8 -G;;+&, 5.@ !;L"((> 
-a& $N> &+D<+?, 5(&(+@ )a <*$02&, ETG;+&$(> $A !"8> $6& &+,<+& e)G.11 
-Z;;+&, S $A !"8> $6& I'*(04& !"+<)GF(<T.*, +K5 :!+T.&(H& E"#&$(>, 
:;;A 5."$("(H& :)?&.$G+&$(>. 
 
The Hippocratic patient not only expected medicine to relieve his suffering, but 
may even have considered the purpose of medical treatment to be the promotion 
of pleasure, rather than the restoration of health (or, as discussed above, the 
removal of pain). In fact, this same author implies that most patients do not 
                                                
11Gomperz 1910 prefers the reading of f)4 (A) to e)G. (MR). Even on Gomperz’ reading, however, 
the point is that the patient’s present painful state and desire for treatment against disease trump, 
in the patient’s eyes, the promotion of health or (it is implied) the prevention of disease. 
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submit to medical treatment for any other purpose than the relief of suffering.12 
 The author of Regimen synthesizes the views of the patient and physician 
when he acknowledges a connection between the patient’s main concern (the 
removal of pain) and the physician’s additional goals (the promotion of health) 
(Regimen I-III 15.5-6):  
 
The following is also part of medicine: to remove what causes pain 
and, in so doing, to create health … 
 
5.@ $%)( 34$"*5N> $8 ;?!G+& :!.;;9<<(*&, 5.@ IB’ +V !+&G(* :B.*"G+&$. 
I'*G. !+*G(*& … 
 
The connection drawn here between the removal of pain and the restoration of 
health hints at the etiological affinity between pain and disease in Hippocratic 
theory. That this author asserts that to remove one is to also cure the other is, 
while perhaps the boldest example of such claims, certainly not an outlier to 
Hippocratic notions of pain, disease, and the body: both pain and disease were 
thought to arise as a result of internal material imbalance. This project 
investigates how the connection between pain, disease, and humors arose 
(Chapter One) and explores the consequences of this relationship (Chapters Two, 
Three, and Four).  
                                                
12The Art 11.29f. Cf. Joints 37, where the author claims that patients are unable to take proper care 
of themselves unless they suffer pain or fear death, and Diseases I 15, where the good condition of 
a patient’s body prevents him from seeking treatment. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
WHAT IS PAIN? 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the Hippocratic view of pain in the light of modern 
breakthroughs in understanding the phenomenon. Because the typical Western 
layperson often has an antiquated and incomplete understanding of the nature of 
pain, it is necessary first to establish what pain (actually) is (and isn’t), so that the 
features of Hippocratic pain highlighted in this study may be appreciated as 
interesting and unique.13 
What is pain? Pain is an entirely subjective experience. While we now 
know, however, that every person feels pain differently, in accordance with a 
combination of biological, experiential, and cultural factors, and that the 
perception of pain involves a series of complex neural processes (and need not, 
necessarily, be caused by actual physical damage), Hippocratic scientists 
conceived of pain as an objective phenomenon that was always caused by 
material change. This chapter briefly familiarizes the reader with the basics of the 
modern understanding of the nature of pain perception (Section 2) and the 
factors that contribute to the phenomenon’s subjective nature (Section 3) before 
moving on to an investigation of Hippocratic inquiries into the nature of pain. 
This latter investigation is divided into three sections; first, I discuss the various 
pain mechanisms found in the Corpus and conclude that, for the Hippocratics, 
pain is always caused by some kind of change in the internal components of the 
                                                
13On the history of pain, see Rey 1993. 
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human body (Section 4). The next section argues that Hippocratic pain was 
almost always an objective phenomenon: most authors assume that the pain 
experience is universal, with little to no variation at the level of the individual 
body. Furthermore, the Hippocratic notion of pain perception inverts the modern 
view: while Hippocratic pain cannot exist merely “in someone’s head,” it can and 
does exist absolutely in the body, whether the subject perceives it or not (Section 
5). Finally, I consider how the link between Hippocratic pain and internal 
material change highlighted in Section 4 relates to the last point of Section 5: the 
notion of pains that exist independent of perception is consonant with an idea of 
pain that is figured not so much as a reaction to physical change but as, instead, a 
reified object constituted by changing and changed material (Section 6). 
 
2. The Definition of Pain 
The average person, given the permeating influence of Cartesian dualism in 
Western thought, is often surprised to learn that the experience of pain is not a 
simple matter of the “body” communicating to the “mind” that it has been 
damaged. It was René Descartes, in fact, who first posited the model of pain 
perception that most laypeople still assume is true: an external, noxious stimulus 
prompts the sending of a message along a pain pathway that runs directly from 
the source of injury, along a nerve or fiber, to the brain.14 Since that time, 
scientists proposed several models for the mechanics of nociception (the 
physiological perception of pain), but the field was revolutionized in 1968 by 
                                                
14Descartes 1664. For the history of  modern pain mechanisms, see, e.g. Melzack and Wall 2008. 
On the persistence of dualism in Western thought, see, Robinson 2011. 
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Melzack and Casey’s identification of what they called the three dimensions of 
pain. Pain is not, they proposed, a straightforward physiological reaction – 
neural or otherwise – to physical damage. Rather, the phenomenon that subjects 
identify as “pain” is actually a synthesis of three systems: the “sensory-
discriminative” (the awareness of the location, intensity, and duration of the pain 
stimulus), the “affective-motivational” (the experience of this stimulus as 
“unpleasant”), and the “cognitive-evaluative” (the assessment of and attention 
paid to the meaning of both the experience and the anticipated experience). Both 
the “sensory-discriminative” and the “affective-motivational” dimensions, 
furthermore, are subservient to the “cognitive-evaluative” component.15 What 
this hierarchy of dimensions means is that both individual experience and 
cultural expectations play a fundamental role in the experience of pain.  
Melzack and Casey’s contribution to the study of pain cannot be 
overstated. Not only must any subsequently proposed mechanism for pain 
perception endeavor to explain how and by what process these psychological 
components contribute to the experience of pain, but the very definition of pain 
must account for the inevitable subjectivity that arises from individual and 
societal experience. 
The most recent definition of pain by the International Association for the 
Study of Pain (IASP), the organization that publishes the journal Pain, defines the 
experience as “[a]n unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with 
actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.”16 This 
                                                
15Melzack and Casey 1968. 
16http://www.iasp-pain.org/Content/NavigationMenu/GeneralResourceLinks/Pain 
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sentence is followed by a lengthy note: 
 
The inability to communicate verbally does not negate the 
possibility that an individual is experiencing pain and is in need of 
appropriate pain-relieving treatment. Pain is always subjective. 
Each individual learns the application of the word through 
experiences related to injury in early life. Biologists recognize that 
those stimuli which cause pain are liable to damage tissue. 
Accordingly, pain is that experience we associate with actual or 
potential tissue damage. It is unquestionably a sensation in a part or 
parts of the body, but it is also always unpleasant and therefore also 
an emotional experience. Experiences which resemble pain but are 
not unpleasant, e.g., pricking, should not be called pain. Unpleasant 
abnormal experiences (dysesthesias) may also be pain but are not 
necessarily so because, subjectively, they may not have the usual 
sensory qualities of pain. !! Many people report pain in the absence of 
tissue damage or any likely pathophysiological cause; usually this 
happens for psychological reasons. There is usually no way to 
distinguish their experience from that due to tissue damage if we 
take the subjective report. If they regard their experience as pain 
and if they report it in the same ways as pain caused by tissue 
damage, it should be accepted as pain. This definition avoids tying 
pain to the stimulus. Activity induced in the nociceptor and 
nociceptive pathways by a noxious stimulus is not pain, which is 
always a psychological state, even though we may well appreciate 
that pain most often has a proximate physical cause. 
 
Within this definition (and its lengthy note) are ideas that will be important to 
keep in mind. That pain is understood as both a sensory and an emotional 
experience is a reflection of the reality of the subjective nature of pain perception. 
Accordingly, it is explained that pain is “always a psychological state” that may 
often, but not always, be associated with a physical cause. The psychological 
element of this state of pain is particularly open to influence from culture and, 
thus, liable to constitute quite different experiences for members of different 
cultures. 
                                                
Definitions/default.htm#Pain. URL retrieved May 31, 2012. 
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3. The Subjectivity of Pain  
The experience of pain is thus subjective. This subjectivity means that “pain” is 
not a stable, universal phenomenon, but that each person feels and experiences 
pain differently. What are the factors that make it possible for two individuals to 
experience different pain when receiving a hypothetically identical stimulus?  
The lower threshold of perception–also known as the sensation threshold–is 
uniform across cultures. This means that every human being perceives the 
“lower” orders of sensation, such as warmth and tingling, in objective ways. But 
the pain perception threshold (the level at which one reports that a stimulus is 
painful) and the pain tolerance threshold (the level at which the individual 
withdraws from the stimulus), are both subject to variation based on both 
biological and psychological factors.17 
There is some evidence that there may be some biological component to 
the subjectivity of pain. Functional MRI studies have shown that those who score 
as more sensitive to pain have different neural patterns: their brains react 
differently to pain, in other words.18 Age and sex may also affect the experience 
of pain; thus, for example, tolerance for pain has been shown to decrease as the 
body ages,19 or anatomical and hormonal differences may predispose female 
bodies to be more sensitive to pain.20 However, scientists have also cautioned 
against making such presumptions, asserting that cultural influence (e.g. 
                                                
17 For an overview, see Melzack and Wall 2008, 17-19. 
18 Coghill 2003. 
19 Woodrow et al., 1972. 
20 E.g. Sheffield et al. 2000, Latthe et al. 2006, Nicassio 2007, Greenspan et al. 2007, Popescu et al. 
2010. Although, e.g., Ohel et al. 2006 found that pain threshold increases during labor. 
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assumed gendered reactions to pain) cannot be overlooked when accounting for 
results such as these.21  
Far more consequential to the experience of pain are the effects of 
experience and culture. These psychological factors (corresponding to the 
“cognitive-evaluative” dimension of pain) can be grouped into three categories: 
situational, behavioral, and emotional.22 
Situational factors are “the psychological and contextual factors that exist 
in a specific pain situation.”23 Thus, the expectation of a painful event can 
increase the amount of pain felt, while the belief that a pain will be long-lasting, 
and the idea that pain is mysterious both contribute to an intensification of 
pain.24 The relevance of one's pain also affects the perception of it. There is such a 
category as “culturally-relevant” pain, although some scholars posit a type of 
unbearable pain that is insensitive to cultural relevance, such as infibulation.25 
Merely knowing why one is feeling pain, (such as receiving a diagnosis) lessens 
the intensity of pain felt.26 Belief in the efficacy of a cure serves to reduce pain 
and fMRI studies of this phenomenon (known as the placebo effect) have been 
able to map brain activity in these situations.27 Religious belief may ameliorate 
pain: Catholics, for example, experience a decrease in pain intensity when 
                                                
21 Esp. Nicassio 2007. 
22 See McGrath 1994 and Melzack and Wall 2008 for an overview of the psychological factors in 
pain perception. 
23 McGrath 1994, 59S. See also McGrath 1983. 
24Koyoma et al. 2005, Ploghaus et al. 1999;  Williams and Thorn, 1988. 
25See, e.g. Kosambi 1967. The idea of “culturally-relevant” pain is connected to the findings of 
Pavlov 1927 and 1928 where dogs were shown to be insensitive to pain when the meaning of it is 
altered;  Johansen 2002. 
26 Brody and Waters, 1980. 
27 Wager et al. 2004. 
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contemplating an image of the Virgin Mary.28 Social expectations of response to 
pain have a great effect. Thus, sex differences in pain perception have been 
shown to correspond to societal expectations.29 Context, belief, expectation, 
assumption – in other words, the factors that together constitute the meaning of 
pain – determine how (and even if) we feel pain. 
The behavior of a person in pain can also affect the experience of the 
sensation. The degree to which one communicates pain directly influences the 
experience of the phenomenon,30 while studies have attempted to classify 
patients in terms of their temperament and personality, so as to better evaluate 
pain in individuals belonging to these groups.31 Behavioral factors include not 
only one's own temperament and communication style, but also the behaviors of 
those close to them: solicitous and punishing behavior of significant others 
towards patients has been shown to decrease the subject’s acceptance of pain 
(thereby increasing the intensity of felt pain).32 How one acts (and we should not 
forget that how one acts is often a byproduct of how society says we should act) 
and how those around us act thus increase or decrease the intensity of the pain 
we feel. 
Finally, emotional state has a direct influence on the level of pain we feel. 
For example, anxiety and depression both increase pain: the presence of anxiety 
increases patients' negative response to pain sensations, while women who suffer 
                                                
28 Wiech et al. 2009. 
29 Defrin et al. 2009. 
30 Thibault et al. 2008. 
31 Conrad et al. 2007, Mongini et al. 2009. 
32 McCracken 2005. 
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from both are more likely to also suffer from chronic and recurrent pelvic pain.33 
In general, “negative” emotions, such as fear, anger, and frustration increase the 
perception of pain. 
The phenomenon of pain, then, is in fact as much a product of one’s 
psychological state (and, so, beholden to the emotional, behavioral, and 
contextual factors that influence this state) as it is an experience of somatic 
damage. Keeping in mind the inherent subjectivity of pain, as well as the fact that 
pain need not have a physical stimulus, let us now turn to an analysis of how the 
Hippocratic authors conceived of the phenomenon. 
 
4. Hippocratic Pain Mechanisms 
We now know that “pain” is a term used to describe a complex, tripartite, 
psychological and (often but not always) physical experience. The Hippocratic 
assumption, however, is that the pain experience is uniformly objective. As we 
shall see, Hippocratic pain is always tied to a physical cause, although the 
stimulus is characterized more often as an imbalance, rather than in terms of 
tissue damage. Psychological factors play absolutely no role in pain perception; 
on those rare instances when pain is described in subjective terms, differences are 
thought to be due wholly to biological, not psychological factors. 
Just as different authors disagree over the constituents of the human 
body,34 so too do they provide different explanations for the cause of pain. A 
                                                
33 Keogh et al. 2004; Latthe 2006. 
34Overview of humoral compositions. 
 14 
closer look at these etiologies of pain, however, reveals many similarities.35 
One of the fullest accounts of the cause of pain is found in the treatise 
Nature of Man. This treatise is concerned with proving, over against those who 
claim that the human body is composed of a single element, that the body 
instead contains four materials within it. Pain plays a large role in debunking 
these monists’ claims: if the human body were made up of only one substance, it 
could not feel pain (Nature of Man 2.11-16):  
 
as there would be nothing from which a unity could suffer pain. 
And even if he were to suffer, the cure too would have to be one. 
But as a matter of fact cures are many. For in the body are many 
constituents, which, by heating, by cooling, by drying or by wetting 
one another contrary to nature, engender diseases; so that both the 
forms of diseases are many and the healing of them is manifold.36 
 
+K)a 'A" g& h& IB’ J$+? :;'L<(*(& i& E]&· (3 )’ +j& 5.@ :;'L<(*(&, 
:&9'54 5.@ $8 3]-(&+& i& (7&.*· &?&@ )a !+;;9· !+;;A '9" E<$*& E& $X 
<]-.$* E&(%&$., b, d5%$.& I!’ :;;L;2& !."A BD<*& T("-.0&4$.0 $( 5.@ 
kDF4$.*, 5.@ ^4".0&4$.0 $( 5.@ I'".0&4$.*, &+D<+?> $05$(*· l<$( !+;;.@ 
-a& 3)G.* $#& &+?<4-9$2&, !+;;6 )a 5.@ e m4<*> .K$G2& E<$0&. 
 
Here we can see that the author takes for granted his audience’s assumption that, 
at the most basic level, pain is caused by some sort of internal change. This 
notion of pain is the foundation upon which he rests the remainder of his 
arguments. Pain is caused by change – that’s a fact – but what this author will do 
is explain what type and manner of changes occur within the body to produce 
pain. A little later on, the author elaborates both on the nature of these 
                                                
35On pain etiologies, see also Rey 1993, 30f. 
36Tr. Jones. 
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constituents – the body both feels pain and enjoys health due to the action of four 
elements within it: blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile37 – and the precise 
mechanisms by which they cause pain – through depletion, surfeit, or the 
isolation of one of these elements. The author steadfastly adheres to his schema, 
explaining that when an element is in excess and flows to an inner part of the 
body, it necessarily creates a double pain: one in the place suffering from 
depletion, another in the place to which the element flowed.38  
Change is again fundamental to the notion of pain found in Ancient 
Medicine, although this author attributes the action of change not to four separate 
humors, but to the action of myriad “powers,” such as the bitter, salty, sweet, 
acrid, astringent or strong, within the body. So long as these qualities remain 
compounded, one is not harmed. However, pain arises when one of the powers 
in the body becomes separated off (Ancient Medicine 14.23-28):  
 
In humans is the bitter and salty, the sweet and acrid, the sour and 
insipid, and thousands more, each possessing many powers, both 
in amount and strength. When these things are mixed and 
combined with each other they are neither detectable, nor do they 
cause pain. But, whenever one is separated off and on its own, then 
is it detectable and hurtful.39 
 
n&* 'A" :&T"]"Y 5.@ "*5"8& 5.@ o;-?"8&, 5.@ ';?5= 5.@ p^=, 5.@ 
<$"?B&8& 5.@ ";.)."8&, 5.@ Q;;. -?"0., ".&$+0.> )?&9-*.> cF+&$., 
";NT%> $( 5.@ 3<FD&. W.,$. -a& -(-*'-G&. 5.@ 5(5"4-G&. :;;L;+*<*& 
+R$( B.&("9 E<$*&, +R$( ;?"G(* $8& Q&T"2"+&· J$.& )G $* $+?$G2& 
:"+5"*T\, 5.@ .K$8 EB’ q2?$+, 'G&4$.*, $%$( 5.@ B.&("%& E<$* 5.@ 
;?"G(* $8& Q&T"2"+&. 
 
                                                
37 Nature of Man 4.1-3. 
38 Nature of Man 4.5-15. 
39Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own. 
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In addition to these “powers,” the attributes “hot” and “cold” can also cause 
pain, although to a lesser degree,40 while the internal structure of the body itself 
can cause both pain and disease. For example, when “breath” (pneuma) within 
the body rushes against a structure that is neither strong enough to withstand its 
pressure, nor soft enough to receive it, pain is caused. 41 The liver, for example, 
suffers the sharpest and most frequent pains (as well as abscesses and tumors) on 
account of its tenderness and the amount of blood within it. The diaphragm, 
while also susceptible to such pains, is less so owing to its inherent strength.42  
The author of Breaths, while ultimately identifying “wind” (pneuma) as the 
source of all pain and health in the body, nevertheless believes that pain is the 
result of the interaction between material and structures within the body. For 
example, he explains that pneuma causes pain in the head together with fever 
when veins in the head become filled with air. These inflated veins then exert 
pressure on the blood in the head, causing pain.43  
The author of Affections claims that all disease arises from bile and 
phlegm. The behavior of either or both of these humors within the body can 
cause pain. For example, overeating or excessive drinking, by overheating the 
body and thereby stirring up bile and phlegm, cause pain.44 When phlegm, 
during strangury, enters a dry, cold, or empty bladder, it causes pain, but, should 
the bladder be moist, replete, and full of urine, it causes less pain.45 Both bile and 
                                                
40 Ancient Medicine 19. On “hot” and “cold,” see also Places in Man 42, discussed below. 
41Breaths 3. 
42 Ancient Medicine 22.49-53. 
43 Breaths 8.30-36. 
44 Affections 27.1-18. 
45 Affections 28.6-8. 
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phlegm cause sciatica: both humors give rise to congealed blood that causes pain 
in the blood vessels of the leg wherever it accumulates.46 Here we can see that in 
some cases, it is not the humors per se, but the material result of their action that 
causes pain. In the case of sciatica, pain is produced by congealed blood, not bile 
and phlegm. At another point in this treatise, the author claims that all drugs that 
treat pain are safe, but those that remove bile and phlegm can be dangerous.47 
Clearly pain cannot be (or be caused by) bile and phlegm alone, if pain on the 
one hand and bile and phlegm on the other, are separate therapeutic targets. 
The author of Places in Man, on the other hand, draws a more direct 
connection between certain humors and pain. In most cases, he says, blood, 
whenever it is in such a state as to cause disease, produces pain, while phlegm 
produces heaviness (W8 -a& .r-. d!%$.& &+,<+& !+*GO, p)D&4& !."GF(*, $8 )a B;G'-. 
C9"+>, s> $A !+;;9, Places in Man 33.18-20). Blood may cause pain in all human 
beings under most circumstances, but the effects of cold and heat are not 
universal (Places in Man 42.1-10): 
 
pain arises from cold and from heat, and both from excessively 
great amounts and from too little. In persons that are cooled by 
nature out of their body towards the skin, pain arises from 
excessive heating, in those by nature hot, from cold, in those by 
nature dry, when they are moistened, and in those by nature moist, 
when they are dried. For in each thing that is altered with respect to 
its nature, and destroyed, pains arise. Pains are cured by opposites, 
and there is a specific thing for each disease: in persons by nature 
hot, and who are ill because of cooling, it is what heats, and so on 
according to this principle.48 
 
                                                
46Affections 29 
47Affections 33. 
48Tr. Potter. 
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While the general principle of what causes pain – internal material change – is 
identical to that found throughout the corpus, this author allows for variation in 
the quality of the material (hot, cold, moist, or dry) that causes pain in each 
individual.49 The contradictory effects of hot and cold thus illustrate the author’s 
point that “it is impossible to quickly learn the art of medicine, inasmuch as it 
has no fixed principle” (u4$"*56& +K )?&.$%& E<$* $.F= -.T(H& )*A $%)(, J$* :)D&.$%& 
E<$* 5.T(<$45%> $* E& .K$\ <%B*<-. '(&G<T.*, Places in Man 41.1-2).50 
These pain etiologies have thus far described how the internal workings of 
the body – humors, powers, and breath – cause pain. While there are fewer 
instances of an author describing the cause of pain associated with tissue damage 
that arises from external injury, there is some evidence that injury-pain was 
caused by the same mechanism as humoral-pain. The author of The Art explains 
that the anatomical structures within the body – flesh, organs, veins, sinews – are 
surrounded by liquid-filled cells. Should any of these cells be broken open (as in 
injury, we can only assume), this liquid matter (3F]") exits the cells in great 
                                                
49Cf. King 1988, 56f. on this passage. 
50See also the discussion of hot and cold in Ancient Medicine 16, discussed below, 16f.  
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quantity and causes much pain.51 The author of Places in Man imagines a 
similarly humoral mechanism for injury pain (Places in Man 32:  
 
Fractures in the head: if the bone is fractured and shatters, this is 
not dangerous: you must heal such a patient with moistening 
medications. But if the bone fractures and a cleft arises, this is 
dangerous. Trephine the patient in order that the serum flowing 
down through the cleft in the bone does not make the membrane 
suppurate, for inasmuch as it enters through a narrow space and 
does not come out again, it produces pain and makes the patient 
delirious. You must trephine the patient, in order that there will be 
a way out for the serum – not just a way in – by sawing open a 
wide space. Apply medications that attract moisture, and bathe.52 
 
v(B.;N> 5.$9'-.$.· S& -a& $8 p<$G+& 5.$.'\ 5.@ ^?&$"*C\, :50&)?&+&· 
5.@ 3Z<T.* F"6 $+,$+& I'".0&+?<* B."-95+*<*&· S& )a w.'\ 5.@ w2'-6 
E''G&4$.*, E!*50&)?&+&· $+,$+& !"0(*&, s> -6 5.$A $6& w2'-6& $+, 
p<$G+? 3Fx" wG2& $6& -L&*''. <L!O· l<$( 'A" 5.$A <$(&8& E<*x& -a&, 
E^*x& )a +y, ;?!G(* 5.@ -.0&(<T.* !+*G(* $8& Q&T"2!+&· $+,$+& F"6 
!"0(*&, s> c^+)+> z $X 3F#"*, -6 -+,&+& c<+)+>, (K"G2> )*.!"*<TG&$+>, 
5.@ B."-95+*<* F"N<T.*, {<<. EB’ q2?$A $8 I'"8& |;5+?<*, 5.@ ;+D(*&. 
 
Notice that the explanation of this pain mechanism is incidental to the discussion 
at large – otherwise we would expect an explanation for the cause of pain in the 
(presumably just as) painful shattered fracture of the skull. Instead, we are told 
that the type of fracture that causes a split in the skull is particularly dangerous 
and requires trephination in order to draw off the serous liquid that arises as a 
result of such damage. The only relevant pain in this discussion is that 
occasioned by the abundance of this serous liquid and not the pain caused by 
                                                
51The Art 10. 
52Tr. Potter. 
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fractures in general.53 Finally, the author of Breaths explains that the pain felt in 
lacerations of the flesh are caused by wind running into the gap of the cut.54 In 
this case, the author’s special preference for assigning the cause of all disease to 
pneuma can be seen to affect his etiology for injury-specific pain. Yet his strategy 
is not so different from that of the authors of Places in Man or The Art: in all three 
of these treatises, the pain of injury is attributed to an imbalance of whichever 
material is claimed to cause pain and disease in other circumstances. 
For the Hippocratics, then, pain is caused by the abnormal behavior of 
material within the body. While individual authors may have their preference for 
the exact makeup of this material, all pain is caused by change and all change is 
of a physical, material, concrete nature. 
 
5. The Objectivity of Hippocratic Pain 
As I discussed in Section 3, the experience of pain is one that is highly subjective, 
owing to differences on the individual, societal, and even anatomic level. By 
contrast, Hippocratic pain is almost always objective. Furthermore, on those rare 
occasions when allowance is made for variation in pain experience, this variation 
is hardly ever at the level of the individual, and is always physically- (not 
psychologically-) engendered. 
Most prevalent is the attitude that pain is straightforwardly objective. The 
                                                
53This point touches on the usefulness of pain to the Hippocratic physician. As I argue below, 
Chapters Two and Three, pain was useful insofar as it was an indication of events that took place 
within the body. It comes as no surprise, then, that the surgical treatises make almost no mention 
of pain, concerned as they are with surgical technique, not the identification, prediction, or 
treatment of disease. Cf. Jouanna 1999, 127f. 
54 Breaths 11. 
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author of Ancient Medicine claims that ancient humans suffered the same violent 
pains when they consumed unprepared, raw foods that modern humans would 
suffer if they should subsist on an identical diet.55 In Fractures we find a similar 
attitude that a certain condition produces the same pain in all humans. He asserts 
that the physician should not bind a patient’s arm in a supine position, as such a 
posture would be painful. So painful, he claims, that anyone could discover this 
truth by positioning their arm in this way (in fact, he says, a weaker person could 
in this way lead a stronger person).56 As we will see in Chapter Two, the 
usefulness of pain in diagnosis and prognosis in particular depended on pain 
being a static criterion for identifying disease and charting and predicting its 
course; species of disease may present differently, inasmuch as the quality and 
quantity of diseased material could differ by individual, but the mechanism by 
which pain represented – or was constituted by – certain types of diseased 
material was fixed and stable. 
On the rare occasions authors do indicate that pains might be different, in 
most cases they clearly conceived of these pains as actually different pains, caused 
by different types of humoral imbalance. For example, the author of Nature of 
Man says that young men suffer more pain as a result of overexertion than older 
men. Note that this author does not say that the young do not tolerate pain as 
well as the elderly; rather, because the young have drier, tenser, and firmer 
                                                
55Ancient Medicine 3. Although the author moves on to qualify this statement (“in the past they 
probably suffered less, since they were used to this diet, but even so, their sufferings were 
severe,” }<<+& -a& +j& $.,$. $%$( (358> h& !9<F(*& )*A $6& <?&LT(*.&· 3<F?"#> )a 5.@ $%$(, Ancient 
Medicine 3.20-21), his point that basic human anatomy has not changed lends support to the 
objectivity of the sensation of pain. 
56Fractures 3. 
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bodies, when they overexert themselves, their bodies become more damaged 
and, thus, suffer more pain.57 Note too that this distinction in pain experience is 
drawn at the level of age group (“young people”), not at any idiosyncratic level 
(i.e. “some people”).58  
 The author of Ancient Medicine, on the other hand, seems to allow for 
variation in pain experience at the individual level (Ancient Medicine 6): 
 
It is necessary to know this well: those of the sick to whom gruels 
are not beneficial, but rather opposed, see their fever and pains 
become more acute if they take them, and it is clear that what they 
have taken provides nourishment and growth for the disease, but 
wasting and weakness for the body. All people in this condition 
who take dry food, either barley cake or bread, even if it is only 
very little, would be harmed ten times more severely and more 
manifestly than if they took gruels, for no other reason than the 
strength of the food in relation to their condition. As for the person 
for whom gruels are beneficial but eating soldi food is not, if he 
were to eat a lot of it he would be harmed much more than if he ate 
a little, and even if he ate a little, he would suffer. Accordingly, all 
the causes of suffering can be reduced to the same thing, namely 
that it is the strongest foods that harm the human being most 
severely and most manifestly, in both health and sickness.59  
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57Nature of Man 4. 
58On age and sex as distinguishing factors, and on variation in pain experience in general, see 
below, Chapter Four. 
59Tr. Schiefsky. 
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While this passage initially seems to allow for individual variation in pain 
experience – e.g. some people feel more pain than others when they eat gruel –  
the author is clearly imagining a class of individuals who are ill suited for the 
consumption of gruel. While we are not told the precise mechanism whereby 
gruel proves more injurious to this group, the author nevertheless speaks of the 
amount of pain occasioned by gruel, then states that solid food causes more pain 
(ten times or more pain, to be precise) than gruel. In both cases, the mechanism of 
pain is the same; the amount or intensity may vary, but this variation is the result 
of the strength of harmful material or the susceptibility of the class of patient. 
For the Hippocratics, therefore, the mechanism that causes pain is a stable 
concept. This stability is at least partly due to the simple equation that a certain 
pain equals a particular imbalance of a specific humoral material. The patient 
rarely enters the equation except in those situations where the class of body (i.e. 
female, old, gruel-amenable) predisposes the patient towards a specific type of 
imbalance. In none of these situations, then, is pain a subjective phenomenon the 
perception of which varied from person to person. 
All of which makes the following treatment for ear pain remarkably 
striking (Epidemics VI 5.7): 
 
If a patient has pain in the ear, twirl wool around your finger and 
pour warm fat on it, then put the wool in the palm of your hand 
and move it underneath the ear so that the patient thinks 
something is coming out of it. Then throw the wool upon the fire: a 
 24 
deceit. 
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In the context of the Hippocratic Corpus, this passage is certainly an outlier.60 Is 
the pain in the patient’s ear “real”? If it does exist as a result of humoral 
imbalance, why is this treatment recommended? 
First, we should not discount the possibility that this “treatment” was not 
thought to be effective per se. Rather, we may have here one of the showy 
displays to attract clients that most Hippocratic authors claim to despise.61 In this 
case, this pyrotechnic exhibition would be a preamble to “real” treatment.62 
This author may have included this treatment, however, owing to some 
belief in its efficacy.63 While no explanation is given as to why this sleight of hand 
would have been thought effective, we can make some assumptions about what 
such an explanation might look like: the pain never existed to begin with, or: the 
pain did exist, but the patient’s mental or emotional response to this deceptive 
treatment effected real, material change in the body.  
If this pain was not “all in the patient’s head,” it may have been thought to 
have been cured by the patient’s head. In other words, the patient’s belief in the 
cure would have been thought to somehow influence the material composition of 
the body, not unlike the modern placebo effect. While such an explanation is not 
                                                
60On this passage, see Manetti and Roselli 1982, King 1998, Jouanna 1999, 133-134. 
61E.g. Sacred Disease 2, Joints 42. 
62On attracting clients through public display, see, Edelstein 1967, 69-70. On the physician and the 
public sphere more generally, see Jouanna 1999, 75-111. 
63On the efficacy of Hippocratic medicine, see Demand 1999. 
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to be found in the Corpus, however, we do have some evidence for a belief in the 
ability of mental or emotional states to cause, if not cure, illness. The author of 
Epidemics III records two cases where intense grief causes illness in women.64 This 
“ear trick” could have been thought of as a reversal of this type of process: the 
patient’s belief in the efficacy of this spectacular treatment would, in this view, 
provoke an alteration of his physical makeup. It should be stressed, however, 
that no such connection between mental state and physical imbalance is made by 
the author of Epidemics VI.  
That this pain doesn’t exist at all, save in the patient’s head is the least 
likely scenario. Not only are no other examples of nonexistent or psychosomatic 
pain to be found in the Hippocratic Corpus, we find, on the contrary, a belief in 
pains that exist despite the patient’s inability to perceive them. For example, in the 
treatise Breaths, epileptics are said to be senseless – literally – to not feel pain – in 
the face of pains (:&9;'4$+0 $( !"8> $+=> !%&+?>, Breaths 14).65 The idea seems to be 
that these pains are actually present in the patient but, because of his seizure, he 
is unaware of them. In a similar vein, the author of Aphorisms claims that 
numbness removes pain, and not that numbness, for example, dulls one’s 
sensation of pain.66 Here, again, pain is real and material. Numbness does not 
drive a wedge between mind and matter so much as remove matter altogether.  
 This last point raises some questions about the relationship between pain 
and perceptibility. That “pain” can exist apart from perception implies that pain 
                                                
64Epidemics III 3.17(11) and 3.17(15). In both cases the cause of disease was attributed to lupê. On 
the ambiguity of this term, see below, Chapter Three. 
65Cf. Aphorisms 2.6. 
66Aphorisms 5.25, cf. Use of Liquids 1 and 6. 
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has its own physicality. Where pain as defined by the IASP is said to exist 
provided that the subject perceives “pain” and need not necessarily have a 
“proximate physical cause,” the Hippocratic notion of pain would appear to be 
reversed: physical cause is the sine qua non of pain, while the patient’s perception 
of this event, though usually coincident to the phenomenon, is not essential to its 
existence. 
The relationship between material imbalance, perception, and pain, was 
nicely articulated above by the author of Ancient Medicine (Ancient Medicine 
14.23-28):  
 
In humans is the bitter and salty, the sweet and acrid, the sour and 
insipid, and thousands more, each possessing many powers, both 
in amount and strength. When these things are mixed and 
combined with each other they are neither detectible, nor do they 
cause a person to hurt. But, whenever one is separated off and on 
its own, then is it detectible and hurtful. 
 
n&* 'A" :&T"]"Y 5.@ "*5"8& 5.@ o;-?"8&, 5.@ ';?5= 5.@ p^=, 5.@ 
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The constituency of the human body in health is not naturally apparent to the 
owner of the body. However, should any of the substances within the human 
body grow apart from the admixture, such a separation is not only able to be 
perceived, but it also causes harm.67 The sensation of something “wrong” with the 
                                                
67On the perceptibility of pain, see Holmes 2010, 108-110 and below, Section 5. 
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body is often what we mean when we speak of pain. For the Hippocratics, on the 
other hand, the “something wrong” in the body is pain; sensation is conceived of 
as a separate, though usually concurrent, process. That these two processes are 
separate, however, allows for the types of miscommunication that we saw above: 
although undergoing pain, epileptics do not feel pain.68 
That pain denotes a state that need not be perceived in order to exist relies 
on the etiological connection between pain and the material within the body. 
Holmes takes this passage as evidence for a Hippocratic belief in a “threshold of 
perceptibility” of sensation, a notion that is crucial to her thesis that the figuring 
of the body as a locus of imperceptible activity is the precursor to the emergence 
of consciousness as a state separated from the physical body.69 The kind of 
transformation of subjective experiences into objective processes that we see in 
this passage was, she argues, an important step in the development of the “body 
as cavity” in Greek thought.  
Where Holmes’ project focuses on the function of all symptoms (a 
symptom, she says, is “often, though not always, painful,” Holmes 2010, 2), I am 
interested in how pain became a symptom in the first place. As I argue below in 
Chapter Two, Hippocratic pain is, to borrow Holmes’ framework, often – but not 
always – a symptom; hence, by subsuming pain under symptom, we collapse 
any distinction between these two categories – be it the kind of distinction that is 
manifest in Hippocratic practice (see below, Chapter Two) or be it the type of 
                                                
68These types of situations are perhaps analogous to, e.g., patients being unable to sense the 
temperature of hot water (Use of Liquids 1); just because the patient cannot perceive the heat of the 
water, the water is, nevertheless, hot.  
69“Threshold of perceptibility,” Holmes 2010, 115-116. 
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inherent difference between actual objective material and subjective experience 
that I will elucidate in the following section.70 
 
6. The Materiality of Hippocratic Pain 
Holmes uses the apt phrase “potentially seen” to characterize the internal 
material substances and processes of the body. This phrase is particularly apt, 
since it both draws attention to the materiality of everything that happens within 
the body and highlights the invisibility of what occurs beneath the surface of the 
skin. I wish to suggest, however, that Hippocratic symptoms should be further 
divided into those that are perceptible only to the patient (pain) and those that 
may also be seen by the physician (almost everything else). The material that 
causes pain can be seen by the physician once it exits the body – thus its status as 
“potentially seen.” However, Hippocratic physicians could not see, objectively 
confirm, or otherwise observe “pain” in the same ways they could when it comes 
to other symptoms of disease, such as burping, sneezing, flatus, urine sediment, 
nosebleeds, hiccups, rashes, boils, hemorrhoids, fractures, feces, mucous, seizure, 
talking nonsense, weeping, fever.71 
                                                
70I want to stress that I am in no way criticizing Holmes for subsuming pain under the category of 
symptom: the Greek symptom is, of course, “often, though not always, painful.” Her project and 
mine are focused merely on different stages of a cognitive process. 
71I do not mean to imply that Holmes is unaware of this difference (first articulated at Holmes 
2010, 134: “The fact the disease is so elusive reminds us that the medical writers are working with 
two kinds of “imperceptibility”: what is potentially seen and what is seen with the mind […] 
Rather than openly acknowledging these two classes of imperceptibles, however, the medical 
writers usually conflate them. By doing so, they allow their claims about the nature of the body 
or the disease to masquerade as concrete objects of perception, as we saw in relation to the 
language surrounding symptoms.”), merely that the difference is not crucial to her thesis. Hence, 
too, her ambiguous terminology: while Holmes’ “symptom” is not always painful, she 
nevertheless subsumes the experience of any type of symptom under the term “suffering”(e.g. 
134) and overemphasizes the “visibility” of pain (in particular, in the context of prognosis, 157-
159). On the purpose of physicians’ efforts to “see” pain without the benefit of the patient’s 
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The calculus involved with turning pain into a “visible” indication, or 
even instantiation, of an object involves more abstraction than the one that 
connects, e.g. audible flatus with trapped pneuma, or menstruation with an 
overabundance of blood. How pervasive or successful was this collapse between 
pain and cause? If pain is not a process whereby one perceives material 
imbalance (i.e., a sensation), must it necessarily be that material imbalance? 
The author of Ancient Medicine, when explaining how material containing 
harsh powers causes pain when it flows towards the eyes or throat, says that it is 
necessary to reckon the cause of each symptom to be those things which, when 
they are present in such a way, exist concurrently with the symptom, yet, once 
they change, so too does the symptom disappear ((H )a )L!+? $.,$. .m$*. q59<$+? 
e'G(<T.*, U& !."(%&$2& -a& $+*+,$+& $"%!+& :&9'54 '0&(<T.*, -($.C.;;%&$2& )a E> 
Q;;4& 5"N<*& !.D(<T.*, Ancient Medicine 19.14-16). Here pain – indeed, all 
symptoms – are closely connected with the material within the body. This 
passage suggests that the physician should realize that the cause of pain can be 
identified as the particular material imbalance that coincides with pain. This 
coincidence allows pain to thus signify material imbalance without the author 
articulating the precise relationship between pain and matter. 
In several contexts, however, pain seems to be concretized.72 Pain often has 
its own substantive presence – a materiality that is particularly apparent when 
pain is described in motion, as in the case history of Cleinias’ young sister 
(Epidemics VII 101): 
                                                
sensation, see below, Chapter Three. 
72Pace Marzullo 1999, 127: “il ‘dolore’ mai costituisce oggetto autonomo: fornisce meccanico 
indizio, di ordine semiotico, privo di primario interesse, di problematicità.” 
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Cleinias’ youthful sister vomited a bloody vomit for fourteen days, 
whatever she ate or drank. There was no fever. Belching, and with 
contractions a suffocation went to the heart. Castorium, seseli 
stopped all symptoms, and juice from pomegranate rind. The pain 
shifted, in moderate form, to her flanks. Onion juice, and acrid 
wine with milk, and minute amounts of bread with olive oil.73 
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Or that of a certain Andreas (Epidemics VII 43.17-20): 
 
… there was pain around the armpits and the thorax. It went down 
into the legs without signs, and ceased. Bathing helped, and 
ointment made with vinegar. In the second month, perhaps, or the 
third, the pain went to the kidneys, having appeared there  
sometime before. He recovered.74 
 
… t)D&4 )a h& !("@ $A> -.<F9;.> 5.@ $A !;(?"9· E> <5G;(. )*N;T(& 
:<L-2>, 5.@ c;4^(&. 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In both of these cases, pain itself is described as shifting or moving throughout 
the body. Cleinias’ sister’s pain gets up and moves to her flanks; Andreas’ pain 
moves down into his legs, then settles into his kidneys. We are not told that 
diseased material is moving about the body; rather, the phenomenon of pain has 
                                                
73Tr. Smith. 
74Tr. Smith. 
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its own weight: the same pain can migrate throughout the body in a fashion 
identical to that of humors. 
That the mere presence of pain was often described as attracting or 
dispelling diseased material points to a special connection between matter and 
pain. Abscesses are more likely to form in areas that are already in pain, while 
humors in general were thought to migrate and settle in any part of the body that 
suffered pain before the onset of illness.75 In both of these cases, pain is reified to 
the point that it has its own gravitational force. In addition to causing harm, pain 
may also cure a condition. For example, a copious bloody flow from the nostrils, 
or spasm, or pain in the hips were said to cure those suffering from slack 
hypochondria.76 That hip pain is classed together with spasm and nosebleed 
suggests that the phenomenon was as physical as these conditions. 
Certain diseases may prevent the contraction of other diseases by virtue of 
their pain. The author of Humors claims that hemorrhoids and other such 
suppurating affections can alleviate symptoms of subsequent diseases by virtue 
of their pain, weight, or some other cause (Humors 20.6-7): 
 
Sufferers from hemorrhoids are attacked neither by pleurisy, nor by 
pneumonia, nor by spreading ulcer, nor by boils, nor by swellings, 
nor perhaps by skin-eruptions and skin-diseases. However, 
unseasonably cured, many have been quickly caught by such 
diseases, and, moreover, in a fatal manner. All other abscessions, 
too, such as fistula, are cures of other diseases. So symptoms that 
relieve complaints if they come after their development, prevent 
the development if they come before. Suspected places cause relief, 
by acting as receptacles owing to pain, weight, or any other cause.77 
                                                
75Humors 7 and Aphorisms 4.33. Cf. Places in Man 24, where disease is thought to attract humors. 
76 Coan Prenotions 290. 
77Tr. Jones.  
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The connection between pain and weight here is particularly suggestive.79 These 
suspected places take on additional material (I!+)(^9-(&+*) as a direct 
consequence of the presence of pain or weight or some other thing (!%&Y S C9"(*, 
S Q;;Y $*&@).80 The physicality of both pain and weight suggests that we ought to 
think of pain not as a reaction to physical imbalance, but as a particular kind of 
physical imbalance: one whose primary quality is that of unpleasantness.81 
The treatment of pain provides another context in which pain seems to 
take on the weight of materiality.82 The spontaneous evacuation of material from 
the body is often credited with relieving pain. For example, intense headache is 
relieved by the runoff of pus or water from the nose, mouth, or ears.83 This 
trouble and intense pain is relieved when material leaves the head, regardless of 
the location of egress. Correspondingly, when an evacuation is incomplete, pain 
                                                
78 cf. Epidemics VI 3.23.  
79Pain and weight are also connected in Internal Affections 49. 
80On “suspected places,” cf. Jones 1931 (2005), 93 n.1: “A ‘suspected place’ is one in which we 
might expect a morbid affection to arise, and pain here, or an accumulation of humours, might 
relieve affections elsewhere. The phenomenon is common enough in certain forms of neuralgia, 
the pains of which often jump from place to place in such a way that one pain seems to relieve 
another.” 
81Note that this formulation of pain corresponds nicely with Melzack and Wall’s “affective-
motivational” dimension of pain. 
82For an extensive report of Hippocratic therapies for pain, see Byl 1992. On anodynes in 
particular, see King 1988. 
83Aphorisms 6.10. 
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is not fully relieved. For example, hemorrhage can cure pain of the head and 
neck, but when the bladder is blocked, the resolution of pain takes more time.84  
That phlebotomy was often the first line of defense against pain 
underscores the materiality of the phenomenon. Nature of Man (9) contains a 
lengthy description of the various veins in the body, including instructions on 
which vein to cut when a patient is pained. Here, phlebotomy is shown to be a 
highly scientific remedy. Where one was supposed to cut a patient depended 
precisely on where the patient was experiencing pain. That phlebotomy was 
particularly suited for the removal of pain is suggested by, e.g. the author of 
Epidemics III, who claims that phlebotomy of a patient who was suffering from 
pain, fever and cough successfully removed the pains, but not the cough.85 
This link between material in the body and pain is quite clear when the 
author of Coan Prenotions says that if pains in the lungs do not cease as a result of 
expectoration, phlebotomy, or regimen, they will turn into pus within the 
patient.86 In other words, if these pains do not exit the body fully via 
expectoration, bloodletting, or the drying action of regimen, they transform into 
a different kind of material: pus.  
The material connection between “cure” and “pain” was strong enough 
that authors could reverse the process in order to “diagnose” the cause of pain. 
The author of Epidemics VI claims that when he shook “the patient whose liver 
was folded at the lobe,” his pain suddenly ceased.87 Clearly, the author 
                                                
84Coan Prenotions 166. 
85Epidemics 3.3.17(8).7-9. 
86Coan Prenotions 388. Cf. Prognostic 15.1-4. 
87Epidemics VI 8.28. 
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retroactively diagnosed this patient with a “folded liver lobe” in order to explain 
why the pain would have suddenly stopped upon succussion. The attitude 
displayed towards pain in the context of therapy indicates that the phenomenon 
had its own physical presence. 
In addition to often connoting some type of physical presence, pain could 
act with a great amount of agency. Pain may cause weakness in patients: the 
author of Regimen in Acute Diseases complains that physicians are not able to 
recognize the various circumstances under which diseases are exacerbated or 
weakened. For example, he says, physicians who wrongly suppose that a 
patient's weakness is due to lack of food (when he is actually weakened by pain) 
mistakenly give the patient ptisan, drink and food. It is left unsaid what the 
proper treatment is to counteract a pain that causes weakness.88 The force of pain 
may prevent a patient from being able to catch his breath,89 or cause choking.90 
Pain can even provoke the passage of material from the body.91 Pain alone can 
even cause death,92 or cure other pain, as we are told in a lengthy and abruptly 
staccato list of mandates by the author of Epidemics VI (Epidemics VI 2.1): 
 
make wide, make narrow, sometimes, yes, other times no. Humors, 
some of them, drive out, dry out others, and others induce, 
sometimes yes, sometimes no. Diminish, nourish the body, skin, 
flesh, etc., sometimes yes, sometimes no. Smooth, roughen, harden, 
soften, sometimes, sometimes not. Wake up, put to sleep: and all 
other such things. Divert, right off the bat retain what yields, and 
make leave what resists. Draw on another humor, not the one that 
                                                
88Regimen in Acute Diseases 11.65-85. 
89 Epidemics VII 2.2-3. 
90 Internal Affections 47.6. 
91 E.g. Coan Prenotions 120. Cf. Coan Prenotions 299 and 369. 
92 E.g. Coan Prenotions 311 and 462.1-3.  
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is flowing, but encourage the one that flows to continue in that 
state, bring about a similar state, i.e. pain stops pain, as for unusual 
conditions, if it prevails upwards and is aloft, take care of it from 
below, and vice versa, i.e. cleansing of the head, phlebotomy, 
whenever it is not removed without cause. 
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This passage not only suggests that pain was thought to stop pain, it may even 
indicate that pain was induced by the physician as a palliative for another pain.93 
The author of Aphorisms explains how pain might have such an analgesic effect:  
when two concurrent pains occur in different parts of the body, the stronger pain 
weakens the other one.94 This explanation is quite counter to how pain is now 
understood. Rather than explaining this phenomenon in terms of the subjectivity 
of pain perception (i.e., by explaining that the patient is less bothered by the 
weaker pain, inasmuch as the stronger one claims the majority of his attention), 
the phenomenon is interpreted in objective terms: there are two pains that exist. 
One is stronger and, by virtue of its strength, weakens the other. 
These are the types of pains that Holmes, I suspect, would call “strangely 
concrete;” yet is their obvious materiality so strange in light of pain’s etiology?95 
                                                
93 First suggested by King 1988. 
94 Aphorisms 2.46. 
95Holmes 2010, 136. Holmes uses this phrase in a discussion of Regimen in Acute Diseases 17, where 
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Pain is not always so strikingly concrete, yet it is also rarely expressly figured as a 
reaction to (i.e. sensation of) material imbalance. Rather, I suspect that in most 
cases the Hippocratic notion of “pain” is a shorthand for some kind of 
perceptible (and thus, significant enough) material imbalance. By “shorthand,” I 
mean that “pain” neither fully symbolizes the result of material imbalance nor 
fully consists of material. Rather, owing to a collapse between the categories of 
material, perception, symptom and disease, “pain” can for the most part exist in 
the conceptual space between cause and effect.96 On occasion, however, authors 
can make use of either end of the spectrum, as we have seen: pain can, as the 
result of material imbalance, prove that the human body is heterogeneous, but it 
can also, qua material imbalance, leap about the body, yield to phlebotomy, draw 
disease to itself, and even take on temperature. This last possibility apparently 
happened in Crannon, where, we are told “old pains were cold, and new pains 
were warm and for the most part bloody” (.` !.;.*.@ p)D&.*, k?F".0· .` )a &(.".@, 
T("-.@, .-.$* )a .` !;(H<$.*, Epidemics VI 1.7.1-2). 
 
7. Conclusion 
The etiology of pain enables this inherently invisible, subjective sensation to 
transform into a materially-connected – even occasionally material – “potentially 
                                                
the cause of death in so-called “stricken” patients is attributed to the physician’s failure to 
“loosen” the pain in the patient’s side prior to giving him food. While this concretized pain is 
certainly strange in light of the modern notion of pain, it is not, I suggest, an outlier – or even 
unusual – in the context of Hippocratic pain. 
96While Holmes 2010 (esp. 130-132) speaks of the “interval” between cause and effect as a way of 
emphasizing the physician’s ability to intervene in the body’s cavity, when I speak of pain 
existing between cause and effect, I do not mean that pain occupies the physical or temporal 
space between the two. Rather, I mean that pain is figured sometimes as cause (material 
imbalance) and other times as effect (caused by material imbalance). 
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visible” object. As a consequence of this reification, the phenomenon of pain is 
able to function as a stable, perceptible sign.97 The following chapter explores the 
ways in which “visible” pain (that is, perceived pain qua symptom) reveals the 
invisible (disease). Yet, as we shall see, the conceptual collapse whereby (actually 
invisible) “visible” pain is used to “see” (potentially visible but, at the moment, 
nevertheless) invisible material imbalance, is not perfect. Rather, the imprecise 
relationship between pain and matter that I have articulated here provides an 
unstable foundation for the association between pain and disease; just as pain 
exists somewhere between cause and effect, so too does pain rest uneasily 
between symptom and disease.  
                                                
97Cf. Holmes 2010, 119: “the texts of the Hippocratic Corpus, despite the diversity of ideas and 
styles, undeniably attest a new self-consciousness about how knowledge about what is unseen is 
created.” 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SEMIOTICS OF PAIN 
 
1. Introduction 
As we saw in Chapter One, by connecting the phenomenon of pain with 
potentially visible material change within the body, the Hippocratic authors 
imbued this perception with a physical reality. This connection with material 
change and assumed objectivity endowed pain with semiotic currency. By 
“semiotic,” I mean that pain, owing to its connection to the material inside of the 
body, could now be used to signify the existence of something else; pain was, in 
this sense, a symptom.98 This chapter explores the ways in which this now 
materially-connected (but actually invisible) pain was used to indicate and point 
to the existence of unseen (but nevertheless concrete and tangible) matter. 
Pain was a remarkably productive and useful symptom for Hippocratic 
physicians and authors. I begin by considering the evidence that Hippocratic 
authors were unaware of the obvious importance they placed on the symptom of 
pain (Section 2). I then move to a catalogue of the semiotic use of pain in 
nosology, prognosis, therapy, and theoretical proof that reveals the special role of 
pain in all of these processes (Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6). I then discuss the 
relationship between pain and disease and suggest that the inconstancy of this 
relationship is to blame for the disjoint between the use of pain as a sign and the 
omission of pain in discussions of the use of signs (Section 7). Furthermore, I 
                                                
98On the symptom in Greek medicine, see Diller 1932, Perilli 1991 and 1994, Manetti 1993, 36-52 
and 1994, Fausti 2002, and Holmes 2010, 121-191. 
 39 
suggest that understanding the relationship between pain and disease is a crucial 
component to answering the question posed at the conclusion of Chapter One: is 
pain the result of material change? Or is pain constituted by matter (Section 8)? 
 
2. Did the Hippocratics Consider Pain a Sign of Disease? 
While several treatises encourage physicians to utilize pain as a sign, variously 
pointing to the semiotic value the Hippocratics found in this sensation, these 
discussions neglect or otherwise misrepresent the extra importance given to pain 
in these situations.99 The author of The Art, for example, explains how diseases 
reveal themselves to the physician (The Art 12.1-9): 
Now medicine, being prevented, in cases of empyema, and of 
diseased liver, kidneys, and the cavities generally, from seeing with 
the sight with which all men see everything most perfectly, has 
nevertheless discovered other means to help it. There is clearness or 
roughness of the voice, rapidity or slowness of respiration, and for 
the customary discharges the ways through which they severally 
pass, sometimes smell, sometimes colour, sometimes thinness or 
thickness furnishing medicine with the means of inferring, what 
condition these symptoms indicate, what symptoms mean that a 
part is already affected and what that a part may hereafter be 
affected.100 
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Despite the fact that Hippocratic physicians routinely relied on pain to “see” 
                                                
99See also Epidemics VI 8.9 and 8.24. 
100Tr. Jones. 
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disease, this author only takes into account those symptoms that are actually 
visible to the physician. In other cases, however, less visible symptoms, such as 
pain, are “counted” as symptoms. For example, the author of the treatise Humors 
urges physicians to receive instruction regarding the significance of symptoms, 
including those of pain and painlessness (Humors 2): 
 
Pay attention to the following: things which stop of their own 
accord, or for example the boils that arise from burning heat, in 
what situations things harm or help, structures of the body, 
movement, disturbances, settling down, sleep, waking up, distress, 
yawning, shivering, whether something should be created or 
stopped, to anticipate something. Instruction regarding vomit, 
emissions from below, sputum, mucus, cough, eructation, hiccups, 
flatus, urine, sneezing, tears, itching, plucking, touching, thirst, 
hunger, satiety, sleeps, pain, painlessness, the body, the mind, 
learning, recollection, voice, silence. 
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B"054, {$( !+*4$G. S 52;?$G., BT9<.*. .0)(?<*> E-G$+?, 59$2 )*(^%)+?, 
!$?9;+?, -D^4>, C4F8>, E"(D^*+>, ;?'-+,, BD<4>, +R"+?, !$."-+,, 
).5"D2&, 5&4<-#&, $*;-#&, k.?<02&, )0k4>, ;*-+,, !;4<-+&N>, [!&2&, 
!%&2&, :!+&04>, <]-.$+>, '&]-4>, -.TL<*+>, -&L-4>, B2&N>, <*'N>. 
 
The instruction to pay attention to pain and painlessness comes in a long list of 
symptoms. Some of these symptoms are as material as vomit, mucus and urine, 
while others are decidedly more imperceptible and so less quantifiable, such as 
“the mind,” “learning,” and, of course, “pain.” The physician should be sure to 
have studied what these various symptoms signify in various circumstances. 
This author includes both the presence and absence of pain within the category 
of symptom; he does not, however, accord to the symptom of pain any extra 
significance beyond that given to any other symptom. The position of pain 
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within this list lends no significance to the terms whatsoever, if any symptom in 
such a long and perfunctory list could be said to have been given special 
prominence. In fact, as we shall see below, the position of pain in this list is in 
marked contrast to the special prominence of pain found in most of the 
nosological treatises when the symptoms of individual diseases are listed. 
More interesting, perhaps, are the instances where similar programmatic 
statements neglect to even list pain as an important symptom to observe when 
making calculations. For example, the author of Epidemics I claims to have paid 
attention to a large variety of circumstances and symptoms when diagnosing 
diseases (Epidemics I 3.10)101: 
 
The following are the criteria I considered (taking into account both 
the common nature of every human as well as the particular 
constitution of each patient) when distinguishing between the 
diseases: the disease, the diseased person, the treatments applied, 
the person who prescribed them (since the practitioner can make 
things better or worse), the constitution in its entirety (but 
especially the heavens and the nature of each place), the custom, 
regimen, habits, and age of each patient. Also utterances, tempers, 
silence, thoughts, sleep, not sleeping, the timing and content of 
dreams, plucking, itching, weeping, paroxysms, fecal matter, urine, 
sputa, vomit. Any changes from one disease into another, the 
humoral manifestations of such transitions (both those that signal 
death and those that signal crisis), sweating, chill, rigor, cough, 
sneezing, hiccough, breathing, belching, flatulence (both silent and 
not), hemorrhages and hemorrhoids. A diagnosis must be made by 
considering both these things and whatever occurs as a result of 
these things. 
 
WA )a !("@ $A &+?<L-.$., E^ U& )*.'*'&]<5+-(&, -.T%&$(> E5 $N> 5+*&N> 
BD<*+> o!9&$2&, 5.@ $N> 3)04> q59<$+?· E5 $+, &+?<L-.$+>· E5 $+, 
&+<G+&$+>· E5 $#& !"+<B("+-G&2&· E5 $+, !"+<BG"+&$+>, E!@ $8 w+& 
'A" 5.@ F.;(!]$("+& E5 $+D$+?· E5 $N> 5.$.<$9<*+> J;4>, 5.@ 5.$A 
-G"(. $#& +K".&02& 5.@ F]"4> q59<$4>· E5 $+, cT(+>· E5 $N> )*.0$4>· E5 
                                                
101Cf. Epidemics IV 43 and Epidemics VI 8.17. 
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$#& E!*$4)(?-9$2&· E5 $N> e;*504> q59<$+?· ;%'+*<*· $"%!+*<*· <*'\· 
)*.&+L-.<*&· [!&+*<*&, +KF [!&+*<*&· E&?!&0+*<*& ++*<* 5.@ J$(· $*;-+H<*· 
5&4<-+H<*· ).5"D+*<*&· E5 $#& !."+^?<-#&· )*.F2"L-.<*&· +R"+*<*· 
!$?9;+*<*&· E-G$+*<*· 5.@ J<.* E^ +2& E> +r. )*.)+F.@ &+?<4-9$2&, 5.@ 
:!+<$9<*(> E!@ $8 p;GT"*+& 5.@ 5"0<*-+&· `)"]>· kD^*>· wH'+>· CL^· 
!$."-+0· ;?'-+0· !&(D-.$.· E"(D^*(>· B,<.*, <*'])((>, k+B])((>· 
.`-+w.'0.*, .`-+w+)(>· E5 $+D$2& 5.@ J<. )*A $+D$2& <5(!$G+&. 
 
 
This author claims to have taken many factors into consideration when 
diagnosing disease. Not only did he pay attention to a great variety of 
symptoms, he also calculated for such varied circumstances as the heavens, the 
patient’s age, and even his thoughts and dreams. The author does not mention, 
however, the symptom of pain. This omission comes in spite of the fact that both 
the constitutions (the accounts of epidemic diseases in various regions) and the 
case histories (the accounts of individual patients) in this treatise do include 
accounts of patients’ pain.  
The only such discussion that comes close to representing the dynamic 
role of the symptom of pain in Hippocratic medicine takes place in a list of the 
symptoms (W(5-L"*.) of disease (Nutriment 26):  
Symptoms: tickling irritation, (severe)102 pain, discharge, mind, 
sweat, sediment in urine, calmness, tossing in bed, fixed stare, 
fantasies, jaundice, hiccup, seizure, whole blood, sleep, from both 
these things and others in accordance with natural constitution, 
and all other things of such sort that generally help or not. Pains of 
the whole body or of a part [are] signs of greater or lesser severity, 
from both [locations of pain come signs] of greater severity and 
from both [come signs] of lesser. 
 
W(5-L"*., '."'.;*<-8>, p)D&4, wN^*>, '&]-4, `)"x>, +R"2& I!%<$.<*>, 
e<?F04, w*!$.<-8>, k*+> <$9<*(>, B.&$.<0.*, m5$("+>, ;?'-8>, E!*;4k04, 
.r-. d;+<F("a>, [!&+>, 5.@ E5 $+D$2& 5.@ E5 $#& Q;;2& $#& 5.$A BD<*&, 
                                                
102On the semantics of pain, see King 1988, Byl 1992, Rey 1995, 17–23, Horden 1999, Marzullo 
1999, Villard 2006 and below, Chapter Three. 
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5.@ J<. Q;;. $+*+?$%$"+!. E> C;9C4& 5.@ E> B(;04& d"-· !%&+* J;+? 
5.@ -G"(+>· -('GT+?> <4-L., $+, -a& E> $8 -Z;;+&, $+, )a E> $8 _<<+&, 
5.@ :!’ :-B+$G"2& E> $8 -Z;;+& 5.@ :!’ :-B+$G"2& E> $8 _<<+&. 
 
The first mention of pain (p)D&4) occurs in a list of symptoms not very unlike that 
found in Humors 2 above. Just as in that example, there seems to be no special 
order to the symptoms listed, and the nature of the symptoms include both the 
obviously material and visible (e.g. “sediment in urine”) and the (to us, at least, if 
not the Hippocratics) intangible (e.g. “mind”). This passage ends, however, with 
a second mention of pain (!%&+*) that does recognize the special position of pain 
in both medical practice and diagnostic, prognostic, and therapeutic theory. This 
aphoristic passage grows especially telegraphic by the end, but we can say with 
confidence that it draws some kind of connection between pain and prognosis.  
Pains, both those within the entire body, and those in specific locations, are 
useful signals (<4-L.) of the patient’s improvement or decline. Nevertheless, 
pain played a significant role in more than just prognosis; the processes of 
diagnosis and therapy in particular relied on pain. 
To a certain degree, then, Hippocratic authors seem to have been aware of 
the semiotic value that they accorded to pain. That some of these passages, 
however, do not seem to count pain as a symptom, and that those that do count it 
as such rarely assign any special prominence to the symptom, flies in the face of 
the reality of Hippocratic practice. In what follows, then, I examine the various 
circumstances under which pain has  a semiotic function. In the conclusion of 
this chapter I will return to the issue of this apparent disconnect between 
Hippocratic reliance on pain for semiotic functions on the one hand and, on the 
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other, an apparent disregard for (or obliviousness to) this practice. 
 
3. Pain and Nosology 
Pain plays a prominent role in the  classification of diseases (nosology).103  
At the most basic level, pain may signify a transition from health to disease, as 
when one author says that one could consider hunger a disease, inasmuch as it 
causes pain.104 For the author of Epidemics II as well, pain is a sign of the onset of 
disease: the author states that the beginning of an illness should be reckoned 
from the point at which the patient began to feel pain.”105 The author of Diseases I, 
however, does not paint in such broad strokes. He posits a class of diseases that 
have pain, as well as an additional class of diseases that, while not mortal, cause 
intense pain, but the implication in both cases are that there are diseases that do 
not occasion pain.106 At a very basic level, then, the presence of pain signifies 
whether a patient is suffering from a disease – or a particular class of disease – or 
not.  
The class of disease known as “acute” are defined by one author as the 
most deadly and the most painful. As such, these diseases require the closest care 
and most precise treatment (W#& &+D<2& <F()%& $* -9;*<$. .` p^(H.* 5.@ 
:!+5$(0&+?<* 5.@ E!*!+&]$.$.0 (3<*, Affections 13.1-2).107 The author of Aphorisms 
                                                
103On the basic principles of Hippocratic nosology, see Lonie 1965, Wittern 1987, Langholf 1990, 
Potter 1990, and Roselli 1990. 
104Breaths 1. 
105Epidemics II 1.11. 
106Diseases I 5 and 8.  
107 On the classification of acute diseases, see Potter 1990, 251-252. Acute diseases are defined 
(variously, as Potter notes) at Aphorisms 4.23, Epidemics III 8 and 16, and Regimen in Acute Diseases 
5. 
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similarly distinguishes acute diseases from non-acute ones based on the amount 
of pain experienced in both. Acute diseases cause extreme pain (1.7) and the 
severity of the pain a patient experiences is directly related to the severity of the 
disease from which he suffers (6.7).108 
Pain can be the criterion that distinguishes disease from health or classifies 
groups of diseases. More often than not, however, pain in the nosological 
treatises differentiates between individual diseases. 109  I have identified, 
furthermore, five ways in which pain serves to classify diseases: (1) pain can, in 
conjunction with other symptoms, aid in identifying a disease, (2) pain can 
constitute the “name” of a disease, (3) pain can constitute the entirety of a disease 
by virtue of being its only symptom, (4) pain, as the only symptom in 
complementary distribution, can differentiate between diseases or (5) between 
species of a single disease. I have chosen in this section to discuss evidence 
pulled mainly from the treatise Affections, inasmuch as this treatise tidily employs 
four of these five strategies, although in a few cases I have included additional 
examples from other treatises and have, in every case, also indicated where in the 
corpus additional examples can be found. 
Pain can function as a straightforward symptom of a named disease. 
Pleurisy, for example, is recognized by the presence of fever, pain in the side, 
shortness of breath, and coughing, phrenitis by mild fever and pain near the 
hypochondrium that tends to the right, near the liver. Tenesmus occurs when the 
                                                
108On the relationship between intensity of pain and intensity of disease, see below, Chapter 
Three. 
109The treatises Barrenness Affections, (Diseases of Women III), Diseases I, Diseases II, Diseases III, 
Diseases of Women I-II, Internal Affections, Nature of Woman, and Sight all, in part or whole, classify 
diseases. 
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patient’s stool contains dark blood and mucus and the bowels are in pain, 
especially during defecation, while the disease of arthritis causes the patient to 
suffer from fever and sharp pains in the joints.110 In each of these afflictions, pain, 
in conjunction with one or more additional symptoms, aids in defining and 
identifying a particular disease. In each case, the pain is specified: for all four 
diseases, by location, while in the case of tenesmus we are also told the physical 
circumstance under which the pain is present (defecation) and in the case of 
arthritis the intensity of the pain is further specified.111 Furthermore, in the 
descriptions of each of these diseases, the additional symptom(s) in combination 
with which pain defines the disease are all decidedly more observable and 
material than pain; fever, shortness of breath, coughing, and bloody and mucus-
filled stool are all physical phenomena that manifest externally in obvious and 
measurable ways.112 
In many cases, the symptom of pain is singled out for special mention. In 
these cases, the definition of an otherwise unnamed disease is headed with a 
description of the type of pain that occurs. One might say, then, that these 
diseases are named for the pains with which they are associated. Included in the 
author’s discussion of diseases that arise from the head are pains in the head and 
pain of the ears (“If pains should attack the head,” & E> $6& 5(B.;6& p)D&.* 
E-!G<2<*, Affections 2.1, and “If pain should attack the ears,” & E> $A $. p)D&4 
E-!G<O, Affections 4.1).113 The former is caused by an overabundance of phlegm in 
                                                
110All examples taken from Affections. Pleurisy: 7; phrenitis: 10; tenesmus: 26; arthritic disease: 30. 
111On the dimensions of pain, see below, Chapter Three. 
112On the materiality of pain, see above, Chapter One. 
113Potter 1990, 253 identifies the three ways in which diseases are named: in reference to “the 
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the head and should be treated with hot water washes, induced sneezing, and a 
diet of gruel and water, while the latter is caused when an excess of phlegm 
travels from the head into the ears and should be treated with a vapor bath, a 
medication designed to draw phlegm upwards, or a purgation. While these 
conditions both arise from an excess of phlegm (all disease, according to the 
author of this treatise, is caused by either bile or phlegm),114 the different 
treatments applied against them corresponds to the difference between the two 
diseases. Furthermore, any doubt as to the status of either of these conditions as 
diseases is put to rest when the author states that he has thus listed all of the 
diseases that arise out of the head (J<. :!8 $N> 5(B.;N> BD($.* &+?<L-.$., 
Affections 5.4-5). These two diseases are identified by their manifestation as pain 
in a specific location and, inasmuch as this criterion introduces each disease, they 
are “named” by their symptom.115  
Sometimes named diseases, while not taking their names from the pain 
associated with them, nevertheless are defined only by the symptom of pain. 
Witness the full entry on sciatica (Affections 29): 
Whenever sciatica occurs, pain seizes the area around the point 
where the hip attaches, the upper part of the rump, and the area 
around the buttock and in the end it spreads throughout the entire 
leg. It helps this patient, whenever pain is present, to soften the part 
of the leg the pain happens to settle in with baths, fomentations, 
and vapor baths and to purge the bowels. When the pain abates, 
give a downward-acting medication and after this, order the 
                                                
essential sign(s), the primary site, or the etiology of the disease. The many diseases that do not 
have names are referred to by some version of the formula: ‘if/when “x” happens’, where ‘x’ 
represents one or more of the same three features.” 
114Affections 1. 
115In the case of pains of the head, this type of naming was concretized into the term 5(B.;.;'0., 
“headache.” “Pains in the sides” seems to have been a particularly productive phrase: see, e.g. 
Aphorisms 3.23, 6.5, Coan Prenotions 372, Epidemics VI 2.5 and 7.11, and Regimen in Acute Diseases 
(Appendix) 33. 
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patient to drink refined donkey milk. Give for the pain the 
medicines which are listed in the book about medications. This 
disease arises whenever bile and phlegm settle down in the blood 
vessels (either because of some other disease, or for some other 
reason). As a consequence, whatever portion of the blood has been 
brought to a stand from the phlegm and bile becomes diseased. 
Accordingly, this material wanders about through the blood vessel 
of the leg and wherever it settles, there does the pain become 
especially obvious. This disease is long and painful, but not deadly. 
If the pain firmly establishes itself in a certain spot, and is not 
driven out by medications, cauterize the area where the pain 
happens to be, and burn with a linen towel. 
 
u<F*A> )a J$.& 'G&4$.*, p)D&4 ;.-C9&(* E> $6& !"%<B?<*& $+, 3<F0+? 5.@ 
E> Q5"+& $8 !?'.H+& 5.@ E> $8& ';+?$%&· $G;+> )a 5.@ )*A !.&$8> $+, 
<5G;(+> !;.&Z$.* e p)D&4. W+D$Y ^?-BG"(*, J$.& e p)D&4 cFO, 
-.;9<<(*& 5.T’ d5+H+& g& $?'F9&O $+, <5G;(+> <$4"01+?<. e p)D&4, E& 
;+?$"+H<* 5.@ F;*9<-.<* 5.@ !?"0O<*, 5.@ $6& 5+*;04& I!9'(*&· J$.& )a 
;2BL<O e p)D&4, B9"-.5+& )+,&.* 59$2· 5.@ -($A $.,$. !*(H& '9;. 
&+? qBT%&· )*)%&.* )a $N> p)D&4> b 'G'".!$.* !."A $+H<* B."-95+*<*&. 
 )a &+,<+> '0&($.*, E!(*)A& F+;6 5.@ B;G'-. E> $6& .`-%w++& B;GC. 
5.$.<$4"0^O, S E^ q$G"4> &+D<+?, S Q;;2>, d5%<+& g& $+, .-.$+> I!8 
B;G'-.$+> 5.@ F+;N> &+<L<O ^?&(<$45%>· $+,$+ 'A" !;.&Z$.* :&A $8 
<5G;+> )*A $N> B;(C8> $N> .`-+w%+? 5.@ J5+? g& <$\, e p)D&4 5.$A 
$+,$+ c&)4;+> -9;*<$. '0&($.*, e )a &+,<+> -.5"6 '0&($.* 5.@ E!0!+&+>, 
T.&.$])4> )a +R· S& )a E> |& $* F2"0+& 5.$.<$4"0^O e p)D&4 5.@ <$\, 5.@ 
$+H<* B."-95+*<* -6 E^(;.D&4$.*, 5.,<.* 5.T’ d5+H+& g& $%!+& $?'F9&O 
E+,<. e p)D&4, 5.0(*& )a $X -+;0&Y. 
 
Sciatica is long and painful, the author tells us. While the given etiology of 
sciatica is quite involved (both bile and phlegm collect in blood vessels and infect 
the blood; this diseased blood then establishes itself in the leg and causes pain), 
the one and only symptom of sciatica is –  as we are told multiple times – pain. 
In the case of sciatica, the only symptom of the disease is pain. When it 
comes to certain classes of diseases, namely those affecting the areas of kidney, 
bowel, or lung, pain is often the only distinguishing symptom between these 
diseases. 
The author of Internal Affections identifies four kidney diseases. In each of 
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these diseases the patient’s urine displays some abnormality (Internal Affections 
14-17):  
(1st Disease): urine contains sand. 
 
(2nd Disease): urine contains blood that eventually turns to pus. 
 
(3rd Disease): urine resembles the juice that runs off from roast beef. 
 
(4th Disease): the patient has difficulty urinating and the urine 
produced contains thick white or red sediment. Later, the feet and 
legs grow cold and he passes almost no urine. 
 
How distinguishing are these characteristics really? The sandy sediment in the 
urine produced in the first disease is different enough from the urine deposits 
described in the second and third diseases to be a distinguishing symptom; 
however, the visible difference between sandy sediment and the white sediment 
described in the fourth disease may be slight. Furthermore, in the case of the final 
three diseases, the distinction between the quality of the urine has the potential 
to be minimal; the contrast between blood, roast beef jus, and red sediment, after 
all, seems to be one of hue and viscosity, two qualities that are certainly in the eye 
of the beholder. Urine deposits, however, are not the only symptoms of these 
diseases (Internal Affections 14-17):  
 
(1st Disease): the patient suffers from sharp pain in the kidney, loin, 
flank and the testicle on the same side as the kidney. Pain ceases 
upon urination, but comes back later. When urinating, the patient 
rubs his penis on account of the pain. 
 
(2nd Disease): pains press the patient terribly just as in the first 
disease. The patient feels increased pain if he exerts himself in any 
way. Eventually there is swelling next to the spine (once the kidney 
suppurates). 
 
(3rd Disease): There are pains briefly in the loins, bladder, perineum 
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and kidney. The pains remit, but then quickly return sharply. 
Sometimes there is pain in the narrow part of the abdomen. 
 
(4th Disease): pains in the side, flank, loins and the muscle of the 
lower back. This patient suffers the same pain as a woman in labor. 
He feels no pain if he lies on the painful side, but if he lies on the 
opposite side feels like it is hanging down. This disease continues 
on in the same way for a year or more, then the pains increase and 
there is internal suppuration with concurrent swelling. 
 
In all four diseases, the symptom of pain varies in terms of intensity, duration, 
location, and circumstance. We are told that the pains of the second disease are as 
intense as those suffered in the first, while the pains of the third disease increase 
in intensity and those of the fourth are as intense as labor pains and grow 
eventually worse. In chronological terms, the pains in all four diseases appear 
intermittently: in the first disease, the pain disappears upon urination, but 
returns later; in the second, the pain increases upon physical exertion; in the 
third, the pains appear only briefly at first, then return just as quickly, and with a 
vengeance; in the fourth disease, the pains persist for at least a year before 
increasing in intensity. The location of pain also serves to distinguish the first and 
second diseases together (both diseases affect the same areas) from the third and 
fourth diseases, respectively: kidney, loin, flank, and testicle (first and second 
disease); loins, bladder, perineum, and kidney, and sometimes abdomen (third 
disease); side, flank, loins, lower back muscle (fourth disease). Finally, the 
circumstances under which the patient feels pain is also variable: in the first 
disease, the patient suffers during urination (at which point he also rubs his 
penis); in the second disease pain occurs upon exertion; and in the fourth the 
patient feels (or doesn’t feel) pain, depending on what side he lies. We can see, 
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then, the pains experienced in these four diseases differ from each other in 
multiple ways, while the urines produced in each may not have been as easily 
distinguishable.  
Pain plays a similar role in distinguishing between intestinal diseases. The 
author of Affections even remarks on the similarity between dysentery, lientery, 
and diarrhea, then goes on to prescribe the same treatment for all three (V$.* .` 
&+,<+*, f $( )?<(&$("04 5.@ e ;(*(&$("04 5.@ )*9w+*., !.".!;L<*.0 (3<*, 5.@ )(H .K$A> 
+[$2> 3N<T.*, Affections 25). In fact, just as in the case of the kidney diseases 
described in Internal Affections, these intestinal diseases are distinguished in 
terms of both pains (Affections 23-26): 
 
(Dysentery): pain and colic throughout the intestinal cavity. 
 
(Lientery): no pain. 
 
(Long bouts of diarrhea): [the symptoms of diarrhea are not given 
in this treatise, however, the condition is described in Nature of 
Woman 36.5 as causing pain. Furthermore, in Aphorisms 7.29, Crises 
10.4 and 53.1, and Diseases I 7.11 the condition is modified with the 
adjective 3<F?"%>, “violent, severe,” a term that is often used to 
describe the quality of certain pains116). 
 
and the content and character of their effluvia. In the case of these diseases, the 
patient’s stool contains either (Affections 23-25): 
 
(Dysentery) bile, phlegm, and burnt blood. 
 
(Lientery) undigested food and water. 
 
(Long bouts of diarrhea) undigested food and water, eventually 
                                                
116On the dimensions of pain, see below, Chapter Three.. 
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phlegm. 
 
Effluvia and pain work in tandem to distinguish between these three diseases: 
lientery and diarrhea provoke the passage of identical stool, but the former is 
painless, while the latter is painful. In dysentery and diarrhea the situation is 
reversed: both cause pain, but the stool produced is, in the first disease, full of 
bile, phlegm, and burnt blood and, in the latter, watery and full of undigested 
food.  
Dysentery and lientery are distinguishable in terms of both effluvia and 
pain. The etymologies of the terms “dysentery” and “lientery,” however, indicate 
that the fundamental notional difference between the two rests not so much in 
the quality of the effluvia as in the ease or difficulty with which the stool is 
evacuated: lientery (;(H+&, “gentle” + c&$("+&, “intestines”) is gentle, while 
dysentery ()?<-, “bad” + c&$("+&, “intestines”) is difficult. While these qualities 
could refer to the stool produced in each condition (in this case, we would want 
to understand a contrast between “smooth” and “hard”), the distinction between 
the effluvia seems to be more one of content, than of density or texture. It makes 
more sense that these prefixes are a reference to the pain involved in bowel 
evacuation, inasmuch as we are told outright that dysentery is painful, while 
lientery is not.117  
In renal and intestinal diseases, then, pain operates in conjunction with 
                                                
117By way of contrast, the term diarrhea ()*9, “through” + wG2, “flow”) evokes the character of the 
“runny” effluvia produced in this disease, while the etymology of the intestinal disease tenesmus, 
the “straining” disease (from $(0&2), a condition described in the section immediately following 
this one, evokes the quality of bowel evacuation (tenesmus is characterized by constipation, pain 
in the lower intestinal cavity, especially during attempted defecation, and the presence of mucus 
and dark blood in the stool). 
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effluvia to distinguish between similar diseases. When it comes to distinguishing 
between diseases of the lung, however, pain plays an even more vital role (Places 
in Man 14.1-6, 12-16): 
Whenever there is a flowing of material to the chest and bile is 
there, this condition is made clear by the following: pain in the 
flank and the collar bone on the same side as the flank, fever, the 
top of the tongue becomes green, and congealed stuff is coughed 
up. The dangerous time for this disease is the seventh or ninth day. 
Whenever both sides have pain, but the other symptoms are the same as in 
the first disease, it is called pneumonia (the first disease is called pleuritis) 
… pneumonia is by far the more dangerous (of the two), its pains in 
the flanks and collar bones are much stronger, and the tongue is 
greener, and the patient feels pain in the throat from the drainage, 
and a strong weariness occurs, and the breath is restrained on the 
sixth or seventh day. 
 
!%$.& )a E> $8& 50T."+& wGO 5.@ F+;6 z, $X)( )N;%& E<$*&· p)D&4 cF(* 
E> $6& ;.!9"4& 5.@ E> $6& 5;4). $6& E> $6& ;.!9"4&, 5.@ !?"($8>, 5.@ e 
';#<<. $A Q&2 F;2"6 '0&($.*, 5.@ :!+F"G-!$($.* ^?-!(!4'%$.· $.D$4> 
$N> &+D<+? qC)+-.0Y d 50&)?&%> E<$*& S E&&.$.0Y. !"#$%& '()#$*+% $, 
-.*/+, '.012, $, 3’ 4..% 5(67% 8 $9 :$1+2, %;$< (=& -*+7-.*/(6&>< ?@$A&, B 3’ 
:$1+< -.*/+C$7D …  !("*!;(?-+&04 !+;= E!*5*&)?&+$G"4 E<$@, 5.@ p)D&.* 
!+;= 3<F?"%$(".0 (3<*& .` E> $A> ;.!9".> 5.@ E> $A> 5;4).>, 5.@ e 
';#<<. !+;= F"+$G"4, 5.@ $6& B9"?''. :;'G(* I!8 $+, w(D-.$+>, 5.@ 
5%!+> cF(* 3<F?"8>, 5.@ !&(,-. q5$.H+& S qC)+-.H+& ;91($.*. 
 
The location of pain (in one or both sides) is the only distinguishable difference 
between pleurisy and pneumonia. Similarly, in Diseases I, pleurisy is 
characterized by fever, severe pains in the side, pain in the shoulder, collarbone, 
and axilla, and the coughing up of matured material; sometimes there is also 
pain in the area below the side which then often causes bilious urine. By contrast, 
pneumonia causes fever and pain, especially in the back, sides, shoulders and 
spine, and the coughing up of matured material. Again, the only reliable 
difference between these two diseases is the location and quality of the pains 
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experienced in each.118  
Finally, pain can also be the only distinguishing symptom among varieties 
of disease. The author of Diseases III distinguishes between two types of 
pneumonia: one in which the patient feels pain from the beginning of the disease, 
and another where no pain is felt until the patient begins to cough up material. 
This latter disease, he claims, both lasts longer and is more intense than the 
former.119 
We can see then, that pain differentiates between diseases in at least five 
ways. Pain can be (1) a symptom of disease, (2) can “name” a disease or (3) 
constitute a disease. Additionally, pain may be the only factor that distinguishes 
(4) between diseases or (5) varieties of the same disease.120  
 
4. Pain and Prognosis 
The author of Diseases I claims that any prospective physician must learn, among 
other things, “what bad thing following another bad thing creates something 
good, and which bad thing necessarily follows on another bad thing (J $* 5.58& 
E!@ 5.5X '(&%-(&+& :'.T8& !+*G(*· 5.@ J $* 5.58& E!@ 5.5X :&9'54 '(&G<T.*, Diseases I 
1.25-26). The prediction of the course and outcome of disease was a large part of 
Hippocratic medicine,121 an operation that, in many cases, depended on the sign 
                                                
118Cf. the diseases described in Internal Affections 18 and 19: the latter disease is generally identical 
to the first, save that the patient experiences a sharp pain in the spleen. 
119Diseases III 15; cf. Critical Days 10. 
120It should be noted, however, that the semiotic dynamism of pain is potentially limited in 
treatises where diseases are classified in terms of affected location or etiology – or, in the case of 
the gynecological diseases, both. On the limited semiotic value of pain in so-called women’s 
diseases, see Chapter Four. 
121The “prognostic” treatises include Coan Prenotions, Humors, Crises, Critical Days, Prognostic, 
Prorrhetic I, Prorrhetic II. On prognosis in Hippocratic medicine, see Pagel 1939, Edelstein 1967, 65-
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of pain. 
Pain could be used simply to indicate the length of a disease. For example, 
pain in the groin during fever indicates that the disease will be of long 
duration.122 Pain could also be put to more strenuous use, however. In order to 
predict the crises of disease, authors often relied on pain. The commencement of 
pain in a disease characterized by fever, headache, darkened vision, heartburn 
and vomiting is used to predict when the disease will reach a crisis: if the pain 
begins on the first day of the disease, the patient will fare the worst on the fourth 
and fifth day. The majority of patients, however, begin to feel pain on the third 
day, feel the worst on the fifth, and regain health on the ninth or eleventh day. 
Finally, if a patient should not feel pain until the fifth day, crisis will not occur 
until the fourteenth.123 An example from Diseases III is equally elaborate (Diseases 
III 16): in both bilious and sanguinous pleurisies, if the pains are mild at first, but 
grow sharp on the fifth or sixth day, the disease is over by the twelfth day and is 
not very mortal; if the pains are mild at first, but sharp from the seventh or 
eighth day onwards, the crisis and recovery occur on the fourteenth day. 
Pain is certainly a “bad” sensation in the eyes of the sufferer and, as we 
have already seen, was closely associated with disease.124 Given these 
associations, it is not surprising that pain was often considered to be a bad sign. 
In every kind of fever, for example, pain of the neck is a bad sign, and is the 
                                                
85 and Thivel 1985. 
122 Coan Prenotions 73. 
123Prognostic 24. 
124On pain as a “negative” sensation, see Chapter One. 
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worst sign in patients who are likely to become delirious.125 
Pain doesn’t always have a negative meaning, however: a sudden 
nosebleed that occurs during a fever in summer or fall is a fatal sign unless a 
mass of blood forces excess blood out of the nose or anus, or causes an abscess, or 
creates pains in the hypochondrium, or pains that move towards a testicle or the 
legs.126 
Just as pain can be good, not feeling pain can be bad: it is a fatal sign for 
pains to disappear without a reason, while giving birth without pain is 
considered a dangerous sign.127 
Pain doesn’t just look forward. The author of Prorrhetic I states that “pain 
of the heart that follows upon pain in the lower back is a sign of hemorrhage and, 
I think, also a sign that a hemorrhage happened previously” (t<BD E!2)D&Y 
5.")*.;'*5A !"+<*%&$., <4-(H. .`-+w])(., +7-.* )a 5.@ !"+'(&%-(&., Prorrhetic I 
130). Here, pain certainly predicts a future event and, the author suspects, may 
be proof of a prior event.128 
In some cases, pain was the predominant circumstance under which 
prognoses were made, as is the case for angina (Coan Prenotions 366-370): 
 
(366) fatal: in angina, pains moving to head together with fever and 
no other signs. 
 
(367) fatal: in angina, pains moving to legs together with fever and 
no other signs. 
 
(368) a pain of the hypochondrium that comes from anginas, when 
                                                
125Prorrhetic I 73. 
126Regimen in Acute Diseases (Appendix) 29. 
127Coan Prenotions 364 and 527; on the benefits of pain in childbirth, see Chapter Four. 
128On the tendency of diseases to “settle” in places that are in pain, see Chapter One. 
 57 
there is no crisis, but there is sluggishness, kills the patient without 
obvious cause, even when it seems especially alright. 
 
(369) intense pain that arrives in the chest and intestinal cavity as a 
result of lessening anginas, together with no other signs, causes the 
patient to suffer purulent diarrhea, and be released (most of the 
time) from this disease. 
 
(370) fatal: all symptoms that arise from anginas, save those that 
create a perceptible pain; Chronic pains travel to the legs and the 
patient has difficult suppuration. 
 
(366)  & 5?&9'FO :<L-2> (3> 5(B.;6& :;'L-.$. -($A !?"($+,, 
p;GT"*.. 
 
(367) & 5?&9'FO :<L-2> E> <5G;4 :;'L-.$. -($A !?"($+,, p;GT"*..   
 
(368)  5 5?&.'F*5#& :5"0$2> I!+F+&)"0+? Q;'4-., -($A :5".<04> 5.@ 
&2T"%$4$+> '(&%-(&+&, 5$(0&(* ;.T".02>, (3 5.@ !9&? )+5+H(& E!*(*5#> 
cF(*&.  
 
(369)  5 5?&.'F*5#& :<L-2> 3<F&.&TG&$2& E> <$NT+> Q;'4-. 5.@ E> 
5+*;04& E;T8& <D&$+&+&, !+*G(* !?#)(> )*.F2"G(*&, Q;;2> 5.@ ;?+-G&+? 
$8 $+*+,$+&.  
 
(370)  5 5?&.'F*5#& !9&$. p;GT"*., J<. -6 c5)4;+& E!+04<(& Q;'4-.· 
:$A" 5.@ E> <5G;(. :;'L-.$. F"%&*. B+*$, 5.@ E5!?+,$.* )?<5%;2>. 
 
In each of these five prognoses, pain is used to indicate the outcome of angina. 
Several of the circumstances under which a patient suffering from angina feels 
pain were thought to be mortal (the pains in 366, 367, 368), but the pain felt in 369 
was considered beneficial, and section 370 states that any symptom except for 
pain, causes death! 
While authors may have utilized all types of symptoms to make 
predictions,129 we cannot discount the role pain played in prognosis. 
                                                
129Holmes 2010, 156-162 identifies effluvia and behavior as the most productive symptoms in 
prognosis, although, as I argued in Chapter One, when considering pain per se, we must account 
for the qualitative difference between other symptoms and the symptom of pain: perceptibility. 
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5. Pain and Therapy 
We have already seen in Chapter One how the treatment of pain relies on the 
notion that pain is a byproduct of material imbalance. Just as the treatment of 
disease attempts to restore the body to a proportional balance, so, too, does the 
treatment for pain involve various techniques for removing one or more humors 
from one or more bodily exits. The treatments found in the Hippocratic Corpus 
fall into two categories: those that treat specific symptoms (overwhelmingly the 
symptom is pain), and those that treat whole diseases (and thus treat an array of 
symptoms). Pain figures in more than just obviously analgesic procedures, 
however.130 Most treatments, regardless of their intended target, rely on the 
indications that pain provides. 
Throughout the Hippocratic treatises, the behavior of pain is consistently 
a deciding factor, if not often the only factor, in how a patient is to be treated. For 
example, the following is the treatment prescribed for a certain nephritic disease 
(Internal Affections 18.14-29): 
 
[H]ave the patient drink squirting-cucumber juice, thapsia root, 
hellebore, or scammony juice. After the cleaning, administer the 
same things as to the patients above. If the disease does not go 
away with this treatment, fatten the patient on milk, and burn four 
eschars beside his right shoulder-blade, three into the acetabulum 
of his right hip-joint, two under his buttock, two in the middle of 
his thigh, and one each above his knee and his ankle. If a person is 
cauterized in this way, it will not allow the disease to migrate either 
upwards or downwards. If, however, pain breaks out first, and, 
before you can cauterize, it becomes fixed in the leg, the patient will 
become lame; if it becomes fixed in the head, he will become deaf 
or blind, if in the bladder, blood will be passed along with the urine 
                                                
130On anodynes, see King 1988 and Rey 1993, 31f. 
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for forty days; if pain occupies the bladder, give the same 
medications as to a patient with strangury. If the pain settle 
somewhere else, cauterize: burn fleshy parts with irons, osseous 
and fibrous ones with fungi …131 
 
W+,$+&, J$.& +[$2> cFO, E;.$L"*+& !H<.* S T.k04> w01.& S E;;GC+"+& S 
p!8& <5.--2&04>· -($A )a $6& 59T."<*& $.K$A !"+<BG"(*&, b 5.@ $+H<* 
!"%<T(&. & )a -6 I!8 $.D$4> $N> T(".!(04> !.D4$.*, '9;.5$* !.FD&.> 
5.,<.* 59$2 $6& -+!;9$4& $6& )(^*6& $G<<.".> E<F9".>, 5.@ E> $6& 
5+$?;0). $+, 3<F0+? $+, )(^*+, $"(H>, 5.@ I!8 $8& ';+?$8& )D+, 5.@ E& $X 
-G<Y $+, -4"+, )D+, 5.@ I!a" $+, '+D&.$+> -04&, 5.@ I!a" $+, <B?"+, 
-04&. PV$+>, S& +[$2 5.?T\, +K5 :B04<*& +R$( Q&2 +R$( 59$2 $6& 
&+,<+& )*.F2"G(*&. & )G 5+? e p)D&4 BT\ w.'(H<., S& -a& <$4"0^O E> 
$8 <5G;+> !"@& S 5.?TN&.*, F2;8> c<$.*· S& )a E> $6& 5(B.;6&, 52B8> S 
$?B;%>· S& )a E> $6& 5D<$*&, !"+F2"G(* {-. $X +R"Y .-.$+> -9;*<$. 
$(<<."95+&$. e-G".>. ;;A F"6, S& E> $6& 5D<$*& w.'\, )*)%&.* $A .K$A 
B9"-.5., b 5.@ $X <$".''+?"*#&$*· 5.@ & 5+? Q;;O e p)D&4 <$\, 
5.,<.*· 5.0(*& )a F"6 $A -a& <."5])(. <*)4"0+*<*, $A )a p<$])(. 5.@ 
&(?"])(. -D54<*. 
 
The first half of this therapy relies on treating the patient before the pain of this 
disease should settle in any particular place in the body. The patient must be 
treated differently, however, if pain should settle in certain areas: if the bladder 
becomes pained, the physician must give the patient a medication for strangury 
and if any other body part besides the bladder should grow pained, the 
physician must use cautery. 
Injunctions to treat a patient differently based on the behavior of pain 
could be quite involved. For example, in all acute diseases, treatment for pains in 
the side were supposed to follow a particular course. In the first place, these 
pains were treated with hot fomentations. If the pain should show signs of 
extending to the collarbone, however, the physician was supposed to 
phlebotomize the inner vein of the elbow. If, however, the pain was under the 
                                                
131Tr. Potter, modified. 
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diaphragm and did not show signs of heading towards the collar bone, the 
physician was supposed to soften the bowels, using any number of appropriate 
purgatives. As soon as the patient takes the purgative, the physician then placed 
the patient on a restricted diet that he gradually increased, but only if the pain in 
the side had disappeared.132 Both type and manner of treatment relied on the sign 
of pain. 
In the case history of a patient in Epidemics VII we can see that this use of 
pain to determine treatment occurred in practice as well (Epidemics VII 112.1-6): 
Polyphantus, in Abdera, had pain in the head with severe fever. 
Urine thin, lots of it, deposits shaggy and disordered. When the 
pain in his head did not stop, a sternutatory was applied on the 
tenth day. Afterwards he had a severe pain in the neck. He 
produced urine that was red, turbid, like a mule’s. his mind was 
unsound in a phrenetic manner. He died with powerful 
convulsions …133 
 
+;DB.&$+> E& C)L"+*<* 5(B.;6& )?&Z$+ E& !?"($X <B+)"X· +j". 
;(!$A, !+?;;9· I!+<$9<*(> ).<G.* 5.@ :&.$($.".'-G&.*· +K !.?+-G&+? 
)a $+, :;'L-.$+> $N> 5(B.;N>, !$."-*5A !"+<($GT4 E%&$* )(5.$.0Y. 
M($A )a, E> $"9F4;+& p)D&4 3<F?"L· +j"+& h;T(& E"?T"8&, 
:&.$($.".'-G&+&, +r+& I!+1?'0+?· !."G5"+?<( $"%!+& B"(&*$*5%&· 
:!GT.&(& E& <!.<-+H<*& 3<F?"+H<*&. 
 
Polyphantus’ physician treated him with a sternutatory in direct response to the 
fact that the pain in his head persisted. Clearly, the principle that underlies the 
instructions in the examples from Internal Affections and Regimen in Acute Diseases 
– that specific types of pain dictate the type of treatment a patient should receive 
– is also behind Polyphantus’ sternutatory.  
The evidence I have examined thus far shows how pain is used as a sign 
                                                
132Regimen in Acute Diseases 7. 
133Tr. Smith. 
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to indicate the type and manner of therapy a physician should use to treat 
disease.134 In some cases, however, it seems that pain is not so much a guiding 
factor in the treatment of disease as it is a symptom that must be dealt with 
separately from the disease proper. Consider the prescribed treatment for pleurisy 
(Affections 7.1-11):  
 
Pleurisy, there are fever, pain in the side, orthopnoea and coughing. 
At the beginning the patient expectorates sputum that is slightly 
bilious, but then by the fifth or sixth day also somewhat purulent. 
Against the pain in his side, give this patient a medication to 
remove phlegm and bile from the side, for if you do this the pain 
will be mildest. Clean the cavity downwards by giving a 
medication and cooling it with an enema; this is very beneficial 
throughout the whole course of the disease. Administer drinks and 
gruel: give these draughts quickly in order that the sputum will be 
cleaned thoroughly from the side. When the side begins to be 
cleaned, it is beneficial to bring the material lying against the chest 
wall to maturity by warming the side from the outside; earlier this 
is not useful, as the material only becomes dry … 135 
 
;(?"H$*>· !?"($8> m<F(*, 5.@ $+, !;(?"+, p)D&4, 5.@ p"T+!&+04, 5.@ CL^· 
5.@ $8 <0(;+& 5.$’ :"FA> -a& I!%F+;+& !$D(*, E!(*)A& )a !(-!$.H+> 
'G&4$.* S q5$.H+>, 5.@ I!%!?+&. W+D$Y $+, -a& !;(?"+, $N> p)D&4> 
)*)%&.*, J $* :!+<$L<(* :!8 $+, !;(?"+, $% $( B;G'-. 5.@ $6& F+;L&· e 
'A" p)D&4 +[$2> g& (m4 -.;.52$9$4· $6& )a 5+*;04& T(".!(D(*& 
I!9'+&$* 5.@ kDF+&$* 5;D<-.$*· +[$2 'A" $\ &+D<Y $\ ^?-!9<O 
^?-B+"]$.$.· !"+<BG"(*& )a !+$%& $( 5.@ w%B4-., 5.@ $A !%-.$. 
)*)%&.* p^D$("., s> $8 <0(;+& :&.5.T.0"4$.* :!8 $+, !;(?"+,· J$.& )a 
5.T.0"(<T.* Q"^4$.* $8 !,+&, T("-.0&+&$. ^?-BG"(* $8 !;(?"8& c^2T(& 
!(!.0&(*& $A !"8> $8 !;(?"%&· !"%<T(& )a +K ^?-BG"(*· ^4".0&($.* '9". 
 
“Pain in the side” is one of four symptoms of pleurisy, yet it is to receive its own 
treatment, separate from those designed to treat the rest of the disease. We are 
                                                
134See also Aphorisms 4.18, 4.20; Diseases II 14, 16, 18, 19, 27, 45, 47, 54-58, 67, 69; Diseases III 1, 3; 
Epidemics II 5.21; Crises 56, 59; Affections 7; Internal Affections 4, 7, 14, 16, 19, 24, 27, 41; Places in 
Man 12; Regimen in Acute Diseases 19, 24; Regimen in Acute Diseases (Appendix) 31, 51. It is likely no 
coincidence that the treatises that tend to use pain as an indication of type and manner of 
treatment are the ones that most equate pain with disease. For a list of these treatises, see below, 
p. 27, n. 44. 
135Tr. Potter. 
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told that the medication for removing bile and phlegm is meant to reduce the 
pain to a milder state and it is quite clear that this treatment is intended to treat 
the symptom of pain in particular ($+, … !;(?"+, $N> p)D&4>). Conversely, the 
additional therapies (purgative, enema, drinks and gruel) do not target 
individual symptoms, while the purgative/enema combination is said to be 
helpful during the entirety of the disease (+[$2 'A" $\ &+D<Y $\ ^?-!9<O 
^?-B+"]$.$.).136 
Pain, then, is an indication of how and in what manner a patient should 
receive treatment. The circumstances under which pain dictates treatment, 
however, indicate that, in some cases at least, the symptom of pain was 
decoupled from the rest of disease and treated as a separate affliction. This 
dichotomy (pain as a symptom of disease and pain as its own disease), as we will 
see below in Section 7,  was not restricted to therapy, but was operative in almost 
every context. 
 
 
6. Pain and Theoretical Proof 
Hippocratic authors even use the existence of pain as proof of an important 
claim, capitalizing, perhaps, on the semiotic power pain displayed in many other 
contexts.137 The author of Internal Affections, for example, relies on the existence of 
pain as proof for his claim that sciatica is caused by exposure to the sun (Internal 
Affections 51.1-7): 
                                                
136See also, Diseases III 7, 12; Affections 9, 10, 15, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30; Places in Man 17, 20, 26; Regimen 
in Acute Diseases 22, 23. 
137Cf. Holmes 2010, 125. Holmes states that the symptom is used in diagnosis, prognosis, and 
proof, while I prefer to count the use of pain in therapy as a distinct usage. On the problems with 
subsuming pain under the category of “the symptom,” see above, Chapter One. 
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Sciatica: sciatica comes about from the following origins in most 
cases: if the patient gets sun for too much time and the joints of the 
hip are warmed through and the moisture in the joints is dried up 
by the heat. My proof that drying and stiffening occur: The person 
who has this disease is unable to turn or move the joints because of 
both the pain in them and the stiffening of the vertebrae. 
 
("@ 3<F*9)+>· 3<F*A> )a :!8 $#&)( $#& :B+"-#& '0&($.* -9;*<$. $+H<* 
!+;;+H<*&, S& (`;4T\ E& $X e;0Y !+?;=& F"%&+& 5.@ $A 3<F0. 
)*.T("-.&T\ 5.@ $8 I'"8& :&.^4".&T\ I!8 $+, 5.D-.$+> $8 E&(8& E& 
$+H<*& Q"T"+*<*&. > )a :&.^4".0&($.* 5.@ !L'&?$.*, $%)( -+* $(5-L"*+&· 
d 'A" &+<G2& <$"GB(<T.* S 5*&G(*& $A Q"T". +K )D&.$.* I!8 $N> E& 
.K$+H<*& :;'4)%&+> 5.@ $+, ^?-!(!4'G&.* $+=> <!+&)D;+?>· 
 
Here, the fact that the patient cannot move on account of pain is adduced as (an 
admittedly tendentious) proof of the supposed cause of this disease. 
Most striking of these proofs, of course, is the tactic employed by the 
author of Nature of Man in service of his argument against the proposition that 
the human body is a unity, composed of only one element. Such a body, he 
asserts, would not feel pain. If this hypothetical body were to feel pain, he adds, 
there would exist only one cure for disease. Since, however, there are many cures 
in existence, the body must be composed of a multitude of elements.138 This proof 
assumes that the audience has a particular idea about the nature of pain. Pain 
must, in this view, arise as a result of material change and, since a unity could 
never undergo change, clearly the body must be composed of multiple 
substances. I have, so far, discussed the relationship between humoral theory and 
pain in unidirectional terms: because the body contains observable humors, pain 
(as some kind of manifestation139 of a change in internal balance) is therefore a 
                                                
138 Nature of Man 2.11-12. See also the discussion of this passage above, Chapter One. Holmes 2010 
discusses the philosophical tradition behind arguments such as this one. 
139See above, Chapter One, for a discussion of whether pain is a reaction to material change, or if 
it actually exists as the change. 
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useful indication that change has occurred within the body. This is a relationship 
that relies on taking the existence of humors within the body as a given: it is 
humoral theory, in other words, that imbues pain with such significance. In this 
example from Nature of Man, however, we can see that the road runs both ways: 
just as the existence of humors sanctions the physician’s reliance on the symbol 
of pain, so too can the existence of pain legitimize the theory of humors. 
 
7. Pain and Disease 
I want to return to the topic of pain’s semiotic function in nosology in order to 
highlight the unstable relationship between pain and disease. As we saw, pain 
distinguishes disease and between diseases in several different ways. This 
variety, as I aim now to suggest, reflects a corresponding diversity in the very 
notion of pain. 
Pain can be construed as either a symptom of disease or as a disease itself. 
As a symptom, pain is subordinate to the category of disease; Hippocratic 
diseases are syndromes (constellations of symptoms) and, when it functions as a 
symptom, pain works in tandem with other signs to signify the presence of 
disease.140 It is in this role as symptom that I have suggested pain has a robust 
semiotic function in the contexts of nosology, prognosis, therapy, and theoretical 
proof.  
Consider again the treatise Affections. Here we find pain operating as both 
symptom and disease. Pain is listed as a symptom in several “named” diseases: 
pleurisy, pneumonia, phrenitis, fever, ileus, dysentery, lientery, tenesmus, 
                                                
140Syndrome: Holmes 2010, 133. 
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arthritis, and gout;141while pain is a disease in Affections 2, 4, 15 and 16. The 
disease of sciatica straddles this divide, inasmuch as the disease, although named 
for the location (“the hip disease”), rather than the nature of the affliction, 
nevertheless is constituted by pain and pain alone. Any ambiguity over the 
confused relationship between pain and disease in this treatise, furthermore, is 
dispelled by the fact that the author refers to the diseases of cholera and diarrhea 
as “pains” (:;'L-.$., Affections 27.15).142 
This confusion over the categorization of pain permeates the entire 
Hippocratic Corpus. Rarely can a treatise be found to be entirely consistent about 
the position of pain relative to disease, although there are certainly treatises that 
lean heavily in one or the other direction.143 
I have spent most of this chapter unambiguously referring to pain as a 
symptom, and focusing on evidence that reveals pain in this function. In what 
remains, however, I shall show that pain should not, de facto, be assumed to 
function as a symptom.  
In some cases, pain and disease are clearly different “things” (or 
                                                
141Affections 7, 9, 10, 14, 21, 23, 25, 26, 30 and 31. 
142Cf., e.g. Nature of Man 15. 
143Pain is (mostly) a symptom of disease: Airs, Waters, Places, Barrenness (Diseases of Women III), 
Coan Prenotions, Crises, Diseases I, Diseases II, Diseases III, Diseases in Women I, Diseases in Women II, 
Epidemics I, Epidemics III, Epidemics IV, Internal Affections, Nature of Woman, Prorrhetic I, Regimen in 
Acute Diseases, The Art, The Sacred Disease. Pain is (mostly) a disease: Aphorisms, Breaths, Epidemics 
VI, Glands, Nature of Man, Places in Man, Prognostic, Regimen, Regimen in Health, Use of Liquids. 
Mixed: Affections, Epidemics II, Epidemics V, Epidemics VII, Humors, Regimen in Acute Diseases 
(Appendix), Prorrhetic II. Note that this division aligns nicely with the now outdated 
Coan/Cnidian division of the corpus. On the Coan/Cnidian distinction in scholarship, see, 
Thivel 1981 and Langholf 1990, 12-36. Holmes 2010 reaches similar conclusions when analyzing 
the role of the symptom in nosology, prognostication, and theoretical proof: 151, n. 16, 
“interpretations of symptoms do depend on context, with the result that the division between 
prognostic and diagnostic functions remains useful.”  
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“categories” or “states”).144 The treatise Ancient Medicine, for example, seems to 
elevate pain to the same level as disease. On multiple occasions in this polemical 
treatise, the author refers to illness and pain in the same breath: he claims that 
discussions of medicine are really about what patients suffer when they are sick 
or in pain (PK 'A" "("@ Q;;+? $*&8> +R$( 14$G(*& ""+<L5(* +R$( ;G'(*& S "("@ $#& 
".T4-9$2& U& .K$+@ +V$+* &+<G+?<0 $( 5.@ "+&G+?<*&, Ancient Medicine 2.11-13); that 
ancient peoples suffered from pains, diseases and early death if they followed an 
improper diet, "%&+*<0 $( 3<F?"+H<* 5.@ &+D<+*<* "("*"0"$+&$(>, 5.@ )*A $.FG+> 
T.&9$+*<*&, Ancient Medicine 3.19-20; and that ancient people realized that 
unprepared foods cause pain, disease, and death (:!8 $+?$G2& )’ .K$G2& !%&+?> $( 
5.@ &+D<+?> 5.@ T.&9$+?> c<(<T.*, Ancient Medicine 3.34-35 and E^ _> +` !%&+* 5.@ 
&+,<+* 5.@ T9&.$+* E'0&+&$+, Ancient Medicine 3.40) forms a crucial part of the 
author’s narrative of the invention of medicine. In all of these situations, while it 
is clear that pain, disease, and death are all to be avoided, it is equally clear that 
these three outcomes are discrete. At a later point, it becomes clear that pain does 
not necessarily indicate disease. This point comes during a discussion of the 
operation of coldness and hotness within the body (Ancient Medicine 16.1-11): 
 
I at least think that of all the properties, coldness and hotness have 
the least affect in the body for the following reason: so long as the 
two are mixed together with each other, they do not cause hurt; for 
the cold finds temperance and measure from the hot, and the hot 
from the cold. But, whenever one of these is separated off, then it 
causes hurt. When cold is the culprit, it causes some hurt for the 
person, [I say some since] on account of the speed when 
straightway for this very reason heat arises from the same place 
within the person, needing no assistance or preparation. These 
                                                
144Holmes 2010, 124, 138-142 sees disease as a “process,” not a “thing.” 
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things function the same for those who are in health and those who 
are sick. 
 
?F"%$4$. )’ c'2'( 5.@ T("-%$4$. !.<G2& f5*<$. $#& )?&.-02& 
&+-012 )?&.<$(D(*& E& $X <]-.$* )*A $9<)( $A> !"+B9<*.>· /& -a& g& 
)L!+? F"%&+& -(-*'-G&. .K$A .K$G+*<*&, {-. $8 k?F"%& $( 5.@ T("-8& 
cO, +K ;?!G(*· 5"N<*> 'A" 5.@ -($"*%$4> $X -a& k?F"X '0&($.* :!8 $+, 
T("-+,, $X )a T("-X :!8 $+, k?F"+,· J$.& )a :!+5"*T(04 F2"@> 
q59$("+&, $%$( ;?!G(*· E& )a )6 $+?$GY $X 5.*"X, J$.& $8 k?F"8& 
E!*'G&4$.* 5.0 $* ;?!L<O $8& Q&T"2!+&, )*A $.FG+> !"#$+& )*’ .K$8 
$+,$+ !9"(<$* $8 T("-8& .K$%T(& E5 $+, :&T"]!+?, +K)(-*N> C+4T(04> 
+K)a !.".<5(?N> )(%-(&+&· 5.@ $.,$. 5.@ E& I'*.0&+?<* $+H<*& 
:&T"]!+*<*& :!("'91($.*, 5.@ E& 59-&+?<*&. 
 
Clearly, if the same set of factors cause pain in both health and disease – if the 
same pain, in other words, can afflict a healthy or a diseased person – this pain, at 
least, cannot be the same thing as disease. In this case, the existence of pain 
cannot signal a state of disease. 
Pains and diseases, then, may be separate categories that only overlap in 
certain circumstances. On the other hand, pain can be entirely interchangeable 
with disease. The treatise Breaths, concerned as it is with proving that all disease 
is caused by wind, pneuma, asserts that all diseases are identical with the 
exception of their location.145 He explains the process in the following way: after 
pneuma fills the veins in the head, weight then presses upon the blood therein 
and forces the leanest component in the blood out of the veins; this expressed 
material then flows to other parts of the body and accumulates (Breaths 10.8-11): 
 
Wherever in the body the runoff goes, there does disease establish 
itself: if it goes to the eyes, there is the pain; if it goes to the ears, 
there is the disease;  if it goes to the sternum it becomes coryza 
                                                
145Breaths 2.1-4.  As we will see below, Chapter Three, the location of a disease is often determined 
solely by where a patient feels pain, while diseases themselves are often categorized by type and 
location of pain. 
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(hoarseness), when it goes to chest it is called brankhos (sore throat).  
 
J!+* )’ g& :T"%+& :B054$.* $+, <]-.$+>, E&$.,T. ^?&0<$.$.* e &+,<+>· 
S& -a& +j& E!@ $6& k*& c;TO, $.D$4> d !%&+>· S& )a E> $A> :5+A>, 
E&$.,T’ e &+,<+>· S& )a E> $A> wH&.>, 5%"?1. '0&($.*· S& )a E> $A <$G"&., 
C"9'F+> 5.;G($.*. 
 
The same material, depending on where it settles, is called either pain, disease, 
coryza, or brankhos. In some locations, convention dictates the use of a specific 
term (e.g. coryza) to refer to this surplus of matter. In other locations, however, 
the affliction is referred to as “pain” or “disease.” Clearly the two terms here 
function synonymously. 
To what extent did the equivalence of pain to disease rob pain of its 
primary meaning? In other words, how “painful” were these pains when they 
were construed neither as discrete symptoms of disease nor separate conditions 
worthy of their own treatment? A case study from Epidemics VII may contain the 
answer (Epidemics VII 5.1-5): 
 
The son of Kydis, around the turning of the winter sun, had 
shivering and fever, pain of the right ear, and pain of the head. That  
pain (the ear pain) was his constant companion ever since he was an 
infant, and was runny, carious and smelly, but was painless for most 
of the time. At that time, however, the pain and the head-pain were 
terrible … 
 
WX vD)*+> !("@ F(*-("*&A> e;0+? $"+!A> wH'+> 5.@ !?"($8>, 5.@ $8> 
)(^*+, Q;'4-., 5.@ 5(B.;N> p)D&4· $8 )a $+*+,$+& 4.0<(% (KT=> E5 
<-*5"+, !.*)0+? !."45+;+DT(* w(?-.$#)(> 5.@ <?"*''#)(> 5.@ c&+)-+&, 
cF+& )a +[$2 $A !+;;A '&E3/&6& h&· $%$( )a e p)D&4 h& )(*&6 5.@ e 
5(B.;.;'04 … 
 
Clearly we cannot, despite the scanty definition in the LSJ (“pain felt or caused, 
suffering”) imagine that in this context Q;'4-. refers to felt pain. If it did, we 
would be hard-pressed to explain why the Q;'4-. could have been painless for 
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so long (:&])?&+&), or why it only at a later time ($%$() became a terrible pain 
(p)D&4 … )(*&6). It is certainly tempting, and, I think, correct, to take both this 
pain, and all other unambiguous instances where “pain” and “disease” are used 
synonymously (such as the example above from Affections 27.15) at face value; in 
these cases, not only is there no notional difference between pain and disease, 
but, it seems, pain has been assimilated completely to the category of disease 
(which, as we saw above in Section 3, was generally considered to be a bodily 
state that need not necessarily be painful). 
 
8. Conclusion 
Why do the Hippocratics avoid stating outright the special importance of pain to 
diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment? I suspect that this omission depends on the 
nebulous status of pain that I highlighted above (Section 7). Before explaining 
exactly how and why the hazy relationship between pain and disease lies behind 
this oversight, however, it will be useful to first focus on the patient, inasmuch as 
the discussion so far has only considered the usefulness and relevance of pain as 
it relates to the physician and the practice of his craft.  
As we saw above, therapies for pain and disease both identify pain as a 
separate entity from disease. While it may be that the singling out of pain relies 
on an assumption that by treating pain, the physician is incidentally also treating 
disease, we would do well to recall the evidence from Diseases I 5 that some 
diseases, though painful, technically require no treatment. While a patient may 
recover spontaneously from such a condition, however, it is still possible to treat 
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the symptoms (Diseases I 5.11-16): 
 
There is a class of diseases and wounds that, while they do not 
cause death, nevertheless have proper moments for treatment. 
There are pains in these diseases and the pains can, if someone 
administers the right treatment, be brought to an end. The services 
offered by the doctor, when they do occur, have no real benefit for 
these patients, since, if no physician had been present, the pains 
(diseases?) would have stopped. 
 
5%<. )a $#& &+?<4-9$2& S $"2-9$2& -6 E> T9&.$+& BG"(*, :;;A 
5.0"*9 E<$*&, p)D&.* $( '0&+&$.* E& .K$G+*<*, 5.@ +r9 $G E<$*&, & $*> 
p"T#> T(".!(D<O, !.D<.<T.*, $+D$+*<* )a +K5 :"5G+?<* '*&%-(&.* .` 
BG;(*.* :!8 $+, 34$"+, J$.& '0&2&$.*· 5.@ 'A" -6 !."(%&$+> $+, 
34$"+,, E!.D<.&$+ Q&. 
 
That some physicians acquiesce to treat these diseases aligns with the notion, 
lamented throughout the corpus, that in the eyes of most patients medicine was 
useful only insofar as it removed pain, and not (as physicians would prefer) in its 
capacity to restore and maintain health.146 Without the knowledge to interpret the 
(dangerous) significance of non-painful physical symptoms, patients seek 
medical assistance only at that point when they find themselves to be suffering.147  
All of this is to say that, while pain may be a useful phenomenon in the 
eyes of the physician, it is an unwelcome sensation in the experience of the 
patient. This distinction – that physicians use pain to “see” inside the body, while 
the patient actually perceives the (invisible) pain – may lie at the heart of the 
differing instantiations of pain found in the Hippocratic treatises. Since pain is 
rarely a visible symptom in the same way that other symptoms are,148 it has little 
or no place in the lists of predominantly tangible symptoms that I discussed in 
                                                
146See above, Introduction, on the relationship between the treatment of pain and the purpose of 
medicine. 
147On the exception of gynecological conditions, see below, Chapter Four. 
148On the visibility of pain, see below, Chapter Three. 
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Section 1. What we may be seeing, furthermore, when we consider the variation 
in forms of pain highlighted in Section 7 are the relics of forcing something as 
imperceptible (to the physician) as pain into the service of medicine.  
The issue of the categorization of pain relates to the question regarding its 
materiality that I raised at the end of Chapter One. It is likely that, regardless of 
whether pain is conceived of as the result of material change or if it actually 
constitutes material change (in this latter case, pain itself actually occupies some 
physical space), “pain” is no more or less material than “disease.” Either pain 
and disease are a reaction to material imbalance, or pain and disease (the latter 
often defined as pain plus additional results of material change) amount to a 
particular degree of material imbalance. An imbalance that passes from an 
imperceptible state to a perceptible one thus turns into pain or disease.149 In the 
context of their relationship to material change, then, pain and disease are 
aligned in such a way that they have little or no categorical distinction.  
In their relation to perceptibility, however, pain and disease are two 
distinct phenomena. As material imbalance moves to the point of perceptibility, 
the patient feels pain, on the one hand, while the physician sees disease, on the 
other. While we can see, in practice, that pain is utilized by the physician as a 
sign (that is, as a visible manifestation of an invisible material change) just as 
much as other, actually visible or observable symptoms are (e.g. sputa, fecal 
matter, urine, sweat, shivering, mania), pain remains, nevertheless, in the 
purview of the patient, not the physician. We saw in Chapter One how 
Hippocratic theorizing about pain connected the inherently invisible sensation of 
                                                
149On the perceptibility of pain, see above, Chapter One. 
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pain with the potentially visible material within the body. In this chapter I have 
argued on the one hand that this connection endowed pain with a robust 
semiotic function, and, on the other, that, owing to the fact that patients’ and 
physicians’ unequal relationships to pain cannot be completely reconciled, pain’s 
status as symptom is inconstant. In the following chapter, I will look at the ways 
in which, given pain’s relationship to the material within the body, and its 
consequent semiotic function, physicians both endeavored to “see” their patients’ 
pain and, having thus appropriated pain into the category of visible, attempted 
to set about measuring the object of pain. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PHYSICIAN AND PAIN 
 
1. Introduction 
As I argued in Chapter One, Hippocratic pain is an objective fact, not a subjective 
sensation. The connection pain shares with the dynamic material inside the body 
transforms this invisible sensation into perceptible proof of the body’s inner 
workings. This material connection, however, also leads to some ambiguity 
regarding the degree to which pain is fully reified; in some cases, “pain” takes 
the heft of materiality upon itself. The material etiology of pain, furthermore, 
imbued the phenomenon with special semiotic force; pain comes to be an 
important – perhaps the most important – symptom of disease within the 
contexts of diagnosis, therapy, prognosis, and theoretical proof (Chapter Two). 
Yet, just as the boundary between “pain as reaction to material imbalance” and 
“pain as material imbalance” is hazy, so, too, is the line between “pain as 
symptom of disease” and “pain as disease” substantially blurred. I suggested that 
the classificatory confusion of pain and disease can be accounted for by the 
relationship of both states to materiality and perceptibility. Inasmuch as both 
pain and disease are figured as material imbalance (or reactions to material 
imbalance), in many contexts the two are etiologically synonymous. In other 
cases, however, pain is subordinated to disease: pain qua objective sensation 
becomes, often in conjunction with other (actually tangible) signs, the object by 
which the physician “sees” disease. In this chapter I return to the issue of 
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perceptibility and pain. While the physician directly sees or otherwise assesses 
the patient’s other symptoms, pain for the most part must be communicated to 
the physician by the patient, verbally or through some other means. The first half 
of this chapter sketches the various strategies employed by Hippocratic 
physicians to “see” the pain of their patients. All of these strategies either rely on 
– or at least reveal a belief in – the objectivity of pain (Section 2). At the same 
time, the Hippocratic physician shaped the phenomenon of pain both by 
prompting the patient to report only particular, “relevant,” pains and, as I argue 
in Section 3, by investing certain dimensions of the pain experience with special 
significance.  
 
2. The Perception of (the Patient’s) Pain 
2.1 The Physician and Perception 
We have already seen how pain was used to see (via reasoning) inside the 
patient’s body and so identify various aspects of disease. Yet, as I have pointed 
out, where the other symptoms of disease are perceptible to the physician, pain is 
in the purview of the patient alone. Hippocratic authors rarely acknowledge this 
problem. The author of Prorrhetic II, for example, takes for granted the notion 
that diseases of the bladder are easily identified by the pain experienced in such 
conditions (Prorrhetic II 4). These diseases are recognizable to the physician by 
means of a phenomenon that the physician does not inherently perceive.150 
Despite this incongruity, the author of Ancient Medicine stresses the 
                                                
150Cf. Holmes 2010, 118: “[l]ocated uncomfortably between the knowing physician and the body is 
the patient, the one who suffers.” 
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importance of perception to the study of medicine (Ancient Medicine 9.11-15): 
 
For one must aim at a measure; but you will find no measure – nor 
number nor weight besides – by referring to which you will know 
with precision, except the feeling of the body. Hence it is difficult to 
acquire knowledge so precise that one errs only slightly in one 
direction or the other. And I would strongly praise this doctor, the 
one who makes only small errors.151 
 
(H 'A" -G$"+? $*&8> <$+F9<.<T.*· -G$"+& )a, +K)a <$.T-8&, +K)a 
:"*T-8& +K)G&. Q;;+&, !"8> / :&.BG"2& (m<O $8 :5"*Ca>, +K5 g& (I"+04> 
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l<$( <-*5"A o-."$9&(*& c&T. S c&T.· 5g& E'x $+,$+& $8& 34$"8& 
3<F?"#> E!.*&G+*-* $8& <-*5"A o-."$9&+&$.. 
 
This author acknowledges that the physician must rely upon the “measure” of 
the body’s sensation ($+, <]-.$+> $6& .m<T4<*&) in order to make the calculations 
necessary for his profession. But whose body? Whose sensation? 
We find our answers in a few places. The author of Epidemics VI explains 
how the body contributes to medical knowledge (Epidemics VI 8.17):  
 
The body’s role in medical inquiry: sight, sound, smell, touch, taste, 
reason. 
 
W8 <#-. c"'+& E> $6& <5Gk*& Q'(*&, k*>, :5+6, w@>, oB6, ';#<<., 
;+'*<-%>. 
 
And the author of Epidemics IV identifies the means by which crises and other 
aspects of the disease are recognized (Epidemics IV 43): 
 
By means of eyes, ears, nose, and hands do we recognize crises and 
other things. (We recognize) the sick person (by the following): by 
seeing or touching or smelling or tasting and by knowing in other 
respects. Hair, complexion, skin, veins, tendons, muscles, flesh, 
bones, marrow, brain, material from the blood, guts, stomach, bile, 
the other humors, joints, pulse, trembling, spasms, hiccup, breath 
                                                
151Tr. Schiefsky. 
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on both sides, excrement.  
 
$* $+H<*& --.<*, $+H<*& +R.<*, $\<* w*<@, $\ F(*"@ .` 5"0<*(>, 5.@ $Q;;., 
+r<* '*&]<5+-(&.  :<T(&G2&· d )"#&, S T*'x&, S p<B".&T(@>, S 
'(?<9-(&+>, $A )’ Q;;. '&+D>· $"0F(>, F"+*6, )G"-.$., B;GC(>, &(,"., 
-D(>, <9"5(>, p<$G., -?(;8>, E'5GB.;+>, 5.@ $A :!8 $+, .-.$+>, 
<!;9'F&., 5+*;04, F+;6, +` Q;;+* F?-+@, Q"T"., <B?'-+@, $"%-+*, 
<!.<-+@, ;D''(>· :-B@ !&(,-.· QB+)+*· +r<* '*&]<5+-(&. 
 
Where is pain? Surely this sensation belongs in such a list? The absence of pain is 
glaring unless one understands the “subject” of these perceptions – the person 
using the bodily senses of sight, touch, taste, and smell – is the physician, not the 
patient. Pain is also missing from a similar list found in the treatise In the Surgery 
(In the Surgery 1): 
 
[Examination: look for] what is like or unlike the normal, beginning 
with the most marked signs and those easiest to recognise, open to 
all kinds of investigation, which can be seen, touched and heard, 
which are open to all our senses, sight, touch, hearing, the nose, the 
tongue and the understanding, which can be known by all our 
sources of knowledge.152 
 
 J-+*. S :&%-+*. E^ :"FN>· :!8 $#& -('0<$2&, :!8 $#& w4<$2&, :!8 
$#& !9&$4 !9&$2> '*'&2<5+-G&2&.  5.@ 3)(H&, 5.@ T*'(H&, 5.@ :5+,<.* 
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Consider the relationship between the physician and pain found in the rest of 
this treatise: the physician should practice his operations so they can be 
performed, among other things, “painlessly” (“well, nicely, swiftly, painlessly, 
neatly, resourcefully,” :'.T#>, 5.;#>, $.FG2>, :!%&2>, (K"DT-2>, (K!%"2>, 4.9-10); 
bandages, similarly, should be applied “painlessly” (:!%&2>, 7.2), that is to say, 
“accomplished with ease” (:!%&2> )a, w4)02> )"\&, 7.3). In these situations, the 
                                                
152Tr. Withington. 
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physician should deftly practice his craft in a way that avoids any “effort” (not 
“pain”) on his part. 
By way of contrast, one should instruct the attendants to hold the patient  
down during surgery (In the Surgery 6.1-3): 
Let those who look after the patient present the part for operation 
as you want it, and hold fast the rest of the body so as to be all 
steady, keeping silence and obeying their superior.153 
 
P` )a !("@ $8& :<T(&G+&$. $8 -a& F(*"*1%-(&+& !."(F%&$2&, s> g& )+5\· 
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The surgical patient’s pain is presumably the reason he needs held down, yet no 
mention is made here, or in the context of any other surgeries, of pain. It is not 
medically relevant.154 
The acknowledged “tools” of perception are therefore only those 
sensations within the purview of the physician. The physician, presumably, is 
unable to perceive the patient’s pain. The author of Epidemics II seems to have 
been especially concerned about this fact (Epidemics II 2.10): 
 
How can one recognize extreme pains by sight? Fear, tolerance, 
experience, cowardice. 
 
t)D&.> $A> 3<F?"+$9$.>, J$Y $"%!Y )*.'&+04 Q& $*> 3)]&· d B%C+>, .` 
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It is only, perhaps, these extremely serious pains that present themselves in such 
                                                
153Tr. Withington. 
154A point first made by Jouanna 1999, 127f.: “The almost total silence regarding the pain of the 
one being operated on, whether in the case of common procedures such as venesection and 
cauterization, or in the case of more dangerous ones such as trephination, is suprising … pain 
interested the physician insofar as it was a meaningful symptom for establishing the idagnosis or 
prognosis of the illnes. The pain of the patient when he was being operated on was of another 
kind: it was a necessary evil that did not enter into the language of signs and symptoms.” 
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an obviously visual way. On many occasions we are told of the extreme physical 
and vocal behavior that can be prompted by pain155: for example, a swollen, 
festering and gangrenous womb causes the patient to shout, jump around, and 
feel pain in the abdomen, groin, waist, and nethers (Diseases of Women II 171.9-
11);156 a patient suffering from hip disease will shout (“oimoi”) if anyone attempts 
to move him.157  Certain pains, then, can be recognized by the physician through 
the vocalizations and actions of the patient. 
The pain need not be so extreme so as to provoke such extreme behavior, 
however. Something as unobtrusive as the patient’s posture can indicate the 
presence of pain. For example, the author of Prognostic says that for a patient to 
lie on his back contrary to custom is an indication that he has pain in his belly.158 
That the treatises that bother to announce the significance of bodily position are 
all prognostic, however, suggests that these techniques were not universally 
applicable for pain perception. What is more, a closer look at the context of this 
example reveals that these physicians were not trying to recognize the 
“symptom” of pain at all. This passage follows after a general discussion of what 
the physician should observe and report upon first entering the patient’s room. 
                                                
155I.e. Coan Prenotions 262, Diseases II 16, 17, and 69, Diseases III 13, Epidemics V 17, Epidemics VII 3, 
11, and 93, Critical Days 5 and 8, Internal Affections 4, 7, 13, 14, 17, 36, 47, 49, 51 and 53. Holmes 
focuses on the visibility of these types of pain expressions, in an effort to emphasize the social 
transgressiveness of such behavior. Holmes 2010, 159: “prognostic signs … are regularly located 
at the nodes of personal identity;” cf. 157: “We can credit the significance of these symptoms in 
part to their immediate, intuitive intelligibility. The spectacle of a person “seized” by pain or 
biting his own tongue does not simply express his struggle with an amorphous, impersonal 
disease but powerfully dramatizes that struggle.” Holmes claims that prognostic signs in 
particular focus on “visible” pain, but I have noticed no such contextual distinction. One need 
only look at any of the examples from Internal Affections to see how “visible” pain was also useful 
to diagnosis, for example. 
156Affections of Women 171.9-11. 
157Internal Affections 51.10-11. 
158Prognostic 3; cf. Prognostic 5, 9, 10, 11; Epidemics II 2.10; Prorrhetic I 75; Prorrhetic II 32; Coan 
Prenotions 8, 46, 487. Cf. Prognostic 1. 
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The physician should announce these observations to the patient in order to gain 
his trust by accurately reporting the past, present and future. The author then 
adds that as a result of such observation, it is (incidentally) possible to treat the 
patient better. These recognitions of pain are more focused on establishing a 
doctor-patient relationship than on “seeing” pain. 
Most likely, all of these examples of intense pain provoking abnormal 
vocal and physical behavior reveal an effort to communicate the intensity of the 
pain, rather than a technique for “seeing” such pain. The greatest proof against 
the latter option is the fact that, outside of a prognostic setting, physicians seem 
to have been hesitant to assume that a patient was in pain merely based on their 
behavior. The author of Epidemics VII, for example, reports that attendants had 
difficulty restraining a patient, inasmuch as, whenever someone would grab her 
and hold her down for a brief time, she would suddenly and intensely jump up 
and shout as if from a blow, terrible pain, or fear. (:&.!4)#<.& 5.@ C+#<.& 
E^.0B&4> 5.@ <?&$%&2>, l<!(" g& E5 !;4'N> 5.@ )(*&N> p)D&4> 5.@ B%C+?, Epidemics 
VII 11.22-24). Behavior alone would not seem to be enough, without additional 
confirmation from the patient, for the physician to “see” pain in his patient. 
Rather, in order to accurately record pain on the basis of non-verbal cues, 
it seems that the physician relied on other indications from the patient. 
Otherwise, how could a female patient have indicated with her hand that a 
gathering about her spleen was painless (5.$A <!;N&. $\ F(*"@ E)(05&?(& p;0'+& 
F"%&+& ^D<$"(--. :&])?&+&, Epidemics VII 84.6-7)? The author of Epidemics V 
explicitly indicates that such non-verbal communication requires the patient’s 
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cooperation (Epidemics V 91): 
 
Polemarchus’ wife sufferedsome sort of a pain that was terrible in 
her hip during an arthritic disease that arose from the failure of her 
menses. She lost her voice for the entire night and into the middle 
of the day. She could hear and had her wits about her, and signaled 
with her hand that there was a pain around her hip. 
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It is because this woman’s mind was sound, and her hearing was unaffected, that 
she was presumably able to communicate with the physician. 
Physicians, then, relied on the patient to communicate, verbally or not, 
their experience of pain. In some situations, observable signs of pain may have 
been taken into account, but these seem to be special cases. The physician’s 
observation of the patient’s positioning is a tool used to prove to the patient the 
physician’s special powers. Such a strategy, in fact, relies on the patient feeling 
the pain; the patient is certainly aware of the pain and the physician’s miraculous 
ability to know about this sensation was calculated to forge a strong relationship 
of trust. A particular kind of pain – strong, intense, or otherwise extreme pain – is 
characterized by the types of vocal and physical behavior it elicits. While such 
behavior is a signal of the pain’s intensity, it is doubtful that physicians would 
have relied on such behavior on its own to deduce pain. Visible behaviors 
typically associated with pain could correspond with the patient’s experience, but 
physicians hesitate to conclude that a patient is in pain without confirmation. 
That the physician did not trust in his own perceptions to observe pain does not 
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mean that the process whereby patients communicated their pain was 
unmediated. On the contrary, several treatises indicate that the physician almost 
always questioned the patient about his or her pains.  
The author of Affections recommends that a physician question the patient 
regarding his symptoms ( $.& )a E!@ &+<G+&$. :B05O, E!.&("2$& F"6 b !9<F(*, 
Affections 37.1). In many cases, the questioning put to the patient is quite 
“leading.” For example, the author of Prognostic recommends, when a patient has 
suffered a nosebleed, asking whether the patient’s head is in pain or if his vision 
is blurred.159 The same author also explains that one may determine if an internal 
abscess affects only on one side of the body by turning the patient and asking if 
he has pain on the other side.160  
The author of Prorrhetic II offers our most robust example of the kind of 
thorough interrogation a patient might expect to receive (Prorrhetic II 42): 
 
In people in whom pains arise about the joints together with 
swellings, and then cease – but not in the manner of gout – you will 
discover that the inward parts are enlarged, and that there is a 
white precipitate in the urine; if you ask the person, he will say that his 
temples often have pains, and he will also say that he has night-sweats. If, 
however, neither this precipitate comes down in the urine nor the 
sweats set in, there is a danger either that the joints will become 
lame, or that what they call meliceris (a cyst filled with a honey-like 
substance) will arise in them. This disease arises in people in whom 
an epistaxis was common in their childhood and youth has 
stopped. Thus you must ask whether such an epistaxis occurred when 
the person was young; also whether there is itching of the chest and back, 
whether the cavities are causing violent pains without any apparent 
disturbance, and whether haemorhoids have developed – for this is how 
these diseases begin. If these people appear to have a poor colour, 
ask whether they have pains in the head; they will say they do. In those 
whose cavities are painful on the right side, the pains are more 
                                                
159Prognostic 7.15-16. 
160Prognostic 16.7-9. 
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violent, and especially when what remains of the pain is at the 
hypochondrium in the region of the liver. These pains are relieved 
at once by rumblings in the belly; when the pain stops, thick 
yellow-green urine is passed. This form of the complaint, though 
not at all mortal, is especially chronic. When the disease is already 
long-standing, patients become dim of vision from it. You must ask 
about the blood – whether the patient haemorrhaged when he was young – 
about the dimness of vision, about the thickening and greenness of the 
urine, and about the rumblings – whether they occurred and whether they 
gave any relief when the did occur; patients will say that all these things 
were so.161 
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It is clear that this author, at least, does not expect the patient to spontaneously 
offer up a report of his pain or other symptoms. Rather, the physician, armed 
with his knowledge of both the likelihood of the existence of particular 
symptoms as well as their significance, carefully asks the patient a series of “yes 
                                                
161Tr. Potter. Emphasis mine. Cf. Prorrhetic II 41. 
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or no” questions. This type of strategy allows the physician to see what he 
expects to see and establishes and reinforces for the patient which of his 
sufferings are medically relevant. The author of Prorrhetic II, for as much as he 
advocates for the physician’s meddling in the process of the reporting of pain, 
nevertheless relies completely on the objectivity and universality of the pain 
experience. 162 Witness, for example, his absolute certainty that patients who have 
a poor complexion will affirm that they have pain in the head. 
In addition to thoroughly questioning the patient about pain, as well as 
the occasional observation of any extreme behavior on the patient’s part, 
physicians also involved themselves in the pain perceiving process by manually 
examining the patient.163 The diagnosis of a particular type of lung ulceration, for 
example, includes the patient feeling an ulcer-like pain upon being touched in 
the region of the hypochondrium ($#& I!+F+&)"02& s> |;5+> k.?%-(&+> :;'G(*, 
Internal Affections 1.23).164 Female patients suffering from reproductive disorders 
were especially likely to be manually examined.165 For example, when a woman 
suffers from suppressed menses, "when she is touched, she will feel pain, 
especially in the lower part of her abdomen," (k.?+-G&4 :;'L<(*, 5.@ -9;*<$. $8 
h$"+&, Diseases of Women I 2.35-36). In several of these cases, the author states 
simply that a woman feels pain when touched, without specifying where this 
pain occurs. That the vagina and cervix were often manually examined,166 
                                                
162Villard 2006, esp. 66f. takes interrogation as proof of the physician’s mistrust of the patient. 
163Cf. Villard 2006, 65f. 
164See also Epidemics II 2.24, Epidemics VII 51, Diseases II 72, Wounds in the Head 20. 
165Diseases of Women I 2.35-36, 2.57-59, 36.47, and 60.14, Diseases of Women II 112.4, 129.3, 137.4, and 
177.11; Epidemics IV 1; Nature of Woman, 35.12, and 38.2. Cf. Villard 2006, 65-66. 
166Diseases of Women I 20.3, Diseases of Women II 118.3, 134.12, 163.2, 165.2, 168.3, and 171.4; Nature 
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however, indicates that the formulaic  "she feels pain when touched" is a 
shorthand for "she feels pain when given a vaginal exam." 
The process whereby a patient’s perceived pain is translated into a 
“visible” medical sign was exceedingly mediated by the physician. In particular, 
through a process of manually examining and methodically interviewing the 
patient, the physician inserts himself into the process of pain perception. This 
insertion need not represent any suspicion of pain’s subjectivity, so much as a 
desire on the part of the physician to filter out irrelevant symptoms. 
 
3. The Dimensions of Pain 
The issue of relevance does not fade away once a particular pain has been 
deemed worthy of attention. On the contrary, certain dimensions of the pain 
experience were privileged in the context of diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment. 
It is not enough, in most cases, merely to observe that a patient is suffering. The 
“type” of pain, any qualities it may possess, its spatial and temporal dimensions, 
its level of intensity, the circumstances under which it appears, and, on occasion, 
its metaphorical resemblance to other types of pain, are all at various times 
relevant to the physician. 
The author of Ancient Medicine stresses the importance of identifying the 
particular kind of suffering any particular foodstuff occasions (Ancient Medicine 
20.17-22): 
 
One cannot merely know that cheese is a troublesome food because 
it brings pain to anyone who eats too much of it, but one must also 
                                                
of Woman 8.3 and 13.3. 
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know what kind of pain and why and with what internal 
constituent it clashes. For there are many edibles and potables that 
are inherently troublesome, and they do not affect someone in the 
same way. 
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The use of the phrase “what type of pain” ($0&. … !%&+&) indicates that this 
author believes pain is entirely classifiable. Other authors allude to the typology 
of pain: one must ascertain whether pains of the sides, chest, or any other body 
part, differ from one another (W#& p)?&G2& E& !;(?"\<*, 5.@ E& <$LT(<*, 5.@ E& $+H<*& 
Q;;+*<* -G"(<*&, S& -G'. )*.BG"2<*, 5.$.-.T4$G+&, Aphorisms 6.5), whereas the 
pains felt in a variety of sciatic diseases are more or less identical (p)D&.* 
!.".!;L<*+* :!8 !9&$2& $+D$2& $#& &+?<4-9$2&, Internal Affections 51.13-14). How 
did Hippocratic physicians distinguish between types of pains? How consistent 
are these distinctions and to what extent do they approach anything like a 
taxonomy of pain? 
The only aspect of Hippocratic pain to receive measurable scholarly 
attention is the vocabulary of pain.167 Scholars have attempted to assess the 
semantics of different words for pain (typically focusing on the three word 
families of ponos, odynê, algos/algêma). King claims that “to an extent, in the 
medical texts ponos is often used for long-lasting pain, dull pain; odyne for sharp 
                                                
167These are King 1988, Rey 1993, Horden 1999, Marzullo 1999, and Villard 2006. 
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pain, pain which pierces the body.”168 Rey claims that the odunê family of words 
“is almost always used in a precise sense – either qualifying, or by giving some 
clue as to the whereabouts of the pain,” whereas those words related to ponos 
“describe a general state of suffering or illness, and ... when the localisation of 
pain is referred to, it is almost always approximate.”169 Marzullo focuses on the 
literary pedigree of the various words for pain used by Hippocratic authors, 
concluding that while they inherited a robust vocabulary for pain, they rarely 
altered its semantics in any meaningful way,170 while Horden, on the other hand, 
challenges King in particular by expressing intense skepticism regarding the 
possibility of deriving precise and individual meanings for each of these terms 
throughout the corpus. She points out how both ponos and odunê  encompass a 
wide range of meaning in various contexts across multiple treatises. In fact, 
Horden argues these authors were uninterested in pain, claiming that “pain is 
not an especially vivid subject” in the Hippocratic Corpus.171 Finally, Villard, 
although apparently unaware of Horden’s objections, similarly concludes that 
terms from any of the three families of pain words are essentially interchangeable 
when used in the context of physical pain.172 
                                                
168King 1988, p. 58. As Horden (1999, p. 300) points out, both authors ignore the algêma family of 
pain words. 
169Rey 1993, p. 28. 
170Marzullo 1999. 
171Horden 1999, p. 298. 
172Villard 2006, pp. 63-64. Unlike Horden, however, Villard does not think that pain was of little 
interest to Hippocratic physicians. Horden 1999 is perhaps best ignored. Her admitted lack of 
expertise and her assumption that an analysis of the place of pain in Hippocratic medicine ought 
to begin and end with the concordance are both cause for concern. Consider in particular the 
twisted logic that underlies her assertion that pain was only a subject of “some concern” to the 
Hippocratics since it was so similar to disease (Horden 1999, 305: “Part of the reason why the 
Hippocratic authors are not much interested in the subtleties of pain, or very interesting when 
they do write about it, is that those statements about pain and disease are nearly tautologous”). I 
am baffled as to how one could conclude that the similarities between pain and disease prove the 
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All of these scholars share a similar approach to the issue of pain 
semantics. It seems that, regardless of the answers they propose, they are all 
attempting to answer the question: what do these different words mean? Thus, 
we are faced with a wide range of conflicting reports, from Rey's and King's 
precise definitions to Horden's dismissal of the topic altogether. My own 
impression is somewhere in the middle. Horden is right to question King and 
Rey: for every generalized statement about the meaning of these terms, it is 
hardly difficult to find enough exceptions to at least question, if not invalidate, 
these “rules.”173 That the meanings of these terms vary, both within the Corpus 
and within individual treatises, is not, however, reason enough to conclude that 
Hippocratic physicians made no effort to classify pain at the lexical level. 
The mere fact that authors use different terms for pain indicates to me (contra 
Horden) an attempt to develop or draw upon contrastive meanings. Take, for 
example, the following case history from Epidemics I (Epidemics I 3.13(5)):  
 
The wife of Epicrates, who lay sick near the founder, when near her 
delivery was seized with severe rigor without, it was said, 
becoming warm, and the same symptoms occurred on the 
following day. On the third day she gave birth to a daughter, and 
the delivery was in every respect normal. On the second day after 
the delivery she was seized with acute fever, !%&+> of the heart and 
in the genitals. A pessary relieved these symptoms, but there was 
!%&+> in the head, neck and loins. No sleep. From the bowels 
passed scanty stools, bilious, thin and unmixed. Urine thin and 
blackish. Delirium on the night of the sixth day from the day the 
fever began. Seventh day. All symptoms exacerbated; sleeplessness; 
delirium; thirst; bilious, highly-coloured stools. Eighth day. Rigor; 
                                                
unimportance of pain to Hippocratic medicine. 
173For example, Horden 1999, 300f. counters Rey’s claims that odynê is used for a precisely located 
pain, while ponos by contrast refers to generalized suffering: “Both terms, not just odyne, can be 
used of pain in a particular part, and the way odyne is localized seems hardly more precise than 
the manner in which ponos is deployed.” 
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more sleep. Ninth day. The same symptoms. Tenth day. She had 
Q;'+> with !%&+> in the legs; p)D&4 again in the heart; heaviness in 
the head; no delirium; more sleep; constipation. Eleventh day. 
Urine of better colour, with a thick deposit; was easier. Fourteenth 
day. Rigor; acute fever. Fifteenth day. Vomited fairly frequently 
bilious, yellow vomit; sweated without fever; at night, however, 
acute fever; urine thick, with a white sediment. Sixteenth day. 
Exacerbation; an uncomfortable night; no sleep; delirium. 
Eighteenth day. Thirst; tongue parched; no sleep; much delirium; 
pain in the legs. About the twentieth day. Slight rigors in the early 
morning; coma; quiet sleep; scanty, bilious, black vomits; deafness 
at night. About the twenty-first day. Heaviness all over the left side, 
with p)D&4; slight coughing; urine thick, turbid, reddish, no 
sediment on standing. In other respects easier; no fever. From the 
beginning she had p)D&4 in her throat; redness; uvula drawn back; 
throughout there persisted an acrid flux, smarting, and salt. About 
the twenty-seventh day. No fever; sediment in urine; some Q;'+>) 
in the side. About the thirty-first day. Attacked by fever; bowels 
disordered and bilious. Fortieth day. Scanty, bilious vomits. 
Eightieth day. Complete crisis with cessation of fever.174 
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174Tr. Jones. 
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That a single patient is described as feeling ponos, algos, and odynê indicates at the 
very least some attempt at distinguishing between types of pain, either on the 
part of the physician-author, or the patient. That a pain can be described as Q;'+> 
with !%&+> (E!*!%&2> ;'((), for example, suggests that the author is indicating 
some kind of contrast between the two terms. On the other hand, however, note 
that the same heart pain is first described as !%&+>, then labelled as p)D&4 (“!%&+> 
of the heart … p)D&4 again in the heart”), suggesting that sometimes differing 
pain words are used more for variatio than to make any kind of semantic 
distinction. While the Hippocratic semantics of pain do not approach anything 
like a systematic taxonomy, however, we can at least acknowledge the effort 
made to distinguish between such pains.175 
In addition to being distinguished (somehow) at the lexical level, pains 
could also be further differentiated in terms of quality, space, time, intensity, 
circumstance, and metaphor. While Villard has catalogued the variety of terms 
used to distinguish pains in these ways, there may still be room for further 
analysis of some of these strategies.176  
                                                
175That the lexical studies of Hippocratic pain exaggerate any indications of a pain taxonomy, and 
that Horden takes the absence of such a taxonomy as evidence that pain was not important to the 
Hippocratics, both suggest that modern evaluations of Hippocratic pain are unconsciously tinged 
by the modern experience of pain; almost all of us, after all, have been asked in a clinical setting 
to describe our pains in precise, often numeric (“On a scale of one to ten, how would you rate 
your pain?”), terms. 
176See Villard 2006 for an extensive catalogue of these strategies. 
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Little more can be said about the qualities (e.g. softness, sharpness, 
weightiness, etc.) assigned to pains beyond merely cataloguing them. That pain 
may be described in terms of weight perhaps suggests some connection with the 
peccant material thought to cause pain.177 For example, the idea that whenever 
the kidneys are full of food they experience a heavy pain draws a clear 
connection between the “heaviness” of the pain and the surfeit of food.178 There 
may be some connection between “gnawing” pain and an acrid or bilious 
cause,179 but at other times this quality is associated with ardent fever.180 In all, 
however, there is nothing to suggest that the quality of a pain sensation was 
associated with any particular etiology. 
The spatial dimension of pain, on the other hand, was a highly productive 
criterion. While pain itself can, curiously, be described in terms of its own spatial 
dimensions,181 for the most part, the location and movement of pain was used to 
diagnose, locate, and track disease. For example, the author of Coan Prenotions 
offers an explanation of pneumonia (Coan Prenotions 394): 
 
When the pain occurs on one side of the clavicle, the upper part of 
the lobe of that lung is diseased; when the pain occurs on both sides 
of the clavicle, the upper part of both lobes are diseased; when the 
pain is in the middle of the side, the middle part of the lung is 
diseased; when the pain is near the diaphragm, the lower part of 
the lung is diseased; and when the pain is in an entire side, the area 
on that whole side is diseased. 
                                                
177On the materiality of pain, see above, Chapter One. 
178Epidemics VI 1.5.1. Cf. Coan Prenotions 523.1-2, Prorrhetic I 109.5, Epidemics I 3.13(7).1. 
179E.g. Ancient Medicine 19 and Regimen in Acute Diseases (Appendix) 7. 
180Regimen in Acute Diseases (Appendix) 1, Regimen in Acute Diseases 1.8-9. 
181Among other signs, small pains in the throat indicate delirium in acute diseases (Coan 
Prenotions 269); a wounded man who suffered a wound from a javelin felt a tiny pain in his 
stomach on the third day after his accident. On the fourth day, however, a pain rushed upon him 
terribly (Epidemics VII 33, cf. Epidemics V 61). Movement, too, can be a descriptor of pain: pains 
that occur in the hypochondrium during fever are said to leap about (Coan Prenotions 293.2).  
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It is taken for granted, in this instance, that a patient has contracted pneumonia, 
while the location of the pain is used to determine the position of the disease. 
The temporal dimensions of time have various semiotic functions. Frequency or 
duration can be diagnostic or prognostic markers. Strong and long-lasting pains 
of the head that occur with fever, should any other deadly symptom accompany 
them, are said to be extremely deadly. However, should the pain continue 
beyond twenty days while the fever persists, either nosebleed or some other 
apostasis into the lower part of the body occurs. When the pain has just begun, 
however, nosebleed or abscess are likely, particularly when the pain is around 
the temples and forehead.182 The observation that the most violent fevers in an 
epidemic were also the longest and most painful (!9&$2& C*.*%$.$+* $#& $%$( 
'(&+-G&2&, 5.@ -.5"%$.$+*, 5.@ -($A !%&2& -('0<$2& '(&%-(&+*, Epidemics I 2.4.60-
61) is certainly related to the idea that length of disease corresponds with pain, 
and vice versa.183 
Similarly, the intensity of pain and the seriousness or intensity of disease 
often correspond. As we saw in Chapter Two, the author of Aphorisms claims that 
all acute diseases are accompanied by extreme pain.184 Throughout the corpus, 
pain intensity is a marker of the degree of disease a patient experiences: excessive 
                                                
182Prognostic 21.1-8. 
183E.g. Internal Affections 48. 
184Aphorisms 1.7. 
 92 
sweating causes excessive pain,185 quick, continuous, and strong pain causes a 
speedy crisis,186 and so on.187 The connection between these two concepts is 
strong enough that the author of Diseases III feels the need to remark on 
situations that do not follow this general rule: thus, if a patient experiences tears 
during pleurisy, the disease is “more painful, but not more mortal,” while another 
variety of lung disease is “less mortal, even though painful.”188 
Finally, the circumstances under which pain is felt (e.g. a patient suffering 
from a phlegmatic disease will feel pain when she exerts herself, Diseases II 70), 
and the occasional metaphorical expression of pain (e.g. the pain felt during a 
withering disease resembles that of a needle prick, Diseases II 66) do not seem to 
be associated with any particular type of material imbalance or disease. 
Beyond merely cataloguing their variety, what can be said about the 
dimensions of pain recorded by Hippocratic authors? Again, I doubt that much 
more than broad generalizations can be made about the significance of any 
particular dimension of pain to medical practice. This does not mean, however, 
that pain – in particular, these aspects of pain that were deemed worthy of note – 
was unimportant to Hippocratic physicians (pace Horden). On the contrary, to 
return to the passage from Ancient Medicine, Hippocratics paid a great deal of 
attention to “what kind of pain” is felt during discrete diseases or as a result of 
certain activities. That they never moved beyond the descriptive, however, to 
form a taxonomy of pain, speaks more perhaps to the subjectivity and ineffability 
                                                
185Aphorisms 7.85. 
186Epidemics II 1.6. 
187See also Critical Days 3, Internal Affections 36. 
188Diseases III 16. 
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of pain than it does to any kind of Hippocratic indifference to pain.189  
 
4. Conclusion 
The physician’s trust in the patient’s report of pain and his impulse to catalogue 
various dimensions of that pain both reflect the Hippocratic notion of objective, 
materially-based, pain. After all, a system that insists on the materiality of pain 
and then exploits that connection in order to use pain to “see” inside the body 
has little place for the instability of subjective perception. Assessing Hippocratic 
interest in pain, furthermore, in terms of the success or failure of the classification 
of pain is an approach that strikes me as outdated, reminiscent as it is of the 
attempts of scholars a few generations ago to assess Hippocratic medicine merely 
in terms of how “right” or “wrong” its theories and practices were. Rather, as I 
suggested above, the fact that the evident Hippocratic urge to categorize pain did 
not – and could not – result in any uniform classificatory scheme suggests the 
limits of such a system of objective pain. That the Hippocratics resolutely upheld 
the notion of objective pain in the face of the evidence for its subjectivity speaks 
to the fundamental importance of pain to Hippocratic theory and practice. 
In the following chapter I look more closely at places where Hippocratic authors 
do seem to acknowledge that sometimes different people (or, better put, different 
classes of “bodies”) feel different pain. As we shall see, however, even in these 
situations the fundamentals of Hippocratic pain that I have outlined in Chapters 
One, Two, and Three, continue to obtain. 
                                                
189On the inherent ineffability of pain, see Scarry 1987. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PAIN AND BODIES 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter explores how Hippocratic theories of pain intersect with 
assumptions about “marked” bodies (e.g. “old bodies,” “female bodies”). As we 
have already seen, the Hippocratic notion of pain was deeply rooted in theories 
about the very composition of the body. So far, I have assumed (as Hippocratic 
authors almost always did, save in “specialized” contexts) that the body within 
which Hippocratic pain operates is a mere vessel. This normative body was, for 
the Hippocratics, assumed to be male, in the prime of life, and humorally-
balanced (Section 2). In this final chapter, however, I will consider what happens 
when this body is young or old, male or female. Hippocratic theorizing about 
how age and sex affect the body is as fundamentally tied to humoral theory as 
the notion of pain. When these two elements intersect, therefore, they 
interpenetrate in ways that are especially strange. The influence of pain theory is 
far reaching: bodies of unborn infants must of necessity experience pain if they 
undergo change (Section 3), while young and old people naturally suffer different 
pains in the same diseases, since they have different bodies (Section 4). 
Assumptions about how female bodies work, on the other hand, govern the 
assumed mechanics and semiotics of female pain (Section 5), while assumptions 
about the reliability of children and women influence how pain in these marked 
bodies is communicated to the physician (Section 6). 
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2. Age, Sex, and the Body 
This chapter explores the ways in which the significance of pain is altered when 
an otherwise unmarked body is further distinguished. While bodies could 
conceivably be delimited in a number of ways – i.e. according to socio-economic 
or enslaved status, complexion or ethnicity – Hippocratic authors distinguish 
between bodies according to age and/or sex.190 In fact, many treatises explicitly 
instruct the physician to take a patient's age into consideration when formulating 
a diagnosis, prescribing treatment, or offering a prognosis, indicating that age 
was thought to affect a body's reaction to disease.191 Furthermore, while none of 
these statements include the explicit instruction to consider a patient's sex, this 
omission is likely owed to the fact that the criteria of sex, particularly for adults, 
was so distinguishing as to not require mention. After all, entire treatises are 
devoted to the subject of “women's diseases.”192  
While many age groupings are to be found in the Corpus,193 for the most 
part, the ages are divided into four groups: childhood, youth, adulthood, and old 
                                                
190 Which is not to say that other factors are not, on occasion, relevant to a patient's bodily state; 
environmental determinism was, after all, a cornerstone of Hippocratic theory. 
191 Nature of Man 9.25-32, Regimen in Health 2, Humors 1, Aphorisms 1.2, 1.17, Regimen I-III 67, 
Regimen in Acute Diseases (Appendix) 11.1-13, Diseases of Women I 11. 
192 The gynecological treatises are Barrenness (Diseases of Women III), Diseases of Women I-II, Eight 
Months' Child, Excision of the Fetus, Girls, Nature of Woman, Nature of the Child/Generation, Seven 
Months' Child, and Superfetation. For a general overview of Hippocratic Gynecology, see: Dean-
Jones 1994, Hanson 1990, King 1998, Lloyd 1983, Sissa 1990. 
193 E.g., children up to 5 years of age: Prorrhetic II 22.1-8; children until 8 or 10 years of age: 
Epidemics I 2.4.108-110; persons under 35 years of age (Airs, Waters, Places 4.19-35, Prognostic 7.17-
18,  21.8, 24, Nature of Man 12.1-10, Coan Prenotions 156, 274); beyond 35 years of age, Prognostic 24; 
after 25 years of age: Aphorisms 5.7; between 7 and 15 years of age: Coan Prenotions 462; between 
14 and 42 years of age: Coan Prenotions 502; between 18 and 35 years of age: Aphorisms 5.9,  7.87, 
Coan Prenotions 431; over 20 years of age: The Sacred Disease 10.18-30; up to 30 years of age: Coan 
Prenotions 139; beyond 30 years of age: Coan Prenotions 139; between 40 and 60 years of age: 
Aphorisms 6.57, Prorrhetic II 40.12-14; between 42 and 62 years of age: Coan Prenotions 502; beyond 
40 years of age: Aphorisms 7.82; beyond 50 years of age: Epidemics VI 8.4 
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age. One could imagine, then, in a fully intersecting system, the Hippocratics 
conceiving of eight “types” of bodies, each distinguished by age and sex, though 
the most common types of marked bodies are four in number: young, male, 
female, or old. 
In order to understand how the intersection of age and sex results in only 
four categories of body, it is first necessary to understand the Hippocratic 
conception of aging. Aging was thought of as a cooling process. The human body 
is hottest at birth and the intense heat of the infant and growing child wanes as 
the person grows old. Eventually this internal heat is entirely consumed–this is 
death.194 During growth, the body requires a constant supply of fuel – food – to 
feed the fires of growth. By contrast, the elderly require the least amount of food, 
so as not to “quench” their internal heat.195  
Where the identifying criteria for age hinges on the temperature within 
the body, the main difference between male and female bodies lay in the texture 
and density of the flesh. In adults, female bodies had softer, spongier flesh while 
flesh of males was harder and denser. 196 This difference led to other secondary 
differences between men and women: it was by virtue of this spongy flesh that 
the female accrued excess moisture, owing to this excess of humors (mostly 
                                                
194 E.g. Nature of Man 12.22-32. 
195 Aphorisms 1.14. This concept of aging as a cooling process affected not only how Hippocratics 
thought of bodies – it also had an effect on their conception of the soul. The substance of the soul 
was thought to be subsumed during youth – especially childhood – since the innate heat of the 
body consumed the essence of the soul. In a parallel process, the inherent coolness of old age was 
also inimical to the function of the soul. It was during adulthood – or the “prime-of-life” – that 
the temperature of the body created a suitable environment for the flourishing of the soul. 
196 On the nature of female flesh, see  Dean-Jones 1994, 55-59 Hanson 1975, King 1998, 28-29, 32, 34, 
71, 77, 92 and 96. 
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blood), had a different internal temperature than the male body.197 
When one compares the qualities of age and sex it becomes clear why this 
intersection produces only four functionally different bodies, rather than eight. 
Children and the aged, regardless of sex, had hot and moist or cold and moist 
bodies, respectively. During the reproductive years, i.e. those encompassing both 
puberty and adulthood, however, the distinction ceases to be one of age, and 
becomes one of sex. In other words, adulthood is the only one of the three age 
groups during which sex is a meaningful distinction. For the most part, then, 
young bodies were compared to old, female to male. 
In the context of theoretical discussions, children were more often 
conceived of as a monolithic, sexless (or at least, not sex-specified) group.198 
Where childhood was primarily sexless (that is to say, sex is rarely adduced as an 
                                                
197 Although the Hippocratics disagreed on this last point. Women are hotter: Nature of Woman 1.1, 
Nature of the Child/Generation 15; Men are hotter: Barrenness (Diseases of Women III) 206, Regimen I-
III 34. Cf. Dean-Jones 1994, 45f. 
198 Apart from the passage from Seven Months’ Child 9 (discussed below) that discusses the 
difference between male and female infants with regard to development, there is little evidence 
that sex difference among children was considered relevant. Rather, sex differences were 
considered to be a hallmark of the procreative age, encompassing puberty and adulthood. When 
attention was paid to the sex of children, it was restricted to the sex of an unborn infant – and the 
significance of the fetus' sex, furthermore, was more often adduced in relevance to the mother’s 
health. In other words, childhood and old age were primarily sexless states, defined by age and 
marked by the level of heat (hot for children, cold for the aged) found in the body. This is not to 
suggest that it was impossible to conceive of children in terms of sex, inasmuch as there is 
evidence that when the group "children" is discussed as a whole, the Hippocratic authors 
conceived of the group as either sexless or as male. For example, Airs, Waters, Places 4.19-35 
claims that, in climates with waters that are harsh and cold as a result of exposure to cold winds, 
children are subject to dropsy in the testicle. It is clear, in this case, that children are male 
children. Another passage from the same treatise differentiates claims male and female children 
suffer differently from urinary stones (Airs, Waters, Places 9.26-43). This passage suggests that 
children who consume milk, regardless of sex, may be equally susceptible to stones if the milk 
they consume is overly bilious. In other words, children are equally diseased by improper 
regimen. However, when it comes to passing stones, the author suggests that stones provide more 
of a problem for boys, owing to anatomical and behavioral difference: boys have a narrower and 
lengthier urethra than girls do. Leaving aside the puzzling observation that girls drink more than 
boys do, this passage illustrates that, when physicians may have had occasion to consider sex 
difference at this age, boys were differentiated from girls in terms of visible anatomical difference, 
rather than with regard to the more fundamental criteria of innate moisture or heat. 
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explanation for symptoms), puberty marks the beginning of such a distinction. 
Adulthood, as we will see below, was defined almost exclusively in terms of sex, 
and puberty marks a transition from a state where one’s body was marked 
primarily for age (young and therefore, hot) to one where sex is the defining 
characteristic (dry and solid-fleshed for men and wet and loose-fleshed for 
women).  
As we saw earlier, according to Hippocratic theory, young bodies are hot 
while old bodies are cold.199 Old bodies are also, in contrast to the firm and dry 
bodies of youth, soft and moist.200 While the period of life that commences at 
puberty and ends at old age has sex as its main dichotomy, the period of old age, 
however, is most often contrasted with younger age. Just as children were often 
treated as a monolithic group, so too are old people considered a group where 
sex differences are rarely relevant, if they exist at all. Dean-Jones has suggested 
that the reason the Hippocratics were unconcerned with menopause – nowhere 
in the corpus is the process explained – is because the cessation of menses marks 
the point at which a woman’s body ceases to be female.201 Just as sexual 
differentiation for the purpose of procreation begins at puberty (and thus, it is at 
this age where we find sex being linked to disease), so too does it end when a 
woman loses the ability to procreate. What had been the defining criterion of 
health – menstruation – ceases and a woman is re-assimilated into a category – 
                                                
199 Nature of Man 12.22-32. 
200 Regimen in Health 2. 
201 Cf. Dean-Jones 1994 105-108, esp. 107: “Whereas menarche differentiated women from men, 
menopause signaled the reassimilation of the female body to the male (and hence more tractable) 
body. Whatever the change was that brought about menopause, therefore, did not require 
specialized knowledge.” 
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old age – that is populated by men. In fact, the only place where we find old 
people differentiated by sex is in the case histories of the Epidemics.202 
For the most part, then, the ability of sex to mark a body as fundamentally 
different in the context of disease is operative during the reproductive years, 
while the marker of age is only applicable to the young and old. In what follows, 
I examine how pain in these marked bodies (young, old, and female) is 
transformed by the interaction between theories of age, sex, and pain. 
 
3. Pain and the Fetus 
As we saw in Chapter One, the fact of Hippocratic pain – owing to the certainty 
that material change in a bodily state necessarily produces pain – was 
incontestable. Thus, in situations where a patient’s body is suffering from 
material imbalance, pain is known to exist within that same body, whether or not 
the subject can sense it. A similar process of deductive reasoning seems to have 
resulted in the Hippocratic insistence on fetal pain. The treatises Seven Months’ 
Child and Eight Months’ Child both on occasion address the ponos of their 
respective subjects.203 The seven months’ child– that is to say, a fetus of six 
month’s gestation – suffers ponos when it inadvertently loosens the membranes 
of the gestational sac. Once the membrane is loosened, the child, owing to its 
weight, moves into the newly-created area within the womb. For the following 
forty days the child struggles (ponein). There are two causes of this ponos: both the 
fact that the infant is no longer receiving nourishment from the same place as 
                                                
202 See passages below. 
203 For the vocabulary of pain, see above, Chapter Three. On the semantic field of ponos, see King 
1988 and Rey 1993. 
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before and the ponoi of the mother herself contribute to the ponos felt by the 
infant. The mother feels ponoi when the loosened membranes and the resulting 
tensions in the umbilical cord caused by the infant moving further down in the 
womb produce odynai in her.204 Regardless of the precise valence of the term 
ponos,205 it is clear that this sensation is caused both by a change in the state of the 
fetus (the movement within the womb and subsequent change in nourishment) 
and by the state of the mother’s body – in particular, the sensation of pain (ponoi 
and odynai) felt by her.  
That this unborn infant is thought to feel ponos seems to be a result of the 
intersection of theories about pain and about gestation. The symbiotic link 
between the maternal and fetal bodies likely underlies the idea that a mother’s 
pain is mirrored by – or even, in this case, perhaps causes – a pain in the fetus. 
Secondly, the idea that pain and disease are caused by change gives rise to the 
idea that the fetus must suffer, inasmuch as it experiences change in location and 
nourishment.206  
Several other passages from Seven Months’ Child and Eight Months’ Child 
connect the ponos experienced by the unborn child with physical change. Eight 
Months’ Child 2 states that the majority of children born at seven months' 
gestation do not live since they are unable to survive the changes caused by 
birth, owing to their diminutive size. If a fetus of this age undergoes the process 
of birth in addition to the sufferings (ponoi) it experienced within the womb, it 
                                                
204 Seven Months’ Child 3. 
205 We must understand ponos as meaning “pain” of some sort, at least in the case of the mother’s 
ponoi, considering the word is glossed as odynai.  
206 For the notion that pain is caused by change, see above, Chapter One. 
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will perish. If a child should suffer such ponoi as occur during the eight month of 
pregnancy and then be born in the ninth month, however, it may survive, but it 
will be thin as a result of its ponoi.207  The more time that passes between these 
ponoi and birth, however, the greater the chance of survival, since the infant will 
be less thin and more robust.208 Furthermore, Eight Months’ Child 10 states that 
even a child born in the tenth month is unlikely to survive, owing to the twofold 
ponoi suffered from both the premature membrane rupture and birth. 
These last few passages all share in common the notion that the process of 
birth itself was painful for the infant. That infants – even prior to or during birth 
– were thought to feel pain is likely related to the theory that infants are 
perceptive on their first day of life.  The fact that infants both laugh and cry in 
sleep is adduced as proof of their powers of perception.  These powers, however, 
are not fully matured, inasmuch as they do not respond in kind when touched.209 
In addition to possessing powers of perception, albeit blunted, infants were 
thought to possess sensibility. In this case, however, these powers were thought 
to differ according to the infant’s sex. Whereas boys in utero differentiate with 
respect to reproductive organs sooner than girls, once born, girls are more 
sensible than boys. In the case of genitals, boys' organs are visible after forty days 
of gestation, while girls' are not, since “like parts in like places remain similar for 
a long time.” These parts take longer to differentiate because of their "habituation 
and attraction." Once born, however, girls outstrip boys with respect to maturity, 
sensibility, and aging, owing to both regimen and the inherent weakness of their 
                                                
207Seven Months’ Child 6. 
208Seven Months’ Child 7. 
209Seven Months’ Child 9. 
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bodies.210 Despite these developed theories of infant perception, however, the 
assumption of pain in the fetus relies more on an insistent reliance on the 
etiology of pain than on the infant’s ability to perceive such pain.211 
 
4. Pain and Old Age 
Where strict adherence to the theory of Hippocratic pain mechanics results in the 
idea that infants must suffer pain, assumptions about the nature of the elderly 
body engenders the idea that the old suffer less than the young. That the old 
suffer less is not, however, evidence for a Hippocratic “subjective” pain: the issue 
is not one of tolerance. On the contrary, young bodies are, owing to their physical 
makeup, more likely to experience greater and more frequent pains.  
The density and strength of an adult male’s flesh, as well as the tension 
and dryness of his body, is adduced as the reason why younger men suffer more 
pain than older men (Diseases I 22.12-21) 212: 
 
When younger men are subject to one of the affections that were 
said to arise from exertions, they suffer in more ways and more 
severely, and have more pains than do others; diseases usually 
become apparent in them immediately, so that they either 
expectorate or vomit blood, although sometimes the disease 
escapes the patient’s notice because of his good bodily condition. 
Older men suffer less often and, when they do, more mildly, since 
they are themselves weaker, and also they have more 
understanding and take better care of their affections. Thus, to 
begin with, these diseases occur less often, on the whole, in older 
                                                
210Seven Months’ Child 9.  
211On the separation of the perception of pain from the existence of pain, see above, Chapter One. 
212While the immediate distinction drawn in this instance is one of age, not sex, it should be noted 
that the differences between the young and aged male bodies are, in principle, the same as those 
between male and female, inasmuch as the primary distinction between male and female flesh is 
one of density.  
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men than in younger ones, and, when they do occur, they are 
milder in older men and more violent in younger ones.213 
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Note that the younger man suffers more and sharper pains than the older man. 
These two types of bodies, then, owing to their different densities and 
compositions, experience different pains (as opposed to experiencing pain 
differently, as a subjective pain model would understand it).214 
In other cases, by virtue of their age, an older person is said to suffer less 
pain. Old men endure fasting most easily, followed by middle aged men, youths, 
and, finally, children.215 This tolerance of fasting is directly related to the 
dwindling of heat that coincides with aging, while the cooler temperature of the 
aged body also meant that fevers were less hot.216 
When old age is to blame for a disease, there is sometimes an attitude of 
resolution to the fact: there is little for the physician to do: curvature of the spine 
                                                
213Tr. Potter. 
214 Unfortunately, the author feels that this one example is sufficient to demonstrate the concept 
that various bodies suffer differently, having begun with the enticing statement that in terms of 
recovery from these diseases, men differ from women, younger men from older men, and 
younger women from older women. Nowhere in the corpus, then, are there any explicit 
comparisons of the pains suffered by women and men. 
215Aphorisms 1.13. 
216Aphorisms 1.14. 
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is just something that can happen in old age,217 recurrent heart pain in an old 
person meant sudden death,218 and when epilepsy occurs for the first time in old 
age, these patients, if they do not die (which was the usual result), were expected 
to recover spontaneously and derive little benefit from physicians.219 When an 
older patient suffers from gout he is similarly incurable by medicine, but his 
escape is not spontaneous; if the older gout patient should develop dysentery he 
will be cured of his illness.220 The author of Aphorisms makes the even broader 
claim that any condition that becomes chronic in old men generally last until his 
death.221 While this statement provides a rather pessimistic view of old age when 
taken on its own, it is preceded by the assertion that old men in general suffer 
less illness than young men. 
If diseases in the elderly were treated, the patients were often assumed to 
respond poorly to such treatment: lichen, lepra, and leuce are said to be healed 
the easiest in young patients,222 while problems in the kidney and bladder are 
equally difficult to cure in old patients.223  
The aged thus suffer the least from pain and disease and are the least 
likely to either need or benefit from medical attention. In addition to the idea that 
the aged are less susceptible to pain and disease, 224  the physical process of aging 
could actually cure many illnesses (Epidemics VI 5.3): 
 
                                                
217Joints 47.1-3. 
218Coan Prenotions 280. 
219 Prorrhetic II 9. 
220 Prorrhetic II 8. 
221 Aphorisms 2.39. 
222 Prorrhetic II 43. 
223 Aphorisms 6.6. 
224 E.g. Aphorisms 2.39, Sacred Disease 9.1-15, and Affections 30.10. 
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Innate, chronic diseases depart in old age because of concoction, 
dissolution, and rarefaction. 
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The intersection of theoretical assumptions about the aging process (that the 
aging body loses both heat and moisture) with theories of pain and disease 
results in the notion that aged bodies experience less pain than others. The 
Hippocratics steadfastly held to these ideas, presumably in the face of the 
sufferings of the elderly. Witness one of the few case histories of an aged patient 
(Epidemics IV 1.42):  
 
The old man who lived on the stone porch felt pain in his lower 
back and both of his legs. Both pains descended into his thighs, 
sometimes to his lower leg, sometimes to his knees. His condition 
became especially chronic and many relapses occurred. Swelling in 
the feet, lower back, lower legs. Small glands, hard stomach, 
distended abdomen. Racked by pain in most parts. He was 
discovered to have a hard and painful bladder. Eruptions. Fevers. 
Afterwards he had pain in his ears. The same tumor, the gland was 
unable to be felt, his bone did not suppurate, but became septic and 
straightway he became feverish. 
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The old man’s disease is pain. He suffers from pains in his loins and both legs. 
These pains move and recur as time passes, his bladder is hard and painful and 
his entire belly is in pain. It is difficult to reconcile the Hippocratic theoretical 
assumptions that the aged are less disposed to illness and pain with the reality of 
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the old man's pain. Nevertheless, as we have by now seen time and again, 
Hippocratic physicians were likely to view pain as confirmation of the assumed 
materiality of the body. Unfortunately for this patient, it appears that the 
physician was content to witness, but not treat, his pain. 
 
 
5. The Mechanics and Semiotics of Female Pain 
5.1 Female Pain and Nosology 
When theories about pain intersect with assumptions about women, the links 
between pain, change, and disease no longer obtain. As argued in Chapter Two, 
non-gynecological nosological treatises rely heavily on the symptom of pain to 
differentiate diseases and this use of pain in diagnosis follows naturally upon the 
assumption that pain is not only a useful indicator of illness, but, in many cases, 
actually constituted disease itself.225 The equation between pain and disease 
resulted from the notion that both phenomena result from an imbalance of 
humors. Pain and disease were also linked  by the self-purported purpose of 
medicine; many treatises state that the purpose of medicine is to diminish pain 
and remove disease. By comparison, one finds no such stated purpose within the 
gynecological treatises. Rather, the purpose of women’s medicine seems to be the 
promotion or restoration of proper reproductive function.226 In other words, the 
focus of women’s medicine is not the removal of pain and suffering, but the 
restoration and promotion of reproductive health. Even when a woman suffers 
from what we might consider a general disease (i.e. one that is caused and 
                                                
225 The non-gynecological nosological treatises include Affections, Breaths, Diseases I-IV, and Internal 
Affections. 
226 Cf. Jouanna 1999, 174. 
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progresses in the same way for all humans), the cause may still have been 
understood within the context of a malfunction of her reproductive system.227 On 
this view, a woman’s reproductive organs are the locus of disease in her body, 
regardless of the manifestation of the disease. Even in non-gynecological 
treatises, when women are mentioned, they are classed separately from men, 
while their symptoms are also different from others.228 When female patients are 
recorded in the Epidemics, their complaints are often gynecological in nature229 
and even when they are not, reproductive functions – primarily childbirth and 
menstruation – are recorded, often in such a way as to indicate that they are 
responsible either for the woman’s illness, or for her return to health.230 
As a result of the strong connections between pain and disease, a typical 
description of disease in a non-gynecological treatise will either list pain as the 
primary component of a disease or even "name" the disease after the type and 
location of pain that constitutes it.231 The nosology of the gynecological treatises, 
however, rarely equates disease with pain.232 Instead, diseases are almost 
exclusively classified etiologically;  to the behavior of the womb, the behavior of 
the menses, or a fertility issue, while pain is merely one of many symptoms 
experienced when a woman’s reproductive system malfunctions.  
                                                
227 Dean-Jones has argued that the diseases discussed in the non-gynecological treatises may have 
been considered "men’s diseases," and that any disease a woman experiences was a "woman’s 
disease." However, see Manuli 1983 on the statement at Diseases of Women I 62 that all diseases in 
women are “women's diseases.” 
228 Cf. Dean-Jones 1994, 114f. 
229 Lloyd (1983, 67-68) reckons that roughly one-third of the case histories in the Epidemics record 
the treatment of women. Demand's figures, however are somewhat higher, since she also 
includes cases where female patients are adduced as examples (Demand 1998, 78 and n. 11). 
230 E.g. Hanson 1994 reports that 33 case histories in the Epidemics are concerned with childbirth. 
231 See Roselli 1990 for an overview of the “typical” presentation of symptoms in the nosological 
treatises Diseases II and Internal Affections. 
232 For exceptions, see  Diseases of Women I 46 and 52. 
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The author of Places in Man attributes the cause of all women's diseases to 
the movement of the uterus from its accustomed position (Places in Man 47.1-20): 
 
Diseases of women, as they are called. The uterus is the cause of all 
these diseases; for however it changes from its normal position – 
whether it moves forward, or whether it withdraws – it produces 
diseases. When the uterus does not drop its os and does not move 
so that it is outside and touching the labia, the disease is very 
minor. But when it moves ahead towards the front and inserts its os 
against the labium, first this produces pain because of the contact, 
and also the menstrual flow fails to take place because the uterus is 
obstructed and capped by its impaction against the labia, and  
when this flow is held back it produces swelling and pain. If the 
uterus descends downwards and turns aside to fall against the 
groin, it will produce pain; and if it ascends upwards, turns aside 
and becomes obstructed, in this way too it produces a disease, on 
account of its porousness; when the uterus is diseased in this way, it 
provokes pain in the hips and in the head. When the uterus 
becomes filled and swells shut, nothing flows and it fills up; when 
it is full, it touches the hip-joints. When the uterus has become 
filled with fluid, dilated and immobile, and when it touches the 
hip-joints, it produces pains both in the hip-joints and in the groin, 
and something like spheres pass by in the belly, and the patient has 
pain in her head, sometimes in one half, sometimes in the whole 
head; such is the disease that arises.233 
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The immediate cause of pain in women's diseases is not excess humor, as it is in 
many of the general diseases. Rather, humoral imbalance provokes abnormal 
behavior in the uterus and this organ in turn causes pain, primarily by touching 
other places within the body.234 Rather than framing all women's diseases by first 
describing the pains they cause and then explaining what happens inside the 
body to produce these diseases (as is the case in non-gynecological diseases), the 
author classifies women's diseases etiologically. It is clear that, for the author of 
Places in Man, when it comes to the female body, disease may cause pain, but it is 
not constituted by pain. Furthermore, pain in the female body is no longer 
coterminous with disease, but is a reaction to the affected uterus. 
In the gynecological treatises, the behavior of the womb may also provoke 
illness, as the author of Places in Man asserts. The spongy nature of female flesh, 
however, especially its propensity to draw liquid to itself, is at the root of the 
difference between female and other bodies.235 The affections described in these 
treatises include not only those caused by the movement of the uterus, but also 
an array of conditions involving diseased flows and infertility. Yet, despite the 
fact that many of the conditions described in the gynecological treatises have the 
same mechanism as many “andrological” diseases – that is, they are caused by a 
                                                
234 That an organ can be a source of pain is not unusual in itself. For example, in Affections 28 we 
are told that pain in strangury is caused when the bladder is dry, cold, or empty. That the cause of 
all diseases in women is an organ, however, is unusual. Cf. King 1998, 34: “[i]n the Hippocratic 
texts, organs are often of less importance than fluids.” On organs in Hippocratic Medicine, see, 
e.g. Gundert 1992. 
235 Cf. Nature of the Child/Generation 21 and Diseases of Women I 1. On the nature of female flesh, see 
Dean-Jones 1994, 55-9 Hanson 1975, King 1998, 28-9, 32, 34, 71, 77, 92 and 96. 
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diseased blockage or flow of humor – the nosological pattern of disease in 
women privileges the mechanisms of disease over the symptom of pain.236 
Compare the following descriptions, which both reflect the typical method 
of disease classification found in their respective treatises (Affections 15 and 
Diseases of Women II 113): 
 
Other pains that occur in the cavity in the summer: pains that 
attack the hypochondrium and the cardia … Patients generally 
suffer these pains because of phlegm, when it is disturbed and 
attacks the heart …  
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and: 
 
Red flux: a flowing of blood like that from a freshly slaughtered 
beast, conspicuous clots, sometimes the red flow gushes out and 
the lower abdomen swells, then reduces, grows weak, then 
hardens, ulcerative pain when touched, fever and shivering. Pain in 
the area near the genitals, the pubis, near the flank, waist, tendons, 
uterus and breast. Also she hurts in her shoulder blades and all her 
other body parts. She is weak and faint and her complexion 
changes. 
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The pain described in Affections is more than just a symptom of disease, it is the 
disease itself (“pains in the cavity,” etc.). Remove the label of pain, and the 
                                                
236 For “andrological,” see Dean-Jones 1994, 119. 
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disease has no name. In the case of the red flux described in Diseases of Women, 
however, the situation is reversed: we are told that the excessive red flow gushes 
out of the body and clots and that several symptoms, including all sorts of pains, 
result from this flow. After labeling the disease, the author of Affections explains 
that these pains, or diseases, are caused by the movement of phlegm towards the 
heart. The disease comes first, then is followed by a description of the action 
within the body that causes the disease. Where the disease in Affections is 
conflated with the pains that it causes, to such an extent that the disease is called 
“pain,” the disease in Diseases of Women Is labeled in such a way as to draw a 
connection not between disease and symptom, but between disease and cause: 
red flux. In both of these examples, the disease is caused by the abnormal 
behavior of a humor inside of the body: phlegm or blood. The author of 
Affections, however, elevates the experience of pain above that of mere symptom 
by turning the patient's experience into his problem.237 
In the case of childbirth, the cause of a woman's pain is even further 
mediated within her body. The assumed passivity of women led to the 
assumption that the entire process of labor was caused by the action of the infant 
inside of her body.238 Hanson has shown that the therapies prescribed in cases of 
dystocia (difficult labor), focused as they are on ways of inducing a child to exit 
the mother's body, indicate that physicians assumed that the pain – in fact, the 
entire process – of childbirth was caused by the fetus' efforts to birth itself.239 
                                                
237On Hippocratic nosological strategies, see Potter 1990.  
238 Fasbender 1897 was the first to draw attention to the fetus' active role in birth. For further 
discussion, see Hanson 1991, 1994, and 1999; Lonie 1981, Dean-Jones 1994, 212; Demand 1994, 19. 
239 Hanson 1999 argues that the therapies for difficult labor reveal the assumption that pain in 
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Pain in women, then, is figured as a reaction to an independent force: 
excessive humor, a wandering womb, or a laboring infant. For a woman to be in 
pain is thus for her to be a passive reactor and, as we will see in the next section, 
this “breakdown” in the cause of pain has a significant effect on the utility of 
female pain as a sign in diagnosis. 
The link between pain and disease in unmarked bodies elevates the 
importance of pain above the other symptoms of disease. The criterion of pain 
can even be the prime factor that distinguishes one disease from another, as I 
showed in Chapter Two. The location of pain was one of the primary ways in 
which pain was distinguished for the purposes of diagnosis.240 In the case of 
women’s diseases, however, the significance of the location of pain is 
dramatically lessened. 
Time and again, a breakdown in the reproductive system is said to 
provoke pain in the waist, loin, groin, belly, womb, or head or some combination 
of the six.241 The variety of the locations in which pain was thought to manifest is 
                                                
childbirth is caused by the baby, not uterine contractions. 
240 See Breaths 2.1-4 for the statement that all diseases have the same manner (tropos), but differ in 
where they occur (topos). On the location of pain, see above, Chapter Three.  
241 These parts account for almost 57% of the instances when pain is localized in a body part in the 
gynecological treatises. Waist: Barrenness (Diseases of Women III) 228.4; Diseases of Women I 3.2, 24.9, 
36.10, 37.3, 57.7, 59.8, 60.16, 63.2, 64.6; Diseases of Women II 112.2, 113.6, 120.4, 122.8, 134.3, 139.3, 
140.2, 141.5, 144.3, 146.5, 156.7, 162.4, 166.4, 167.8, 168.5, 170.3, 171.10, 175.6, 177.6; Nature of 
Woman 2.7, 5.2, 6.3, 7.3, 9.2, 11.4, 12.6, 13.4, 15.2, 35.14, 37.5, 40.5, 43.3, 45.6, 46.6, 47.2, 54.3, 70.1, 
89.2; loin: Diseases of Women I 2.20, 2.48, 3.14, 4.16, 5.14, 34.9, 36.23, 60.17, 61.26; Diseases of Women 
II 110.18, 115.2, 137.22, 157.4, 163.5; Nature of Woman 35.15, 39.5, 54.2; groin: Diseases of Women I 
3.13, 4.16-17, 38.6-7, 57.7, 59.8, 63.3; Diseases of Women II 110.13-14, 115.3, 144.3, 162.4, 171.10; belly: 
Barrenness (Diseases of Women III) 228.4, 246.1; Diseases of Women I 3.1-2, 36.22, 45.8, 46.2, 52.3, 57.6, 
59.7, 60.16, 61.26, 63.3, 64.5-6, 74.3; Diseases of Women II 120.4, 122.7, 131.2, 134.2, 135.2, 137.22, 
139.2, 141.5, 144.2, 146.4-5, 156.6, 157.4, 162.3-4, 163.5, 167.7, 170.2-3; Nature of Woman 2.7, 5.2, 6.2, 
7.3, 8.2, 9.2, 11.4, 12.5-6, 13.4, 14.2, 15.2, 37.5, 39.4-5, 40.5, 43.2, 45.5-6, 46.5, 54.2-3, 89.1; womb: 
Barrenness (Diseases of Women III) 206.28, 206.34, 207.1, 209.24; Diseases of Women I 36.49, 51.5, 52.1, 
56.2, 56.6; Diseases of Women II 154.7, 156.6, 172.1, 172.5; Nature of Woman 80.1, 85.1, 92.1. 
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more homogenous than what is found in the "general" texts.242 Furthermore, since 
the location of pain in women's diseases is so limited, it is no longer a viable or 
important criterion for the differentiation of diseases. For example, in the treatise 
Nature of Woman, pains in the lower belly and the waist are listed as symptoms in 
six different diseases (a completely prolapsed uterus, folding of the cervix, 
incomplete delivery of the afterbirth, a womb full of phlegm, erysipelas (a type 
of lesion) in the womb, and an unnatural gaping of the womb, Nature of Woman 
5.2, 7.3, 9.2, 11.4, 12.5-6, and 13.4, respectively). 
The rather limited locations of pain found in the gynecological treatises 
comes as no surprise given that these treatises are concerned with describing the 
course of diseases effected by a breakdown in reproductive function. What is a 
productive sign in other bodies – the precise location of pain – is merely another 
symptom in gynecological diseases. The limited location of pain is a natural 
extension of the notion that all women's diseases (and perhaps, all diseases in 
women) were caused by reproductive failure.243 
While physicians may have expected less variety in the location of pain in 
women's diseases, they were primed to recognize the temporal dimensions of 
female pain. Several instances point to an effort to measure female pain in cycles. 
The Hippocratics expected the principles of cyclicality as manifested in 
general medicine to also carry over to female reproductive function. The author 
of On the Seven Months' Child makes this connection explicit. He states that the 
reproductive functions of women – conception, miscarriage, and birth – follow 
                                                
242 On the location of pain, cf. Villard 2006, 73. 
243 Cf. Dean-Jones 1994, 112. 
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the same crises as general human affections such as disease, convalescence and 
death (\<* )a '?&.*^@& .` <?;;Lk*(> $#& E-C"D2& 5.@ +` $"2<-+0 $( 5.@ +` $%5+* 
5"0&+&$.* E& +r<0 !(" . $( &+,<+* 5.@ .` I'0(*.* 5.@ +` T9&.$+* $+H<* <D-!.<*& 
:&T"]!+*<*&, On The Seven Months' Child, 9.1-3). 
The author of Epidemics II claims that in pregnant women, pains occur 
throughout gestation according to a fixed pattern. In a staccato list of topics 
related to gestation we are told that “pains come in cycles” (P` !%&+* E& 
!("*%)+*<*&). The author later elaborates by saying that pains associated with 
pregnancy occur on the third day after fifty and the sixth after one hundred and 
that monthly pains manifest in the second and fourth months of pregnancy (P` 
!%&+* !("@ $"0$4& e-G"4& !"8> $\<* !(&$L5+&$., 5.@ |5$4& !"8> $\<*& q5.$%&· -4&*.H+*, 
)(?$(".0Y 5.@ $($."$.0Y, Epidemics II 3.17,  cf. Epidemics VI 8.6). 
The menses may also be cyclical. In fact, the same author explicitly refers 
to menstruation as a cycle (!("0+)+>) and further links the process to pregnancy 
by stating that the heaviness felt during the period is related to the pains felt 
during the eighth month of gestation ($A !"8 $+D$2& C9"(. :)(;BA $#& p5$.-L&2& 
!%&2&, ibid).244 
In theory, at least, pains felt as a consequence of reproductive issues were 
thought to follow temporal patterns. In practice, however, it is unclear how the 
physician was supposed to identify these cycles. Only one case within the 
Epidemics records that a female patient’s pains were cyclical. This case history 
records that a young girl who suffered from an acute and ardent fever, 
                                                
244 For Hippocratic views on the cyclicality of the menses, see Dean-Jones 1989, esp. 63 and 181.  
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presumably as the result of suppressed menarche,245 suffered pains “on the even 
days.”246   
While this case history mentions that the parthenos' pain occurs in cycles, 
the author makes no move to explain the significance of this event. As in most of 
the case histories, the phenomenon is merely recorded, with no explanation. In 
theory and practice, then, it seems that the precise nature of the cyclicality of 
female pain was of little interest. Rather, the authors of Epidemics and Seven 
Months' Child all share in common a vague assumption that pain in women 
followed a pattern. 
The pains associated with reproductive function – menstruation, 
childbirth, and the movement of the uterus – seem to have been considered a 
type of pain altogether different from those felt by other bodies in other 
afflictions. 
The pains of birth would seem to be the primary type of female pain to 
which other female pains are compared or assimilated. On occasion, the “pangs” 
of labor are referred to by the term ôdines (Diseases of Women I 65 and 68), while 
on even more occasions a term for “pain” is employed. On two occasions, the 
pains of menstruation are likened to those of childbirth.247 Finally, we are told 
that sharp and strong pains suffered during an abundant flow fall upon the groin 
and move in the same way as birth pangs (B+*$G+?<.* l<!(" )H&(>, Diseases of 
                                                
245 The author mentions that, in addition to suffering a nosebleed, the young woman commenced 
menarche once her fever dissipated. Cf. Aphorisms 5.33. See Dean-Jones 1994, 143-144 and King 
1998, 68-74 for the connection between nosebleeds and menstruation. 
246 Epidemics III 3.17(12). 
247 In Diseases of Women I 2 we are told that a woman experiences the pains associated with the 
third month of pregnancy during her menstrual period; in Epidemics II 3.17, as noted above, p. 10, 
the heaviness felt during menstruation is said to be related to the pains felt during the eighth 
month of pregnancy 
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Women II 110.14-15). In all of these cases, the pains of childbirth are referred to as 
if the reader should both understand their nature and recognize their 
manifestation. 
Pain in elderly or inexperienced women may still be equated with these 
special pains.  We are told that an old woman (graiê) suffered from a disease 
known as white phlegm.248 After most of her symptoms disappeared, she then 
developed glaucoma. After a short-lived improvement in her glaucoma, pains 
"that appeared to be hysterical" appeared in her hip and leg.249 That these pains 
are described as "apparently hysterical" indicates some doubt on the author’s 
part as to whether the uterus was truly to blame for the old woman’s pains. Such 
doubt is likely a reflection of the notion that, beyond menopause, the uterus was 
not thought to play a role in women’s diseases. What, then, compels the 
physician to identify these pains as potentially hysterical? The symptoms 
recorded in this case history seem to be linked to the internal flux of white 
phlegm – after the old woman’s white phlegm stopped manifesting it 
presumably traveled to her eyes, hence the connection between the glaucoma’s 
appearance and the white phlegm’s disappearance. Similarly, the pains in her hip 
and leg commence when her glaucoma momentarily improves. Even though, by 
virtue of her age, this woman’s uterus played little role in her body, the location 
of her pains (the hip in particular being one of the few places consistently 
marked for pain in women of reproductive age) coupled with the evidence that 
her condition is caused by a migratory overabundance of humor, perhaps 
                                                
248 On this disease, see Grmek 1989, 146. 
249 Epidemics IV 1.30. 
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prompted the author to suggest that the uterus may be to blame for her pain. 
In one other case history female pains are identified in a woman who 
could have had no experience of the phenomenon (Epidemics V 1.25):  
 
In Larissa, the female servant of Dyseridos, when she was young, 
had terrible pain whenever she had sex – otherwise she was 
without pain. She never conceived. When she was sixty years of 
age she began to have pain around the middle of the day, like she 
was in strong labor. From the middle of the day she ate many leeks, 
then the strongest pain ever seized her. She stood up and felt 
something rough in the mouth of her uterus. Then, after she 
fainted, another woman put her hand down there and squeezed 
out a rough stone as big as the whorl of a spindle. She was 
immediately healthy. 
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This woman, despite never experiencing the pain of childbirth (she never 
conceived a child) is said to have experienced a pain akin to strong labor when 
"delivering" a stone.250 
That both of these women are recorded as experiencing a type of pain that 
is typically assigned to either a woman who is experiencing birth (Epidemics V 
1.25), or one who is suffering from a displaced womb (Epidemics IV 1.30) when 
neither woman could have had experience with such a complaint speaks to the 
                                                
250 The analogy between the stone and an infant is easier to imagine when we consider Diseases of 
Women I 33. The author explains how pain is caused during a breech birth by using the metaphor 
of an olive pit in an oil flask. If one were to throw the pit into a small-mouthed flask, the pit, if 
transverse, would not easily come out of the opening. In a lateral or breech birth, then, the 
woman experiences a great deal of pain since the “olive pit” inside of her is not positioned in 
such a way as to easily come out of her “oil flask.” 
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pervasiveness of the notion of “female” pain.  In addition, that a woman need 
not have experienced such pains in order to be identified as experiencing them, 
suggests that these pains were identified by the physician, rather than recognized 
by the patient, a point to which I shall return in the next section. 
In several ways, then, pain plays a different role in the diagnosis of disease 
in women than it does in other bodies. The location of pain – while a useful 
diagnostic sign for other patients to such a degree that diseases may even be 
defined by where pains occur – cedes ground to the location of the uterus as an 
etiological criterion for disease. The uterus may move around within the body, 
causing various types of diseases, but the pains it occasions are more restricted in 
location. On the other hand, pain takes on other dimensions in women. In bodies 
marked as “female,” the temporal dimension of pain displays cyclical tendencies. 
In addition, pain felt “when touched” becomes another symptom useful for 
diagnosis. Lastly, not only were reproductive women thought to suffer their own 
particular types of pains, but the notion of “female pain” was so pervasive that 
physicians thought they recognized it in women who, by definition, could not 
possibly have been experiencing such pains. 
 
5.2 The Meaning of Female Pain 
As I argued in Chapter Two, the role of pain in prognosis reflects the fact that all 
pain was not universally understood as having a negative value. Rather, in 
certain circumstances pain was thought of as a “good” sign. That a woman’s 
reproductive system was to blame for her illness has great repercussions for how 
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a woman’s pain was understood. Pain in a woman is focused through the actions 
of the uterus, and hence the meaning of a woman’s pain is influenced by the 
significance accorded to her reproductive functions. It should come as no 
surprise, then, that in many cases the meaning of a woman’s pain, especially 
when connected to her positive role as life-giver, is portrayed as a boon.  
The author of Diseases of Women I explains that the process of childbirth 
and lochia (post-natal bleeding) fundamentally alters the body of the woman.251 
This treatise begins with the statement that a woman who has never experienced 
birth suffers more both during birth and menstruation than a woman who has 
given birth previously. The author explains that the process of birth and the 
lochia transform the body. The woman's body is broken down at the level of the 
flesh, so that she is able to bear any later accumulations of moisture. 
Furthermore, the woman's body and womb become accustomed to being full. 
Because the process of birth also expands the woman's womb, it easier for her to 
“get rid” of her menses and she is thereby less likely to suffer from any 
blockages. 
Taking this passage together with the statement from Diseases I 8 that a 
physician, should he attempt to treat a laboring woman’s pains, may be blamed 
for her death, King has argued that Hippocratic physicians believed the pain of 
childbirth to be not only natural for a woman, but also necessary for her health.252 
In fact, pain was thought to be so integral to the process of birth, that the author 
of Coan Prenotions claims that it is dangerous for a woman to feel no pain while 
                                                
251Diseases of Women I 1.1-24. On this passage, see Dean-Jones 1994, 72 and King 1998, Ch. 6. 
252 King, 1998, Ch. 6 and 1999. 
 120 
giving birth (W8 !"8 $#& $%52& E!*w*'+,&, 5.@ $A :&2)D&2> $*5$%-(&., 5*&)?&])(. , 
Coan Prenotions 527).253 
The process of childbirth itself, then, was not only considered necessary 
for a woman’s health, but also carried with it the promise of less pain in the 
future.254  
In addition to these circumstances where the natural pain of the female 
reproductive process was expected to be salutary, in several other circumstances, 
the meaning of a woman’s pain was thought to be  positive. Aphorisms 5.53 states 
that if a pregnant woman’s breasts become thin, she is likely to miscarry. If, 
however, her breasts become hard again, "she will suffer pain, either in the 
breasts or in the hip joints, eyes, or knees, and there is no miscarriage.”255 In this 
case, pain felt in the hardened breasts is an indication of a return to health and a 
successful birth. 
In other circumstances, a lack of pain in the mother may bode poorly for 
the fetus. Superfetation 11 warns that a fetus will be born dead – or will not 
survive for long – if the laboring mother experiences a copious flow of blood – 
without pain – before delivery. The prognosis for the child is entirely dependent 
on the state of the mother’s body: a flux from her body presages the death of the 
fetus. It is only when this blood flow is painless, however, that it is of any 
significance. In this case, should the mother wish for her child to survive, it is a 
                                                
253 This passage also discussed above, Chapter Three. See Hanson 1999 for a discussion of this 
passage in relation to the expectation of pain in childbirth. 
254 On less pain as opposed to no pain, see Dean-Jones 1994, 126:“[a]lthough the use of the 
comparative adverbs (F.;(!]$("+&, TZ<<+&) to describe the suffering of a childless woman shows 
that giving birth did not guarantee absolutely pain-free menstruation, motherhood was generally 
viewed as the ultimate solution to women's problems, and easing normal menstruation was no 
exception.” 
255 Cf. Aphorisms 5.37 and 5.52. 
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better sign for her to feel pain during such a flux. 
In addition to signifying a successful birth, pain may also indicate 
conception. If after a suppository a women suffers pains in her joints, among 
other symptoms, she has a greater hope of conceiving than women who do not 
respond to the suppository.256 It was thought that the most difficult women in 
which to compel pregnancy were those whose menses disappear without any 
effect on their complexion, or without any pain. However, if a woman's menses 
disappear, she says that she has headaches and, in addition, has a poor 
complexion for no obvious reason, the woman's uterus must be cleaned in order 
to restore, it is implied, her fertility.257 In all of these cases, then, pain offers 
women confirmation of fertility. 
Under many circumstances, then, a woman’s pain signals a positive 
outcome. The pain of childbirth carries with it the promise not only of health, but 
also of less painful menstruation and easier subsequent births. In other 
situations, pain indicates a positive outcome for a woman’s reproductive 
function in that it can signify conception or successful pregnancy. A Hippocratic 
patient likely understood her pain as part of a normal, natural, even occasionally 
beneficial, process and, as these examples show, there even must have been 
situations in which a woman was relieved to experience pain. The 
contextualization and meaning of pain has a profound effect on how one 
experiences the phenomenon.258 In addition, studies have shown that a woman’s 
                                                
256Barrenness (Diseases of Women III) 214.6-9, cf. Superfetation 20. 
257Prorrhetic II 24. 
258 See, e.g. McGrath 1994 and Melzack and Wall 2008 for an overview of the psychological factors 
in pain perception. 
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experience of pain in childbirth is mediated through cultural assumptions about 
the process.259 In all likelihood, then, these assumptions about the role of pain in 
women’s health would have shaped a woman’s very experience of pain in these 
circumstances. 
 
6. The Communication of Pain in Marked Bodies 
6.1 Communication of Children’s Pain 
As we saw in Chapter Three, Hippocratic physicians occasionally utilized 
patient’s physical cues as a measure of the intensity of their pain. At the same 
time, however, physicians were hesitant to “diagnose” pain on the basis of 
physical behavior alone; whenever possible, physicians preferred to receive a 
report (verbal or not) from a lucid patient rather than rely on their own 
observations to deduce the presence of pain. 
Two case studies in the Epidemics concern children, paidia, who are  infants. 
Epidemics VII 1.106 describes the case of a two month old infant who suffered 
from pustules all over his body and subsequently died. While this passage is 
evidence that infants were treated by Hippocratic physicians, it contains little 
evidence of a concern with – or acknowledgement of – the perceptions or 
sensibilities of the child. 
The other passage from Epidemics, however, indicates an interest in the 
pains of the infant that parallels the presentation of pain in adult cases (Epidemics 
VII 1.52):  
 
                                                
259 See, e.g. McLachlan and Waldenstrom 2005. 
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The infant son260 of Hegesipolis had, for nearly four months, a 
gnawing pain by the navel. As time passed, the pain intensified, he 
beat on his belly, plucked at it. Fever seized him. He wasted away. 
The bones were seized. His feet swelled; testicles. The parts of the 
belly around the navel formed a loose-textured stalk of material 
that was going to make a disturbance in the bowel. He did not 
want food. He would take milk. The end was near. The bowel 
became watery, and bloody serous matter came out, foul-smelling. 
The intestine was inflamed. He died after vomiting a small short 
phlegmy object that seemed like the embryo of the flatworm. On 
his death the suture of his skull became very hollow. While he was 
sick he kept drawing down with the hand from the front of his 
head, epecially as the end was imminent, but he had no pain in the 
head. And on the left thigh underneath the lower gland, a livid 
area. The testicles lost their swelling, perhaps on the previous day. 
Similar symptoms occurred for the child of Hegetorides, which 
died. Except that more vomiting occurred towards the end.261 
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The presentation of pain in this case study conforms with that found throughout 
the Epidemics: the infant’s complaint initially is pain – and a particular type of 
pain at that: a “gnawing” pain in his belly. This pain is specified in several ways: 
by the term used for the pain (Q;'4-.), in terms of quality (C"2$*58&), and in 
terms of location (!("@ p-B.;8&). We are then told that this pain increased in 
                                                
260 Smith, per litteras: “the suggestion of the hollowing of the fontanelle on his head, which could 
be from dehydration, is still persuasive to me that the child is in his first or second year.” 
261Tr. Smith. 
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intensity and later that he did not feel pain in his head.262 
So far, then, this case study is quite "normal" when it comes to how pain is 
typically recorded in individual case studies. Yet this very fact – that in terms of 
recorded symptoms this case could just as easily describe the course of the same 
disease in an adult – is surprising. How exactly does the physician know that the 
infant is suffering from such a particular or precise pain? How does he know that 
this pain intensifies? Or that the infant does not feel pain in his head? 
Here it helps to examine the atypical aspects of this case study: the 
inclusion of detailed descriptions of the infant’s behavior. He is described as 
plucking at and beating his belly as well as his head. Presumably it was actions 
such as these, as well as, perhaps, vocalization such as crying, that led the 
physician to assume that the infant was in pain and that the pain was localized to 
his belly. 
That the physician would have relied on such non-verbal behavioral clues 
in the process of "translating" the infant’s felt experience into the description 
found in this case study accounts for much of how the child's pain is described. 
Certainly by beating at his stomach, the infant indicated pain in that region, 
while an increase in the intensity of such behavior could have reasonably 
corresponded to an increase in the intensity of his pain. But what of the fact that 
we are told that the pain was "gnawing"? And what especially of the fact that – in 
spite of the infant’s gesturing in the area of his head – we are told that he did not 
feel pain in his head? It is certainly possible that the child possessed enough 
language ability to communicate that, despite his gestures, his head was not in 
                                                
262On the dimensions of pain, see above, Chapter Three. 
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pain. We should not discount the possibility, however, that the physician 
assumed the child's head was not in pain after comparison with the the 
symptoms of the child of Hegetorides. We do not know the specific disease this 
infant was supposed to have suffered and, thus, cannot investigate whether the 
nosology of his disease allowed for the possibility of head pain. 
Several case studies highlight emotional and obstinate behavior in 
children in pain. For example, a boy in Epidemics IV who suffered from a 
hemorrhage, constipation, and a painful and hard hypochondrium is recorded as 
tossing about and crying out loudly,263 while the author of Epidemics VII compiles 
cases where children who suffer bone damage cry out loudly, klangodes.264 In this 
latter instance the author is clearly in the process of categorizing the symptoms 
children experience when suffering from head wounds. While not all children cry 
out shrilly as a result of this condition, the author still feels the need to record 
that in many cases children will exhibit this behavior.  
In all of these examples, the behavior of children is considered meaningful 
and relevant to the case study, and is included among the child’s symptoms. 
These responses to pain seem to be taken as evidence for the location and 
intensity of pain in a way that similar behavior from adults is not. That the 
behavior of children could be taken as evidence for pain explains why the author 
of Epidemics VII feels compelled to explain that the infant discussed above did 
not feel pain in his head, despite his continuous gesturing at that area. 
Despite these behavioral clues that a physician could rely upon in 
                                                
263 Epidemics IV 1.20.7-11. 
264Epidemics VII 35; cf. Epidemics V 97. 
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assessing a child’s symptoms, however, there is some indication that the verbal 
reports of children were nevertheless considered unreliable. The author of 
Epidemics VII relates the case of a child who suffered from a small fistula in his 
naval. The author says that the child “claimed” that bilious matter exited the 
fistula whenever he was feverish.265 Rather than simply relate this symptom, the 
author casts some doubt on the claim by framing the report with the distancing 
ephê, "he said." 
The author of Prorrhetic II  goes one step further in his mistrust of 
children’s ability to relate accurately their symptoms. He relates a variety of 
symptoms that, if present, indicate that a child has suffered epileptic attacks in 
the past. The author claims that, if one should suspect that a child has suffered 
epileptic attacks in the past, the child’s caretaker (trephontos) will, if prompted, 
confirm that the child has suffered one or more of the symptoms. However, the 
author warns, many caretakers will say that they haven’t noticed any of the tell-
tale signs.266 What does it say about the mistrust this author has in a child’s 
ability to read accurately the signs within his own body that the author would 
instead choose to rely on the report of those who, he admits, often will disavow 
precise knowledge of the child’s experience?  
The author of the Sacred Disease believes that children are neither 
experienced enough to understand what is happening to their bodies nor 
acculturated enough to hide their reaction, and as a result, grow fearful during 
seizures.The author of Sacred Disease connects epileptic children's propensity to 
                                                
265 Epidemics VII 1.117. 
266 Prorrhetic II 10. 
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run to their mother's out of fear during a seizure with the child's lack of shame 
(Sacred Disease 12): 
 
Those who are accustomed to the disease sense when they are 
going to  have a fit and so flee from human sight – to home if their 
own house is near, but if not, to some empty place, where the 
fewest will witness them falling, and straightway they conceal 
themselves. They run away because they are ashamed, not because 
they are fearful, as many assume. But children, when they are first 
attacked, because of their inexperience with the symptoms of the 
disease, fall down wherever they happen to be. However, once they 
have had experience with multiple epileptic fits, whenever they 
sense an attack coming on they grow fearful and frightened of the 
symptoms of the attack and so flee to their mothers, or to anyone 
else they know well. For, owing to their young age, they have not 
yet learned to have shame. 
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That the child's behavior is thought to be because of shamelessness suggests that 
the Hippocratic’s propensity to record the behavior of children was linked to the 
idea that children had not simply learned yet how to control their reactions to 
pain. In other words, children were reacting outside of social norms, not in 
response to pain that they “felt more” than adults. If this is true, the reaction of 
children to pain may be one of the few places where Hippocratics were prepared 
to acknowledge the subjectivity of pain expression (if not experience). A similar 
assumption seems to underlie the passage from Prorrhetic II: children are 
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considered to be illiterate when it comes to understanding or communicating 
pain, or any of the symptoms, within their bodies. 
 
6.2 Communication of Female Pain 
Pain in female bodies, being mediated through reproductive function, loses some 
significance as a diagnostic sign, while its tendency to indicate a positive 
prognosis increases. Both the diagnostic and the prognostic functions of female 
pain affected physicians' views on the woman's ability to interpret or translate 
her pain. The positive value attached to pain, in particular its tendency to signify 
conception, is likely to blame for the attitude that women can be deceived by 
pain. Furthermore, the process whereby the female patient communicated pain 
to the physician may have been affected by the assumption of the location of pain 
in women's diseases. In fact, it is likely that a combination of mistrust in women's 
ability to interpret their pain, and the notion that women were hesitant to share 
their troubles with male physicians, may underlie the presentation of pain in 
diagnosis. 
King has argued that women's bodies, and women's interpretations of the 
signs in their bodies, are both deceitful from the perspective of the Hippocratic 
physician. In complaints of a gynecological nature, women's ability to accurately 
access the state of their body is dependent on their experience. While women 
who have experience in female conditions (especially pregnancy) are trusted, 
those who are inexperienced are represented as not knowing what happens in 
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their body.267 This mistrust of the patient stems from the fact that the physician is 
“one stage further away from the reality of the disease” (p. 45) and must rely on 
his own abilities to perceive what is happening in the patient's body.  
All of the situations King adduces focus on how the physician, not the 
patient, can be deceived by the patient's body. What of the woman's ability to be 
deceived by her own body? Take, for example, the statement at Fleshes 19 that 
women who have experience quite easily recognize the symptoms of pregnancy: 
a sudden chill, followed by heat, shivering, and tension, as well as a sluggish 
feeling in her joints, body, and uterus. So far, this statement supports the 
argument that a woman can overcome the disadvantages of having a deceptive 
body once she has experience of that body's processes. The passage continues, 
however, by stating that only women who are “in a clean state” and not humid 
experience these symptoms, but that many of those who are stout or phlegmatic 
are not able to recognize what happens in their body. That the state of a woman's 
body had such influence over her ability to recognize, or even perceive, what 
happens inside of her seems to directly contradict the idea that experience 
“teaches” a woman how to interpret the signs in her body. The idea that 
experience is necessary for proper reading of signs presupposes that the signs are 
present in the woman to begin with. A woman's inexperience, then, lies in her 
misreading of signs that present themselves, rather than in her inaccurate 
sensation of them. By contrast, the idea that the condition of a woman's body 
may prevent her from even “seeing” the signs at all leaves little room for the 
operation of experience. Taking the evidence from On Fleshes, then, it is entirely 
                                                
267 Cf. King 1998, 53. See also Demand 1995. 
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possible for a woman who, despite having had experience of, in this case, 
pregnancy, to nevertheless be constitutionally incapable of experiencing 
symptoms altogether.  
Even if she is sensible to pain, a woman may still inaccurately read the 
significance of her pain.268 Many women, we are told, misinterpret pain during 
sex as a positive sign. The author of Diseases of Women I 3 says that when a 
woman's menses fail to appear, the woman supposes that she is pregnant and 
that when she feels pain during intercourse, she supposes that something is 
inside of her. The author of Prorrhetic says that women are deceived into thinking 
they are pregnant when their menses disappear and their abdomens swell. These 
women, however, do not produce milk or, if they do, produce only a small 
amount, and, what is more, suffer pain in their head, neck and hypochondrium. 
Women who are pregnant, on the other hand, produce milk and do not suffer 
such pains, unless they were habitual.269 In all of these situations, the woman has 
felt a pain and subsequently misinterpreted its meaning. 
There is also evidence that women were not trusted to communicate their 
pain. On several occasions, an author distances himself from acknowledging the 
reality of a woman's pains (among other symptoms) by saying that the female 
patient “says” that she has pain.270 While such a strategy may merely indicate that 
the woman communicated her symptoms to the physician, as a man would,271 I 
suspect that more is at play. After all, if we were to expect the physician to frame 
                                                
268As may men. Cf. Diseases I 20: patients can be deceived by moving pains into supposing that 
their ulcer has (also) moved. 
269 Prorrhetic II 26. 
270 Epidemics VII 1.11, Prorrhetic II 24. 
271 Cf. King 1998, 47: “like men, women can tell the doctor how their bodies feel.” 
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every symptom felt by the patient with “he said” or “she said,” we would find 
many more examples of this technique in the case histories. As it is, case histories 
often contain information that must have been said by the patient, yet merely list 
such symptoms as fact. 
On other occasions it is clear that the women are expected to report pain 
after careful interrogation. It is necessary to learn by inquiry (!?&T9&(<T.* )a F"6, 
Prorrhetic II 24.7) about a woman's menses if she is unable to become pregnant. 
Women who are of a greenish complexion for no reason will “say they have 
headaches and that their menses are difficult, irregular, and scanty”(.V$.* 
BL<+?<* 5(B.;6& :;'G(*&, 5.@ $A 5.$.-L&*. !+&4"#> $( <B0<* 5.@ :5"0$2> '0&(<T.*, 
Prorrhetic II 24.17-18). One may diagnose that a woman's uterus has turned 
towards the head if the woman says that she has pain in the small vessels of her 
nose and eyes.272 After administering a clyster to a woman suffering from flux, it 
may be necessary to treat her again if, after being questioned, she says that the 
mouth of her uterus is hard and she has pain (S& -($A $.,$. .K$6 E"2$4T(H<. B\ $8 
<$%-. $#& I<$("G2& <5;4"8& (7&.* 5.@ p)D&4& cF(*&, Diseases of Women II 119.30-31). 
It is clear that, in these cases, the question put to these women was not, e.g., 
“What do you feel?” or “Where does it hurt?” but must have been much more 
pointed. Women suffering from chronic fluxes were subjected to extremely 
leading questioning. The physician is instructed to ask such patients whether 
they have pain in their head, loins and lower belly, and then to ask if their teeth 
are on edge, their vision is blurred and their ears are ringing (WA> )a I!8 $#& w%2& 
                                                
272 Nature of Woman 48, Diseases of Women II 123. 
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$#& !+;?F"+&02& EF+-G&.> E"2$&, (3 5(B.;6& :;'G+?<* 5.@ p<B=& 5.@ $8 59$2 $N> 
'.<$"%>· E"G<T.* )a 5.@ !("@ .`-2)0.>, 5.@ :-C;?2<-+,, 5.@ F2&, Prorrhetic II 27). 
We can see evidence of such interrogation in a case history from Epidemics. 
A woman suffering from fever and pains in her head, upon arising, is reported to 
have said that her heart was weakening. After a few days, she was prompted via 
questioning to say that her entire body, and not just her head, was in pain (-($A 
$A> !"]$.> e-G".>, E"2$2-G&4, +K5 c$* -%&4& 5(B.;6&, :;;A 5.@ J;+& $8 <#-. 
!+&G(*& cB4, Epidemics VII 11.5-6).  
By highlighting this evidence for the interrogation of female patients, I do 
not mean to suggest that male patients were not similarly led on by the 
physician. In fact, as I argued in Chapter Three, such leading questioning was 
probably standard. What is unusual, however, is the emphasis placed on the 
interrogation of women, and the framing of female utterances with the 
distancing “she said.”  
The extra emphasis on the interrogation of women may stem from the 
belief that women were reluctant to communicate with male physicians. In 
particular, it was thought that women were often too embarrassed to discuss 
their conditions with male physicians.273 The practice of mistrusting a woman's 
unprompted vocalizations of pain, or prompting a shy woman to communicate 
her pain, may or may not have been supported by generalizations about female 
behavior. At any rate, the process whereby pain was communicated from female 
patient to male physician nevertheless created a situation where apparent pain 
                                                
273 Diseases of Women I 62. Cf. King 1998, 47. 
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would accord most easily with expected pain.  
Such practices may especially have been reflected in (or may have 
reflected) the limited location of pain in the diagnosis of disease in women. How 
is it that women, even when suffering from epidemic diseases, were not just 
thought, but also observed to have, their own set of symptoms? Pain is especially 
vulnerable to the influence of cultural assumption.274 Physicians' propensity to 
tell a woman where she was feeling pain by prompting her with pointed 
questions assured that the assumptions about pain in women, especially its 
location, were reflected in practice. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The material etiology of pain was so entrenched in Hippocratic doctrine that the 
process of birth, being emblematic of change, was assumed to cause pain in the 
neonate. At the same time, however, when faced with an expressive infant or 
child, it seems Hippocratic physicians found themselves conflicted: to what 
extent could they trust in the authenticity of children’s nonverbal pain cues? 
Assessing pain in a child thus seems to have pushed at the limits of Hippocratic 
trust in the objectivity of the pain experience, at least when it comes to reporting 
such pain, while the child’s observable behavior becomes both an indication that 
a child is in pain and a manifestation of childish inexperience. 
Female pain is another topic where Hippocratic theory runs against social 
assumptions, although in this case, the assumptions win out. The reduction of 
the locus and operation of female health and disease to the reproductive system 
                                                
274See above, Chapter One. 
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transforms pain from a productive symbol of disease to a – routinely salutary – 
byproduct of necessary change. At the same time we can see how extensively the 
assumed purpose of medicine affects the role of pain. In contrast to the attitude 
of both physicians and patients towards the role of medicine in alleviating pain 
that I highlighted in the Introduction, gynecological medicine was concerned 
with the conception and birth of children.  
Female pain was often, then, figured as an incidental reaction to the real 
issue of misdirected menses, misbehaving womb, or inherently painful 
childbirth. I do not mean to suggest that women were thought to suffer less pains 
than others; rather, the significance of female pain shifts from the physician’s 
purview to the patient’s.  
In fact, a typical Hippocratic physician, if asked, might assert that female 
bodies experience more pain than others. Women, after all, were thought to feel 
less intense, but nevertheless longer, pleasure during orgasm than men, while 
men enjoy a higher intensity of pleasure owing to the swiftness and violence of 
their ejaculation.275 Is it possible that a similar schema was thought to underlie 
pain in men and women? That is, was the female body both more disposed to 
experience pain and less susceptible to the most intense pains? 
The author of Places in Man claims that those parts of the body that are dry 
are more likely to become ill and to suffer more (Places in Man  1.3-8): 
 
[D]iseases arise from the whole body indifferently, although the 
drier component of the body is disposed to become ill and to suffer 
more, the moist component less. For whereas any disease that 
occupies a dry part is fixed and unremitting, one in a moist part 
                                                
275Nature of the Child/Generation 4. 
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flows somewhere else and generally occupies different parts of the 
body at different times; through constantly changing, it has 
interruptions and goes away sooner, and so it is not fixed.276 
 
$#& &+<4-9$2& :!8 !.&$8> d-+02> $+, <]-.$+>· $8 -a& ^4"%$("+&, 
!(B?58> &%<+?> ;91(<T.* 5.@ -Z;;+& !+&G(*&, $8 )a I'"8& _<<+&· $8 -a& 
'A" E& $X ^4"X &%<4-. !L'&?$.0 $( 5.@ +K )*.!.D(*, $8 )’ E& $X I'"X 
)*.w(H, 5.@ $+, <]-.$+> Q;;+$( Q;;+ -9;*<$. cF(*, 5.@ .3(@ 
-($.;;9<<+& :&9!.?<*& !+*G(*, 5.@ TZ<<+& !.D($.*, l<$( +K !(!4'%>. 
 
 
Following this line of argument, then, a body that contains within it more dry 
areas will, when affected in these parts, suffer greater, more continual, and 
longer-lasting pain. 
Men’s flesh, in contrast to women’s and, as we have seen, the elderly, was 
dense and compact and the areas of the body that are not so – the glands – are 
small. The male body does not draw moisture to itself as the woman’s does, 
owing to both the texture of his flesh and the exercise that it undergoes.277 On the 
other hand, women, in particular those who have not experienced childbirth, 
suffer as a result of their looser, softer flesh. Because of its spongy nature the flesh 
of the female body draws excess moisture to itself that must be purged (via 
menstruation in a healthy woman). The looser and softer her flesh, and the 
broader her internal passages, the less her pain during menstruation, childbirth, 
and lochia.278 
While a woman, then, is more easily overloaded with excess humor, 
owing to her regimen and the texture of her flesh, the natural processes of her 
body are nevertheless well equipped to dispatch of such excess humor in a way 
                                                
276Tr. Potter. 
277 Glands 16. 
278 Diseases of Women I 1. 
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that decreases her pain: menstruation, childbirth and lochia all ameliorate future 
pain. Men’s bodies, on the other hand, are neither disposed towards creating and 
drawing excess blood, nor are they, however, equipped to dispose of excess 
humor when it arises in disease (or, more properly, when it is disease). 
Women are more liable to pain than men, while men, when they are in 
pain, suffer from greater pains than women.  
I have shown how the pain experienced in a “marked” body was analyzed 
and understood in the context of the patient's age or sex; pain was explained, 
treated and situated within the context of “young,” “old,” or “female,” before or 
instead of contextualizing the phenomenon according to other criteria, such as 
environment, regimen, or constitution. Just as the unmarked (i.e. adult male) 
body, may have been susceptible to more severe and stubborn pains, so too did 
the owner of such a body enjoy a greater variety of contexts in which to impart 
meaning to pain.  
In many respects, the adult male is the least "visible" category of body in 
the Hippocratic Corpus. After all, women have entire treatises devoted to their 
peculiar diseases. Parthenoi, as well, have their own tract, while infants and 
children are accorded special prominence in many treatises (not to mention Seven 
and Eight Months’ Child). Yet there are no “men’s diseases.”279 When the bodies of 
men are discussed explicitly, it is generally as a corollary to a more in depth 
explication of women’s bodies. In other cases, it is difficult to distinguish "male" 
qualities from human qualities. The adult male body, in other words, was  the 
                                                
279 Despite the tongue-in-cheek comment of the author of Diseases of Women I that physicians often 
make mistakes when treating women under the assumption that they are suffering from the 
“diseases of men.” On the statement, see Manuli 1983, 186 and Hanson 1989, 38. 
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“norm” and, as such, received very little attention in its own right. On the 
surface, then, it is difficult to add much more to the picture of “adult male pain" 
that has not been discussed in previous chapters. However, it is possible to gain a 
more individualized view of the adult male’s experience of pain by taking into 
consideration the great number factors that could mark a male body. In fact, the 
pain of a "normal" male was more likely to have been understood in the context 
of a large variety of factors, including not just the season, district, and 
constitution that so many Hippocratic authors claim as significant, but also socio-
economic or foreign status, regimen, complexion, and even baldness.280 
While generalized statements about the human body could conceivably 
refer to both men and women, on several occasions such generalized statements 
are clearly in reference to males alone. For example, the author of Airs, Waters, 
Places states that a dry season, while harmful to the bilious is beneficial for those 
who are phlegmatic, humid, or women.281 In this case, because all women are 
thought to be wet, regardless of constitution, the entire sex is treated as a 
monolithic category. Men, on the other hand, can be further individualized 
within their category. Their bodies can be humid, phlegmatic, or bilious, with 
varying results. This statement about the effects of a dry season on the humid, 
phlegmatic, and bilious, we must conclude, refers only to men.282 
That authors go out of their way to indicate when both men and women 
should be understood as the subject of such statements, furthermore, highlights 
                                                
280 However, for the notion that the constitutions of the Epidemics consider both male and female 
bodies under the rubric of environmental factors, see Hanson 1989, esp. 39: “Being women is a 
less unifying factor in the etiology and nosology than is climatic exposure.” 
281 Airs, Waters, Places 10.60-70. 
282 This attitude of "all women, some men" is also to be found at, e.g., Airs, Waters, Places 10.16-44. 
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how most of “general” medicine is really just “adult male” medicine.283  
Furthermore, the inverse (statements that don’t specifically include women) also 
reinforce this conclusion: e.g. those with moist noses and semen are said to be 
healthy.284 
Thus, there is plenty of evidence to support the supposition that female 
bodies may not have been specified beyond sex. For example, Hippocratic 
physicians rarely take enslaved status into account when treating women: the 
fact that a woman’s body was female was enough explanation for her pain and 
disease).285 On the other hand, there is every reason to assume that men – by 
virtue of possessing unmarked bodies – were thought to be subject to the full 
array of variables that affect the body in health and disease. So, while a woman’s 
reproductive function – parturition and menstruation – may have provided 
physicians with an additional means of "seeing" inside her body, her pains and 
sufferings were analyzed in the broader context of “female.” Men may have 
lacked these additional comparanda, but they gained, as we have seen, more 
opportunities for individualized contextualization of their sufferings.286 
                                                
283 I.e. Epidemics VI 4.11: "those who always ate beans, men and women; and Prorrhetic II 31: "those 
with a poor complexion … both men and women." 
284 Epidemics VI 6.8. See also  Epidemics III 3.14, Aphorisms 3.14, 3.11. and Regimen in Acute Diseases 
(Appendix) 9.27-33. 
285 Demand 1998 has proven quite effectively that, unlike what is to be found in Aristotle, the 
Hippocratics did not distinguish between “enslaved” and “not-enslaved” so much as they 
distinguished between “male” and “female.” McKeown 2002 follows Demand on the whole, 
although he adduces evidence that the Hippocratics were aware of the “occupational hazards” of 
slavery. 
286 However, see Epidemics VI 6.8, discussed above, for evidence that semen, too, could function as 
a marker of health and disease as much as menses. In addition, it is not the case that women were 
incapable of being considered, e.g. phlegmatic. Barrenness (Diseases of Women III) 226, Diseases of 
Women I 9, 18, 26, 29, 82, Diseases of Women II 134 and Nature of Woman 22 and 33 all reference 
bilious or phlegmatic women. However, both Nature of Woman 106 and Diseases of Women I 8.3 
instruct the physician to determine whether a woman’s menses are bilious or phlegmatic, while 
Nature of the Child/Generation 55 mentions a phlegmatic uterus. This suggests that even when a 
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Male pain was both useful to the physician as a meaningful symptom of 
disease and, when contextualized, understood within a greater variety of 
circumstances. “Marked” pain, on the other hand, was not as relevant to the 
physician: female pain loses semiotic currency while at the same time gaining 
more meaning for the patient; geriatric pain is both less likely and less treatable; 
the pain of the child must be assumed, but can it be trusted? 
                                                
woman’s body may have been particularized, this particularization may have only focused on the 
"sexed" elements of her body. 
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AFTERWORD 
 
This dissertation has made two broad claims: first, that Hippocratic pain was 
unwaveringly material and objective and, secondly, that the clash between this 
theory of objective pain and the actual inherent subjectivity of the pain 
experience prevented any kind of tidy categorization or taxonomy of pain, 
despite Hippocratic impulses in that direction. 
Thus, we have seen the material etiology of pain engender a productive 
semiotic system (Chapter Two) and we have witnessed how the obstinate belief 
in the objectivity of the pain mechanism results in both material explanations for 
different pain experiences and the odd notions of de facto fetal pain, mild or 
nonexistent geriatric pain, and salubrious female pain (Chapter Four). 
At the same time, however, the Hippocratics are both inconsistent in their 
definition of the relationship between pain and peccant material (Chapter One) 
or between pain and disease (Chapter Two), and frustratingly labile when it 
comes to the meaning or value of the dimensions of pain they insist are relevant 
(Chapter Three). Furthermore, there is the distinct possibility that the theoretical 
insistence on the objectivity of pain went to pieces in the face of practical 
consideration of bodily variation (Chapter Four). Hippocratic pain may have 
been objective, but, tied as the phenomenon was to material imbalance, if every 
human body was assumed to be composed of an idiosyncratic mixture of 
constituents, it follows that everyone’s pain was different.  
The only reality of pain that obtains in all cultures is its inconsistency: pain 
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actually is subjective. The history of pain could very well be rewritten as the 
struggle to come to terms, consciously or not, with this fact. Furthermore, that 
modern medicine now acknowledges the subjectivity of pain does not mean that 
it has “solved” the problem of pain. Physicians, after all, still find the symptom of 
pain to be too useful to ignore, despite the fact that pain assessment tools are far 
from perfect.287 In highlighting the limitations of the Hippocratic approach to 
pain, then, I do not mean to suggest that Hippocratic pain “failed,” so much as to 
celebrate that, inasmuch as all medical attempts to make sense of pain are 
uniquely deficient, Hippocratic pain was “wrong” in particularly interesting 
ways – ways that both arose from and then reinforced the very foundations of 
Hippocratic theory. 
                                                
287Reviews of pain assessment tools include Duhn and Medves 2004, Williamson and Hoggart 
2005, and Zwakhalen et al. 2006. 
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